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Preface
The present thesis is a collection of essays written at the University of Kiel dur-
ing my period as a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Economics. Chapters
1, 3, and 4 are joint work with Till Requate. Chapter 1 has been submitted
for publication to Energy and Resource Economics, where it is currently in the
second revision process. Chapters 3 and 4 are based on a policy report entitled
Emission Permits and Competition commissioned by the Directorate for Finan-
cial and Enterprise Affairs of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Lastly, Chapter 2 is joint work with Leonardo Morales-
Arias. On the following pages I will provide a general introduction motivating
the thesis topic and highlighting the research questions and main results of each
chapter. After the last chapter I will present some general conclusions and policy
recommendations.
1
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged by now that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
will cause increasingly adverse impacts on the earth’s climate, ranging from rising
global mean air and sea temperatures to an increase in natural disasters such as
floods or draughts. According to the various assessment reports published by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1990, these climatic
impacts will entail a variety of negative socioeconomic effects such as declining
productivity of ecosystems, loss of human settlement areas, and implications for
health (cf. IPCC, 2007). In 1992, when the United Nations proclaimed the goal
of stabilizing the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that
prevents dangerous anthropogenic disruptions of the earth’s climate, combating
global climate change moved to the center of international environmental policy
debates. Since then, a wide array of policy instruments has been put into practice
aiming at limiting the increase in greenhouse gas emissions, in particular the
emissions of CO2.
These policy instruments can be broadly summarized in two categories. The
first set of instruments applies to emissions directly by either defining a total
emission cap or charging a price for emissions. The second set of instruments
takes a more indirect approach by aiming at increasing the share of renewable
energies, improving energy efficiency, or both, to reduce the use of fossil fuels and
thus emissions in energy production. While the instruments in the first category
define the reduction of emissions as the major policy goal, the instruments in the
second category usually also follow other goals such as guaranteeing the security
of energy supply and promoting innovation in the renewable energy industry.
The instruments summarized in the first category are emission taxes and
tradable emission allowances. In the case of emission taxes the regulator defines
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a price to be paid for each unit of pollution. In the case of emission allowances
the regulator sets an overall emission limit and creates a market where emission
allowances, each valid for one unit of pollution, can be traded. The introduction
of a price or a cap on emissions has important repercussions for energy-producing
and energy-intensive industries, since it turns CO2 emissions from a free into a
costly production factor and thus affects the production decisions of the firms.
Under this kind of regulation, emitters required to pay a tax on their emissions
or to hold a corresponding number of allowances will take their emission and
abatement decisions by comparing their marginal abatement cost with the tax
rate or the allowance price, respectively. In the most simple case, i.e. when
there are no market imperfections, emission taxes and tradable allowances are
equivalent and lead to an economically efficient result, implying that the total
social cost of the policy is minimized.
Popular instruments in the second category are feed-in tariffs and tradable
green certificates for renewable energies. Feed-in tariffs are production subsidies
paid for electricity generated from renewable energy sources such as wind and
solar power. In most currently implemented feed-in tariff systems, the tariffs are
differentiated according to the production costs of the alternative renewable tech-
nologies, where the most expensive technology receives the highest tariff. The
rationale is that most renewable energy technologies cannot compete on equal
terms with conventional fossil-fuel and nuclear energies and would therefore not
be able to penetrate the market without additional funding. However, the fact
that the most inefficient technologies obtain the highest subsidy often leads to
excessive costs associated with this policy. A more cost-efficient alternative in
promoting renewable energies is the implementation of a tradable green certifi-
cate system. Similar to tradable emission allowances, such a system is based on
setting a total quota for renewable energy, for instance in electricity production.
In addition to selling electricity at the wholesale price, producers of renewable
energies can sell certificates on the green certificate market to recover the addi-
tional costs incurred by producing renewable energy. Since a unique market price
for green certificates is established, inefficient technologies will not be successful
in the market. Therefore, green certificates imply lower total social costs than
technology-specific feed-in tariffs. They are, however, still inefficient in abating
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CO2 emissions compared to the instruments in the first category. Indeed, the dif-
ference in marginal abatement costs of using renewable technologies such as wind
and solar power and marginal abatement costs of traditional measures typically
induced by emission taxes and allowances such as fuel switching and efficiency im-
provements is huge. For Germany, Frondel et al. (2010) and IEA (2007) currently
estimate marginal abatement costs in the order of 700 and 1000e/ton CO2, re-
spectively, for photovoltaic and 50e/ton CO2 for wind power. By contrast, since
the introduction of the European emissions trading scheme in 2005, the allowance
price has never exceeded the value 30e/ton CO2.
In most countries there is not only one single climate policy goal but rather
a wide array of different subgoals, including targets for CO2 emissions, the share
of renewable energies, particular renewable-energy technologies, the energy effi-
ciency in different industries and sectors, and the share of biofuels in transport.
To accomplish these different objectives most climate policies consist of a pol-
icy mix containing a combination of the above-mentioned instruments. However,
combining different policy instruments may lead to overlapping regulations that
usually give rise to distortions harming both the effectiveness, i.e. the ability of
an instrument to reach the desired policy objective, and the economic efficiency
of the policy. For instance, feed-in tariffs and other instruments promoting the
production of electricity from emission-free sources are not compatible with emis-
sions trading. The reason is that, due to the cap on total emissions defined by
the emissions trading system, additional measures to reduce CO2 will only reduce
the market price for emission allowances but not the amount of allowances and
thus emissions in the system. Therefore, if the policy objective is the reduction
of CO2 emissions, the only effect of renewable energy policies will be to distort
cost efficiency without creating any additional emission reductions. If, on the
other hand, there are other policy objectives besides reducing CO2 emissions, an
emission tax is more compatible with renewable energy policies than emissions
trading. Since the tax rate is fixed, emission reductions achieved through the pro-
duction of renewable energies will not be offset by increasing emissions in other
sectors.
In the present thesis, I study several of the above-mentioned policy instru-
ments for carbon mitigation with a particular focus on subsidies for renewable
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energies, emission taxes, and tradable emission allowances by means of theoreti-
cal, empirical, and policy-oriented approaches. In the first chapter, I contribute
to the analysis on overlapping regulations in emission and renewable energy poli-
cies by studying the optimal design and the welfare implications of two policy
combinations consisting of (i) an emission tax for conventional fossil-fuel utilities
combined with a subsidy for the producers of renewable energy equipment and
(ii) an emission tax combined with a feed-in tariff for electricity produced from re-
newable sources. For this purpose, I consider a model with two types of electricity
producers, an oligopolistic sector of polluting fossil-fuel utilities and a competi-
tive fringe of non-polluting generators of electricity from renewable energy sources
(RES-E), and an oligopolistic upstream industry of RES-E equipment producers
engaged in learning by doing.
To preview some of the results in the first chapter with policy relevance I
show that a first-best optimal policy requires two instruments, a tax in the fossil-
fuel sector and an output subsidy for RES-E equipment producers. In the case
that first-best optimal taxes are not available to the regulator, I derive second-
best optimal feed-in tariffs paid to the generators of renewable electricity. By
means of simulations I find that even under optimistic assumptions concerning
the learning and spill-over rates in the renewable energy industry the learning
effects have a small impact on social welfare compared to the impact of market
power and pollution in the fossil-fuel sector. In particular, I show that if the
regulator implements an emission tax amounting to only half of the optimal value,
the welfare loss of a second-best optimal feed-in tariff policy will be significantly
lower compared to a pure feed-in tariff policy. If first-best optimal emission taxes
are feasible, the welfare effects of an additional second-best optimal feed-in tariff
for renewable energies will even be almost zero. Moreover, in contrast to most
currently implemented feed-in tariff policies including decreasing feed-in rates
over time, the numerical results potentially call for a short-term decrease in feed-
in tariff levels but a long-term increase in those levels as electricity markets are
progressively liberalized. I therefore suggest that increasing the price for CO2
emission would be a superior strategy, since higher costs of CO2 and an expected
decline in the share of nuclear electricity would lead to increasing electricity prices
5
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and renewable energies would become more competitive and gain higher market
shares even without subsidies.
The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of the empirical interrelation-
ships between European emission allowance prices and prices for electricity, hard
coal, and natural gas with an application to portfolio allocation. The motivation
for this analysis arises from the fact that the introduction of an emission cap has
important repercussions for energy-producing and energy-intensive industries in
Europe. The emission constraint imposed on the European firms does not only
directly affect the production costs of the firms, but also has indirect effects due
to both rising electricity prices and relative changes in the prices of fuels with dif-
ferent emission intensities, particularly coal and natural gas. Therefore, optimal
decision making requires a deep understanding of the CO2 price dynamics and
its interaction with other relevant commodity prices through the energy market.
In particular, I propose a Vector Error Correction model (VECM) taking into ac-
count the (potential) long-run equilibrium relationship between electricity, emis-
sion allowance, gas, and coal prices, their short-run interactions, and exogenous
factors such as temperature and rainfall indices, seasonal effects, crude oil prices,
and economic growth rates. By means of an orthogonalized Generalized Autore-
gressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) error specification I identify
the contemporaneous relationship between CO2 and energy returns without im-
posing a-priori restrictions on the contemporaneous parameters. This approach
is very useful to analyze, for instance, the impact of unexpected shocks on the en-
dogenous variables. In addition to the analysis of the dynamic interrelationships
between the emission allowance and energy returns, I study the performance of
the empirical model in a dynamic portfolio allocation setting.
To preview some of the results in the second chapter with policy relevance I
find that in the long run CO2, gas, and coal prices are positively related to the
price for electricity. By contrast, in the short run EUA prices seem to mitigate
the impact of increasing coal prices on the electricity price. This is an expected
effect indicating that increasing costs for coal-based electricity production will
reduce demand for emissions and allowance prices. In the case of increasing
natural gas prices the dampening effect on electricity prices via the allowance
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price is not evident, indicating the possibility of fuel-switching from less emission-
intensive gas to more emission-intensive coal. This result is interesting for policy
makers since in the alternative case of regulating CO2 emissions through taxes, a
dampening effect on the wholesale electricity price would not occur. The results
of the portfolio allocation application show that an investor holding a portfolio
of the four commodities and a risk-free asset can improve the performance of his
portfolio by engaging in dynamic trading strategies compared to a static trading
strategy. This result can be relevant for financial investors and potentially also for
firms wishing to hedge against price risks in their energy and emission commodity
portfolio.
In the Chapters 3 and 4, I discuss further policy-related issues of emissions
trading. One important question arising in the context of emissions trading,
which is less pressing in the case of emission taxes, concerns the potential for
market manipulations by firms holding a dominant position in the emission mar-
ket, the output market, or both. For instance, dominant firms in the emission
market may try to manipulate allowance prices to their advantage either by hold-
ing down supply or suppressing demand for allowances. Alternatively, dominant
firms may try to abuse the allowance market to put their competitors in the out-
put market at disadvantage. Finally, emission markets are not immune against
illegal agreements and the formation of seller or buyer cartels. In Chapter 3 I
therefore analyze the different forms of market power and their potential abuse
in emission allowance markets and review the available empirical evidence on
market manipulations in different emissions trading systems worldwide.
To preview some of the results in the third chapter with policy relevance I
argue that the risk of abusing market power in emission markets is lower when
the markets are sufficiently large and encompass firms from different sectors, the
trading procedure is transparent, and there is a unique allowance price. In princi-
ple, this result holds independently of whether emission allowances are allocated
for free or auctioned off. However, auctions might be more susceptible to bid
shading and collusion than free allocation since it is clear a priori which firms are
large buyers of allowances. Therefore, it is crucial to apply auction procedures
preventing such behavior. Finally, applying emissions trading to small-scale pol-
lution problems with only a small number of participants should not be ruled out
7
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per se. However, since the potential for market power is larger in small emis-
sion markets, these markets require a stricter surveillance by competition and
anti-trust authorities.
Another important source of competitive distortions arising from emissions
trading systems may be attributed to unequal emission regulations across in-
dustries, sectors, regions, or countries. In particular, firms that are subject to
tighter emission caps and thus face higher allowance prices may be at a compet-
itive disadvantage compared to firms that are subject to less strict regulations.
Moreover, in the international climate policy context many countries are either
reluctant to impose unilateral emission limits at all or apply special provisions to
protect their national industries from losing competitiveness on the global output
markets. The different stringency of environmental policies worldwide may also
give rise to carbon leakage if energy-intensive production is shifted to countries
with less strict emission targets or none at all. The fourth chapter therefore an-
alyzes competitive distortions arising from uneven conditions (i) between firms,
industries, and jurisdictions regulated under the same emissions trading scheme,
(ii) between industries in one jurisdiction regulated under different policy instru-
ments, and (iii) between countries with different environmental regulations.
To preview some of the results in the fourth chapter with policy relevance
I argue that the problem of competitive distortions due to unequal conditions
within the same emissions trading system can best be solved through an auction-
ing system for allowances. Concerning the issues of international competitiveness
and carbon leakage, I suggest that the countermeasures currently proposed to
mitigate the adverse impacts of unilateral climate policies are highly imperfect,
since they are almost ineffective in avoiding the indirect impact of emission poli-
cies on global energy prices. The empirical evidence on competitiveness effects
arising from emissions trading in the energy-intensive industries indicates that,
although it is not a general problem, it indeed affects certain industries more
than others. This result is contingent on free allocation of allowances and might
change if a larger share of allowances is auctioned off. The estimated carbon
leakage effects also show a great variation across sectors, where the leakage rates
may range from almost zero to more than 100 percent. Since leakage rates are
lower when the coalition of countries participating in emissions trading increases,
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the problems related to both international competitiveness and carbon leakage
may best be solved by more and better international policy coordination.
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Chapter 1
Subsidies for renewable energies
in the presence of learning effects
and market power
1.1 Introduction
Alongside issues such as the security of energy supply, the debate on global climate
change and how to mitigate its adverse environmental effects has brought about
political rethinking concerning the current and future use of fossil fuels. As a
result, the promotion of renewable energy sources has become an energy-policy
priority for many OECD economies. For instance, the member states of the
European Union have agreed on binding targets to raise the share of renewable
energies to 20 percent of gross final energy consumption by 2020. In terms of
renewable electricity (RES-E) generation, the EU plans to source 21 percent of
electricity consumption from renewable energy in 2010. Several other OECD
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel, and Korea, as well as
a number of U.S. states have also announced renewable-energy and renewable-
electricity targets with varying degrees of ambition.
Among the different national policies in the European Union, feed-in-tariff
schemes have been particularly effective in promoting the rapid expansion of RES-
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E capacity and production.1 The United States also provides production subsidies
for RES-E.2 A popular argument in favor of subsidy policies such as feed-in tariffs
is the existence of learning effects in the renewable energy industry. A number of
empirical studies indicate that there is considerable potential for cost reductions
through learning by doing in the wind turbine industry, the photovoltaic module
industry, and other RES-E technologies (Gru¨bler et al., 1999; Hansen et al., 2003;
Isoard & Soria, 2001; Junginger et al., 2005; McDonald & Schrattenholzer, 2001;
Neij, 1997, 1999; van der Zwaan & Rabl, 2004). If this is the case, the allocation of
subsidies is justified in the early stages of renewable resource use, as such subsidies
encourage learning by doing and enable renewable energy producers to realize
cost savings by moving downward on their learning curves. Without subsidies,
these technologies would not be able to compete with fossil-fuel utilities. It is
further argued that once learning has occurred and firms have eventually achieved
competitiveness, the subsidies should be cut back.
From an economic viewpoint, however, public policy intervention is justi-
fied only if learning by doing generates spill-over effects benefiting other market
participants without compensation. The spill-overs thus represent positive exter-
nalities that, together with the negative externalities through pollution, lead to
an undersupply of new pollution-reducing technologies by the market (Helm &
Scho¨ttner, 2008; Jaffe et al., 2005).
The model we develop in this chapter is based on three main strands in the
literature. The first of these strands can be traced back to the seminal work by
Buchanan (1976) and concerns the allocative inefficiency of Pigouvian emission
taxes for imperfectly competitive firms. In the context of an imperfect market
structure, there is a trade-off between the social gain from emission abatement
and the social loss from monopolistic or oligopolistic output restriction, which
1The highest feed-in-tariff rates are currently paid in Germany, where producers of onshore
wind power installations are granted e0.092 per kWh during the first five years of operation
(or more, depending on the efficiency of the installation) and the base rate of e0.052 per kWh
subsequently. In the case of photovoltaic power the tariff for modules installed in 2009 lies
between e0.32 and e0.43 per kWh.
2At the federal level, the Renewable Energy Production Incentive offers $0.015 per kWh
of renewable energy generation, denoted in 1993 US-$ and indexed for inflation. Moreover,
around 40 incentive programs are currently established in individual states, utilities, and
through non-profit cooperations (cf. Database of state incentives for renewables and efficiency,
http://www.dsireusa.org/index.cfm).
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the regulator has to take into account when setting the tax rate (Barnett, 1980;
Lee, 1975).
Second, there is a growing literature studying environmental policies in the
presence of imperfectly competitive eco-industries (Canton et al., 2008; David
& Sinclair-Desgagne´, 2005, 2010; David et al., 2011; Requate, 2005). The term
’eco-industries’ is used to refer to providers of abatement goods and services, such
as the producers of RES-E equipment discussed in the present chapter. Assum-
ing the polluting sector to be perfectly competitive David & Sinclair-Desgagne´
(2010) find that a first-best policy consists of a combination of pollution taxes
and abatement subsidies.
The third strand analyzes the impacts of learning by doing and learning spill-
overs on output, prices, and industrial structure. This large body of literature
considers both monopolistic and oligopolistic markets (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1983;
Spence, 1981) and perfectly competitive industries (Ghemawat & Spence, 1985;
Petrakis et al., 1997). According to Spence (1981), the main determinants of
costs and firm performance in the presence of learning by doing are the learning
rate, the extent to which the firm’s costs decline through learning, the degree
of learning spill-overs, and demand elasticity. Fudenberg & Tirole (1983) focus
on the strategic interaction of firms in the presence of learning by doing when
firms correctly anticipate the effect of their learning on their rivals’ actions. In
the context of environmental-economic models, the effects of learning by doing
on the timing and total quantity of pollution abatement and on optimal policy
instruments such as emission taxes and/or abatement subsidies have been studied
by Goulder & Mathai (2000) for a single abatement technology and by Bramoulle´
& Olson (2005) for heterogeneous abatement technologies. However, neither of
these studies considers the possibility of learning spill-overs, which represent an
additional market failure as they lead to a divergence of social and private returns
on learning by doing. In a recent paper, Fischer & Newell (2008) assess different
policies for reducing CO2 emissions and promoting renewable energy in the pres-
ence of technological progress through learning, R&D, and knowledge spill-overs.
They conclude that in a perfect-competition framework an optimal portfolio of
policy options will include an emissions price and subsidies for technological R&D
and learning.
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In this chapter we shall not consider technological progress through R&D but
instead focus on the effects of learning and learning spill-overs in an imperfect-
competition framework. In particular, we take account of the vertical struc-
ture of the renewable energy industry by assuming an upstream sector of RES-E
equipment producers and a downstream sector of RES-E producers that buy the
equipment and sell electricity to the consumers. Firms in the upstream sector can
lower their costs through learning by doing, i.e. private learning and/or learn-
ing spill-overs. Furthermore, the producers of renewable electricity compete with
conventional, fossil-fuel electricity producers. In the framework of a two-period
model we assess two policy options: (a) an optimal policy consisting of an emis-
sion tax combined with an output subsidy for RES-E equipment producers, and
(b) a feed-in-tariff policy where a subsidy is paid to the producers of RES-E.
We assume the fossil-fuel industry to form a Cournot oligopoly, with an exoge-
nously given number of firms. This is a realistic representation of the European
and other OECD countries’ electricity markets, which are usually dominated by
a small number of large utilities. For the upstream RES-E equipment industry
we consider both the case of perfect and imperfect (quantity) competition in the
upstream market.3 The findings of Petrakis et al. (1997) indicate that, in the
case of purely private learning, subsidies for RES-E producers should only take
account of environmental damage but are not necessary to spur learning. In our
model market power in the fossil-fuel and RES-E equipment industries creates
additional distortions that the regulator has to take into account when deciding
on subsidies for RES-E.
In the optimal policy the tax in both periods corrects for the marginal damage
caused by pollution and for oligopolistic competition. With perfect competition
3The prevailing market structure in the RES-E equipment market is not so obvious. For
example, the six market leaders in the wind turbine industry Vestas (Denmark), GE Wind
(United States), Gamesa (Spain), Enercon (Germany), Suzlon (India), and Siemens (Denmark)
accounted for 85 percent of the world market in 2008, but smaller expanding players such
as Sinovel (China), Acciona (Spain), Goldwind (China), and Nordex (Germany) are stepping
up competition in the market for wind turbines (BTM Consult, 2009). However, many wind
turbine manufacturers are still mainly active in their domestic market and a few neighboring
markets in the same region (Lewis & Wiser, 2007). For instance, Enercon, Vestas, and Siemens
supply over 50 percent of the German, Dutch, and UK markets, respectively, Suzlon almost 70
percent of the Indian market, and GE Wind over 40 percent of the U.S. market (BTM Consult,
2009).
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in the RES-E equipment industry, the optimal subsidy in the first period only
takes account of the learning spill-overs neglected by the firms. In the case of
an oligopoly of RES-E equipment firms, an optimal subsidy should also target
the strategic effects induced by imperfect competition. Assuming that first-best
levels of policy instruments are ruled out for political reasons, we then study
a situation where subsidies are paid to the generators of renewable electricity,
mimicking the common feed-in-tariff policy approach. We show that the second-
best feed-in tariffs take account of environmental damage, distortions through
market power and learning spill-overs. However, they perform much worse than
first-best policies. A sensitivity analysis shows that both the ability of firms to
learn via increase in their level of output and the size of the learning spill-overs
have little impact on the performance of second-best optimal feed-in tariffs. The
main factor with an impact on efficiency is the elasticity of electricity demand:
the less elastic the demand, the higher the welfare loss of a second-best optimal
feed-in-tariff policy will be in comparison with the first-best alternative. We also
show that liberalization of electricity markets makes for decreasing feed-in tariffs
in the short run but will raise these tariffs in the long run (when demand is more
elastic).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section
we will set up the model. Section 1.3 will analyze the maximization problem
of the social planner. In Section 1.4 we will illustrate the optimal policy in a
decentralized economy. Section 1.5 will analyze a feed-in-tariff policy and derive
the second-best optimal levels of the feed-in tariffs. We will then use a numerical
example to investigate the effects of market structure on the size of feed-in tariffs
and analyze the welfare effects of different policy combinations. Section 1.6 will
summarize the results and draw some policy conclusions.
1.2 The model
We study a stylized electricity market with an exogenously given number of m
identical oligopolistic fossil-fuel utilities engaging in quantity (Cournot) competi-
tion and a competitive fringe of RES-E producers with a continuum of firms. For
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simplicity we assume that the fossil-fuel utilities use a unique, mature technol-
ogy generating emissions of a single homogeneous pollutant. Output by a typical
conventional utility is denoted by ki. Its cost function is given by K(ki) and it
has positive and increasing marginal costs, i.e. K ′(ki) > 0 and K ′′(ki) > 0. Total
output from fossil-fuel utilities is then given by Qf =
m∑
i=1
ki. Due to symmetry
of the firms, total output of fossil-fuel utilities will be equal to mk in a social
optimum and in market equilibrium, and therefore Qf = mk. For simplicity we
assume that emissions are proportional to the use of fossil-fuel inputs. Through
appropriate choice of the social damage function we can write the damage as a
function of the fossil-fuel utilities’ output, i.e. D(Qf ), with positive and constant
or increasing marginal damage, i.e. D′(Qf ) > 0 and D′′(Qf ) ≥ 0.
The generation of RES-E is emission-free and RES-E firms are heterogeneous.
Their cost function is represented by C(q, x˜), where q denotes output and x˜ is
a location parameter. This parameter reflects the assumption that the produc-
tion cost of the RES-E generators depends on the location of their installations,
e.g. wind turbines or solar panels. For instance, electricity produced by wind
turbines is more effective and thus less costly at coastal sites, where the wind
blows more steadily than at sites further into the countryside. In the case of
solar panels, electricity production is more effective at sites with stronger solar
radiation than at more cloudy sites. Besides being more realistic than simply
assuming the downstream firms to be symmetric, this assumption also induces
a nicely downward-sloping inverse demand function for RES-E equipment. The
cost function of the RES-E producers satisfies Cq > 0, Cx˜ > 0, Cqq > 0, Cqx˜ > 0
for q < q¯, where q¯ is the maximal capacity, for instance, of a wind turbine.
Marginal costs are positive and increasing in both output and the location pa-
rameter. The increasing marginal cost can be explained by maintenance costs.
The better is the maintenance the higher is the efficiency and the lower is the
probability of default. We further assume that limq→q¯ Cq(q, x) = ∞. In other
words, perfect maintenance becomes prohibitively expensive. Moreover, to guar-
antee that second-order conditions are satisfied, we assume overall convexity of
the cost function, implying Cx˜x˜ > 0 and CqqCx˜x˜ − [Cqx˜]2 > 0.
Besides the producers of electricity, we consider an upstream sector of RES-E
equipment producers with an exogenously given number of n symmetric firms,
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characterized by their cost functions. Since we assume that RES-E equipment
producers engage in learning by doing, we have to consider at least two periods
t = 1, 2. Hence, we let Γ1(y1i)and Γ
2(y2i, Li) denote upstream firm i’s cost in
period 1 and 2, respectively, where yti is firm i’s output level in t = 1, 2. A
firm’s cost in t = 1 is solely determined by its own output, while in t = 2 costs
also depend on a variable Li representing the experience gathered by firm i. The
experience in the second period depends on firm i’s own level of production in the
first period y1i (private learning) but also on the other firms’ aggregate output
in the past multiplied by the degree of learning spill-overs (ε). Thus experience
is given by Li = y1i +
∑
j=1,j 6=i εy1j. For ε = 0 learning is purely private, while
for ε = 1 there are complete learning spill-overs, implying that for a single firm
it does not matter whether it produces one additional unit itself or whether the
other firms do so.4 In a symmetric allocation the aggregate experience is the
same for each firm, i.e.
L = [1 + (n− 1)ε]y1. (1.1)
The cost function of the RES-E equipment producers satisfies the following
properties: Γtyt > 0, Γ
t
ytyt > 0, i.e. positive and increasing marginal costs in
output, and Γ2L < 0, Γ
2
Ly2
< 0, i.e. lower costs and marginal costs in the second
period due to learning by doing. Further we assume that Γ2LL > 0, implying
that the marginal effect of learning is decreasing. To guarantee satisfaction of
second-order conditions we again assume overall convexity of Γ2 through
Condition 1 : Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2
− [Γ2Ly]2 > 0.
Condition 1 implies that the ”own-convexity” effect dominates the cross-effect
and also guarantees satisfaction of the second-order conditions for both the social
optimum and the firms profit maximum under decentralized decision making.
For simplicity we assume that each downstream firm buys only one RES-E
equipment unit, e.g. one wind turbine, per period. Since the downstream firms
are asymmetric, we denote the output of firm x˜ by qt(x˜). Furthermore, we use
X to represent the marginal location above which the downstream firms do not
4There is little empirical evidence on the size of spill-over effects in the renewable energy
industry. One of the few studies in field is by Irwin & Klenow (1994) who estimate a spill-over
coefficient of about ε = 0.33 in the semiconductor industry.
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produce. Therefore, due to Cx˜ > 0 and Cqx˜ > 0, it is efficient that all firms
with x˜ < X produce if the firm at location X produces. This argument is also
consistent with the behavior of the downstream firms in a decentralized economy.
If it is profitable for the marginal firm at location X to produce, the same must
hold for any x˜ < X. We can also interpret X as the total number of RES-E
equipment producers in the market in each period t, so in a symmetric allocation
Xt = nyt (1.2)
represents the total output of RES-E equipment and hence the total capacity
installed in t. Total output by fossil-fuel electricity generators in period t is given
by Qft = mkt and total ”clean” electricity by Q
c
t =
∫ Xt
0
qt(x˜)dx˜ such that overall
total output is
Qt = Q
f
t +Q
c
t = mkt +
∫ Xt
0
qt(x˜)dx˜. (1.3)
We denote demand for electricity by a downward-sloping inverse demand function
pt = Pt(Qt) (1.4)
satisfying P ′′t (Qt)Qt + P
′
t(Qt) < 0, implying that the inverse demand function is
not too convex. Anticipating a symmetric allocation, we are now ready to define
welfare as
W =
∫ Q1
0
P1(Q)dQ−mK1(k1)−
∫ X1
0
C1(q1(x˜), x˜)dx˜
− nΓ1(y1)−D1(mk1) + δ
[∫ Q2
0
P2(Q)dQ−mK2(k2)
−
∫ X2
0
C2(q2(x˜), x˜)dx˜− nΓ2(y2, L)−D2(mk2)
]
,
(1.5)
where δ denotes the discount factor.
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1.3 The social optimum
Before we study the optimal policy instruments, it is useful to characterize socially
optimal allocations. The social planner maximizes welfare with respect to qt(x˜),
kt, and yt. The first-order conditions are given by the following equations:
Wqt = Pt(Qt)− Ctq(qt(x˜), x˜) = 0, t = 1, 2, x˜ ∈ [0, Xt], (1.6)
Wkt = Pt(Qt)−K ′t(kt)−D′t(mkt) = 0, t = 1, 2, (1.7)
Wy1 = P1(Q1)q1(X1)− C1(q1(X1), X1)− Γ1y1(y1)
−δ[Γ2L(y2, L)(1 + (n− 1)ε)] = 0, (1.8)
Wy2 = P2(Q2)q2(X2)− C2(q2(X2), X2)− Γ2y2(y2, L) = 0. (1.9)
The interpretation of the conditions for a welfare maximum is straightforward:5
(1.6) requires that the optimal price of electricity, corresponding to the con-
sumers’ marginal willingness to pay, must be equal to marginal costs in the
RES-E generation sector in each period, while (1.7) implies that in every pe-
riod the marginal willingness to pay must equal the sum of marginal costs and
marginal damage for the fossil-fuel firms. As (1.6) holds for all x˜ < Xt, it
also determines the optimal number of RES-E equipment units in each period.
Note that P (Q)q(X) − C(q(X), X) represents society’s marginal willingness to
pay for RES-E equipment. Therefore, (1.8) and (1.9) imply that this marginal
willingness to pay equals the marginal costs of RES-E equipment producers in
each period. Equations (1.8) and (1.9) thus define the optimal individual out-
put levels for the upstream producers. Since learning occurs in t = 1, the ef-
fects on marginal costs of both private learning and learning spill-overs are in-
cluded only in equation (1.8). Due to −Γ2L > 0, (1.8) implies that Γ1y1(y1) >
P1(Q1)q1(X1) − C1(q1(X1), X1). Thus it is optimal to set a production level of
RES-E equipment with marginal cost of production exceeding the private benefit
to consumers in t = 1, because more output in t = 1 decreases the costs of all
other RES-E equipment producers in t = 2.
5Since the welfare function is the sum of concave functions it is also concave and therefore
the second-order conditions are satisfied (Takayama, 1997).
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In this section we consider decentralized decision making and optimal regulation
of markets. Since Cournot-oligopoly is the prevailing market structure on the
electricity markets in most countries, we assume that the fossil-fuel producers act
strategically when choosing their level of output, while the RES-E operators act
as a competitive fringe. Both kinds of electricity producers, however, make their
output decisions simultaneously. Concerning the RES-E equipment producers
the existing market structure is not so obvious. As BTM Consult (2009) reports
for wind energy, in some countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and China
there is quite a large number of wind turbine suppliers, while in other countries
such as India, the Netherlands, and the UK the market is governed by only two
or three firms. In the following, we will first consider the simple case of perfect
competition among the RES-E equipment producers. We will then work out the
differences arising from the more complex case of quantity (Cournot) competition
in the upstream market.
1.4.1 Perfect competition in the RES-E equipment mar-
ket
We anticipate optimal decentralizing policies from the beginning by assuming
the conventional firms to be subject to an emission tax τt in both periods and
the RES-E equipment producers to receive an output subsidy σ1 in the first
period. Since emissions are proportional to output, the emission tax τt can also
be interpreted as an output tax.
The profits of the clean electricity producers (c), the conventional electricity
firms (f), and the RES-E equipment producers (e) are given by
pic(qt(x˜), x˜) = Pt(Qt)qt(x˜)− Ct(qt(x˜), x˜)− bt, t = 1, 2, x˜ ∈ [0, Xt], (1.10)
pif (kt) = Pt(Qt)kt −Kt(kt)− τtkt, t = 1, 2, (1.11)
pie(y1, y2) = [b1 + σ1]y1 − Γ1(y1) + δ
[
b2y2 − Γ2(y2, L)
]
. (1.12)
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Here bt represents the competitive price for RES-E equipment. The first-order
condition for profit maximization of the clean electricity producers is then
Pt(Qt)− Ctq(qt(x˜), x˜) = 0, t = 1, 2. (1.13)
The marginal firm Xt in the RES-E equipment sector is determined by the fol-
lowing free-entry zero-profit condition:
Pt(Qt)qt(Xt)− Ct(qt(Xt), Xt)− bt = 0, t = 1, 2, (1.14)
while all intra-marginal firms make positive profits. In equilibrium, the fossil-fuel
utilities take the output levels of their conventional competitors and the RES-E
generators as given. For simplicity we assume that the conventional firms do not
take into account possible strategic effects on the producers of RES-E equipment.
In principle, they could bring down demand for RES-E equipment and thus the
learning effects for the equipment producers by increasing their output in the first
period. However, since the market share of electricity generated by renewable
sources is still small in most countries, we neglect this strategic consideration.
Therefore the behavioral condition of the conventional firms is given by
Pt(Qt) + P
′
t(Qt)kt −K ′t(kt)− τt = 0, t = 1, 2. (1.15)
Equations (1.14) and (1.15) together determine the aggregate output level of
electricity. The behavior of the RES-E equipment producers in the first and
second period is governed by the following two conditions:
b1 + σ1 − Γ1y1(y1)− δΓ2L(y2, L) = 0, (1.16)
b2 − Γ2y2(y2, L) = 0. (1.17)
According to 1.16, the RES-E equipment firms only take into account their private
learning effects when taking their output decisions but neglect the learning spill-
overs. We are now ready to define the optimal levels for the policy instruments in
obtaining the first-best solution. Equating the first-order conditions for a welfare
maximum with the first-order conditions for a profit maximum by the firms and
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solving for the policy instruments yields
τ ∗t = P
′(Q∗t )k
∗
t +D
′
t(mk
∗
t ), t = 1, 2, (1.18)
σ∗1 = −δ(n− 1)εΓ2L(y∗2, L∗). (1.19)
The optimal tax in both periods corrects for the marginal damage caused by pol-
lution and the low level of output due to oligopolistic competition in the fossil-fuel
industry. Accordingly, it is possible for the optimal tax rate to become negative
if |P ′(Q∗t )k∗t | > D′t(mk∗t ). The optimal output subsidy for RES-E equipment
producers in t = 1 accounts for the individually neglected learning spill-overs
imposed on the other (n− 1) firms. We can summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 1 Consider an electricity market with Cournot competition among
polluting utilities, a competitive fringe of electricity suppliers using renewable
energy, and a competitive upstream market of RES-E equipment producers. If
emissions are proportional to output, the first-best allocation can be decentralized
by imposing a tax on emissions (or output) correcting for both the externality
of pollution and the output contraction due to oligopoly power and by paying
a subsidy on RES-E equipment correcting for insufficient public learning. The
emission tax and the subsidy follow the rules (1.18) and (1.19), respectively.
If emissions are not proportional to output, but firms have a separate abate-
ment technology, the emission tax will only correct for the pollution and a separate
output subsidy would be necessary to correct for the output contraction.
1.4.1.1 The impact of market concentration in the fossil-fuel industry
In this section we will analyze the impact of increasing competition in the fossil-
fuel industry on output, prices, and the policy instruments. For this purpose,
we compute the comparative-static effects of increasing the number of fossil-fuel
utilities m by differentiating (1.2)–(1.4) and (1.13)–(1.19) with respect to m and
solving the resulting system of equations for the endogenous variables.6 Clearly, a
higher number of fossil-fuel firms decreases the market share of the single utilities
and increases the total production of fossil-fuel based electricity. As there is less
6The proof is provided in Appendix A.1.
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strategic output contraction and higher pollution, the optimal tax rate τt will
increase in both periods:
∂kt
∂m
< 0,
∂Qft
∂m
> 0,
∂τt
∂m
> 0, t = 1, 2.
Moreover, the electricity generated by the marginal renewable electricity pro-
ducer decreases, so that some green electricity is crowded out of the market:
∂qt(Xt)
∂m
< 0,
∂Qc
∂m
< 0, t = 1, 2.
In contrast to what is often claimed in the public debate, green electricity providers
gain from market power and market concentration in the conventional utility sec-
tor. Overall electricity production from dirty and green firms increases, and the
price for electricity decreases accordingly:
∂Qt
∂m
> 0,
∂pt
∂m
< 0, t = 1, 2.
The crowding-out effect on green electricity production decreases the RES-
E generators’ willingness to pay for RES-E equipment units, so both individual
and aggregate RES-E equipment production decreases, together with the RES-E
equipment price:
∂yt
∂m
< 0,
∂Xt
∂m
< 0,
∂bt
∂m
< 0, t = 1, 2.
The sign of the subsidy rate’s variation in response to market concentration
is ambiguous, so the optimal subsidy policy response to an increasing number of
fossil fuel firms is not straightforward. In order to illustrate this ambiguity, we
construct a numerical example where the optimal subsidy rate either increases or
decreases depending on how strongly the RES-E equipment producers costs are
reduced through learning.7 A possible interpretation could be as follows: Since
the subsidy internalizes the learning spill-overs neglected by the RES-E equipment
firms, decreasing output of RES-E equipment leads to a decrease in learning and
learning spill-overs, resulting in a lower optimal subsidy rate. If, by contrast,
7The numerical example is described in Appendix A.2.
22
1.4 Optimal policy
learning by doing leads to a relatively large reduction of production costs in the
RES-E equipment industry, it is socially optimal to increase the subsidy rate in
order to prevent more crowding-out of RES-E equipment production.
1.4.2 Market power in the RES-E equipment industry
If there is oligopolistic (Cournot) competition in the RES-E equipment sector,
an inverse demand function for RES-E equipment has to be defined. This can be
derived from the zero-profit condition for RES-E producers:
Bt(Xt) = Pt(Qt)qt(Xt)− Ct(qt(Xt), Xt). (1.20)
The marginal renewable electricity producers’ willingness to pay for one RES-E
equipment unit is exactly Bt(Xt). If the RES-E equipment producers notice their
market power, they will produce less than optimal. Thus an optimal subsidy on
output not only corrects for the neglected learning spill-overs but also for the
output contraction. In order to achieve a first-best allocation a subsidy must
be paid in both periods. We can thus write the profit of the RES-E equipment
producers as follows:
piE(y1, y2) = [B1(X1) + σ1]y1 − Γ1(y1) + δ
[
[B2(X2) + σ2]y2 − Γ2(y2, L)
]
. (1.21)
As the number of RES-E equipment producers is exogenous and they engage
in oligopolistic competition, their behavior in a symmetric equilibrium is governed
by the following conditions for the first and the second period, respectively:
B1(X1) +B
′
1(X1)y1 + σ1 − Γ1y1(y1)
+δ
[
B′2(X2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
− Γ2L(y2, L)
]
= 0, (1.22)
B2(X2) +B
′
2(X2)y2 + σ2 − Γ2y2(y2;L) = 0. (1.23)
In equation (1.22), ∂y˜2/∂y1 represents the other firms’ output contraction (expan-
sion) in t = 2 as a reaction on a particular firm’s output expansion in t = 1. This
is the typical effect of shifting the reaction curves outwards in the second period
through investment in the first one (Dixit, 1980). Thus the normal reaction is
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∂y˜2/∂y1 < 0, which in fact happens if ε is not too large.
8 We are now ready to
derive the optimal level of the subsidy rates in both periods:
σ∗1 = −B′1(X∗1 )y∗1 − δ
[
B′2(X
∗
2 )(n− 1)
∂y˜∗2
∂y∗1
+ (n− 1)εΓ2L(y∗2, L∗)
]
, (1.24)
σ∗2 = −B′2(X∗2 )y∗2. (1.25)
The optimal subsidy for RES-E equipment producers in the first period is now
composed of three terms. The first term corrects for the output contraction due to
oligopolistic competition. This effect is mitigated by the second term representing
the strategic output expansion of the firms in the first period. The third term in
(1.24) corrects for the learning spill-overs in the same way as described in Section
1.4.1. In the second period, the optimal subsidy only corrects for the output
contraction due to oligopolistic competition. Therefore, the subsidy is equal to
zero when the RES-E equipment sector is competitive. We summarize the results
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider an electricity market as described before, except that
now there is Cournot competition on the market for RES-E equipment. The
first-best allocation can then be decentralized by imposing a tax on emissions (or
output) and by paying two different subsidy rates for RES-E equipment produc-
tion. In period 1 the subsidy corrects for insufficient public learning and strategic
behavior by RES-E equipment producers. In period 2 the subsidy only corrects for
insufficient output of RES-E equipment. The optimal subsidy rates are given by
(1.24) and (1.25), respectively.
1.4.2.1 The impact of market concentration in the RES-E equipment
industry
In the following, we will analyze the impact of market structure on output, prices,
and the policy instruments when there is oligopolistic competition in both the
fossil-fuel industry and the RES-E equipment sector. For this purpose we conduct
comparative-static analysis with respect to the number of fossil-fuel firms m and
8If  is sufficiently large, the reaction is ambiguous. The reason is that the other firms gain
in a similar way from experience of the firm that increases its output in the first period. For
the derivation of ∂y˜2/∂y1, please consult Appendix A.3.
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the number of RES-E equipment firms n, respectively.9 In order to unambigu-
ously sign the comparative-static effects, we assume both the learning spill-over
coefficient ε and the strategic cross-period effect ∂y˜2/∂y1 to be equal to zero.
This simplification does not imply major drawbacks for the interpretation of our
results since by continuity the results must also hold for small values of ε and
∂y˜2/∂y1.
We first analyze the impact of changes in market structure in the conven-
tional industry by differentiating equations (1.2) – (1.4), (1.13)–(1.15), (1.18),
(1.20), and (1.22) - (1.25) with respect to the number of fossil-fuel utilities m and
solving the resulting system of equations for the endogenous variables. Since the
signs of the comparative-static effects are consistent with those summarized in
Section 1.4.1.1 and to safe on space, we do not repeat them here. In addition,
now the sign of the variation of the subsidy paid to the RES-E equipment pro-
ducers is negative in both periods, implying that subsidies decrease in response
to increasing competition in the fossil fuel industry:
∂σt
∂m
< 0, t = 1, 2.
Since we neglected the learning spill-overs and the strategic cross-period effect
∂y˜2/∂y1 in the RES-E equipment industry, the decrease in the subsidy rate can be
attributed to the decreasing production of RES-E equipment, leading to smaller
output contraction by the RES-E equipment firms.
We now turn to the comparative-static effects of the number of firms in the
RES-E equipment industry. Clearly, the higher degree of competition in the
RES-E equipment sector decreases the individual output level of a typical RES-E
equipment firm but enhances the aggregate output of RES-E equipment and thus
dampens the market price for RES-E equipment:
∂yt
∂n
< 0,
∂Xt
∂n
> 0,
∂bt
∂n
< 0, t = 1, 2.
The overall output of electricity also increases in both periods and leads to
decreasing electricity prices, whereas the individual output levels of both the
9The proofs are described in Appendix A.4.
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fossil-fuel firms and the marginal renewable electricity producer decrease:
∂Qt
∂n
> 0,
∂pt
∂n
< 0,
∂qt(Xt)
∂n
< 0,
∂kt
∂n
< 0, t = 1, 2.
The reason for this result is that declining RES-E equipment prices enable
more renewable electricity producers to enter the market, thus crowding out
fossil-fuel based electricity production. The crowding-out effect on conventional
electricity in turn explains the decline in the emission tax rate:
∂τt
∂n
< 0, t = 1, 2.
Again, we cannot unambiguously sign the impact of the number of RES-
E equipment firms on the subsidy rates without imposing further assumptions
on the cost functions in the RES-E sector. We thus simplify by assuming the
effects of learning by doing on the cost of RES-E equipment producers to be
close to zero, i.e. Γ2LL ≈ 0 and Γ2Ly2 ≈ 0. The signs of the comparative-static
effects then depend on the rates of change of the marginal costs of both RES-
E equipment producers and RES-E generators, i.e. the second derivative of the
RES-E equipment producers’ cost function with respect to output and the second
derivative of the RES-E generators’ cost function with respect to the location
parameter. Therefore, if CtXtXt and Γ
t
ytyt in t = 1, 2 are sufficiently small, we
can sign the impact of market structure in the RES-E equipment industry on the
subsidy rates as follows:10
∂σt
∂n
< 0, t = 1, 2.
The economic intuition for the latter result is that stronger competition in the
RES-E equipment industry leads to decreasing subsidy rates for RES-E equipment
producers, because there is less market power and thus smaller incentives for
strategic output contraction.
10For the RES-E generators, the assumption on the cost function implies that marginal
costs are not allowed to increase too steeply when the location of their installations becomes
less favorable.
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1.5 Feed-in tariffs
We will now consider a situation where first-best policy instruments are not fea-
sible. Instead, we analyze feed-in tariffs as currently implemented in many Eu-
ropean and other OECD countries. Under a feed-in tariff policy generators of
renewable electricity receive a fixed price ζt (which may vary across periods) per
unit of electricity fed into the electricity grid. Although in some countries, such as
Germany, the fossil-fuel utilities have to pay these tariffs to the RES-E generators
according to their share of the market, we here reproduce the Dutch and Danish
system where the tariffs are paid by the government. The reason for choosing this
approach is that payment of feed-in tariffs by the fossil-fuel utilities may induce
further strategic behavior by these firms with respect to their market shares.11
However, as long as the market share of RES-E firms is small, these effects are
likely to be small. Moreover, we assume that firms in the conventional sector pay
an exogenously given emission (or output) tax τt, which may deviate from the
first-best tax level. Under this policy regime the firms’ profits are given by the
following expressions:
piF (kt) = [Pt(Qt)− τt]kt −Kt(kt), t = 1, 2, (1.26)
piE(y1, y2) = b1y1 − Γ1(y1) + δ[b2y2 − Γ2(y2, L)], (1.27)
piG(qt(x˜), x˜, ζt) = ζtqt(x˜)− Ct(qt(x˜), x˜)− bt, t = 1, 2. (1.28)
With perfect competition in the RES-E equipment sector the first-order condi-
tions for profit maximization by the firms are given by
P ′t(Qt)kt + Pt(Qt)− τt −K ′t(kt) = 0, t = 1, 2, (1.29)
b1 − Γ1y1(y1)− δΓ2L(y2, L)] = 0, (1.30)
b2 − Γ2y2(y2, L) = 0, (1.31)
ζt − Ctqt(qt, x˜) = 0, t = 1, 2. (1.32)
11See Gersbach & Requate (2004) on modeling strategic behavior when emission taxes are
reimbursed according to market share.
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The free-entry zero-profit condition for RES-E generators yields
ζtqt(Xt)− Ct(qt, Xt)− bt = 0, t = 1, 2. (1.33)
With oligopolistic competition in both the fossil-fuel and the RES-E equipment
sector the first-order conditions for the RES-E equipment producers yield
B1(X1, ζ1) +B
1
X1
(X1, ζ1)y1 − Γ1y1(y1)
+δ[B2X2(X2, ζ2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
− Γ2L(y2, L)] = 0 (1.34)
B2(X2, ζ2) +B
2
X2
(X2, ζ2)y2 − Γ2y2(y2, L) = 0, (1.35)
where the demand for RES-E equipment units Bt(Xt, ζt) is again defined by the
free-entry condition for RES-E generators.
1.5.1 Second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs
We will now study the structure of a second-best optimal feed-in tariff given that
emission taxes are fixed and possibly non-optimal. For this purpose we therefore
consider all the endogenous variables yt, qt(x˜), kt in t = 1, 2 and welfare given by
equation (1.5) as functions of the feed-in-tariff rates ζ1 and ζ2.
As is always the case under a second-best analysis, the second-best formulas
for the policy instruments will contain the reactions of the firms’ choice variables
on increasing feed-in-tariff rates ζ1 and ζ2. It is therefore useful to briefly study
the signs of these effects:12
Lemma 1 With oligopolistic competition in the fossil-fuel industry and perfect
competition in the RES-E equipment sector increasing the feed-in tariff for RES-
E generators in period t = 1, 2 yields: ∂qt(x˜)
∂ζt
> 0, ∂kt
∂ζt
< 0, ∂Xt
∂ζt
> 0, ∂pt
∂ζt
< 0,
∂Qt
∂ζt
> 0, ∂yt
∂ζt
> 0, ∂bt
∂ζt
> 0, ∂q(x˜)−t
∂ζt
= 0, ∂k−t
∂ζt
< 0, ∂X−t
∂ζt
> 0, ∂p−t
∂ζt
< 0, ∂Q−t
∂ζt
> 0,
∂y−t
∂ζt
> 0, ∂b−t
∂ζt
< 0, where ”− t” := 3− t.
As expected, increasing the feed-in tariff in one period increases electricity
production by the intra-marginal RES-E generators in that period. Since their
12The proof is provided in Appendix A.5.
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output decision in a particular period only depends on the feed-in tariff paid in
that period, increasing the feed-in tariff in one period does not affect the RES-
E generators output in the respective other period. Moreover, due to higher
feed-in rates, more RES-E producers become competitive, inducing demand for
RES-E equipment and production in the RES-E equipment industry to increase.
The RES-E equipment price responds to increasing demand by RES-E generators,
rising in the period where the feed-in tariff is increased and falling in the respective
other period. In addition, higher feed-in tariffs induce a crowding-out effect
on conventional electricity production in both periods. The overall impact on
electricity production is positive and the electricity price decreases accordingly.
We are now ready to derive the formulas for the second-best optimal feed-in
tariff rates ζ1 and ζ2. Differentiating welfare with respect to the feed-in tariffs
and inserting the behavioral conditions gives us two symmetric expressions in ζ1
and ζ2.
13 Solving these for the feed-in-tariff rates yields
ζpc1 =P1(Q1) + [D
′
1(mk1)− τ1 + P ′1(Q1)k1]
H2m
∂k1
∂ζ1
−H1m∂k1∂ζ2
C2H1 − C1H2
− δΓ2L(n− 1)
H1n
∂y1
∂ζ2
−H2n∂y1∂ζ1
C2H1 − C1H2
+ δ[D′2(mk2)− τ2 + P ′2(Q2)k2]
H2m
∂k2
∂ζ1
−H1m∂k2∂ζ2
C2H1 − C1H2 ,
(1.36)
ζpc2 =P2(Q2) + [D
′
2(mk2)− τ2 + P ′2(Q2)k2]
C2m
∂k2
∂ζ1
− C1m∂k2∂ζ2
[C1H2 − C2H1]
− [Γ2L(n− 1)]
C1n
∂y1
∂ζ2
− C2n∂y1∂ζ1
[C1H2 − C2H1]
+
1
δ
[D′1(mk1)− τ1 + P ′1(Q1)k1]
C2m
∂k1
∂ζ1
− C1m∂k1∂ζ2
[C1H2 − C2H1] ,
(1.37)
where the superscript ”pc” denotes perfect competition in the RES-E equipment
sector and C1, C2, H1, and H2 describe the reaction of clean electricity production
when the feed-in-tariff rate changes in a particular period, i.e. C1 = q1(X1)
∂X1
∂ζ1
+
13The derivation of the second-best optimal feed-in tariffs is provided in Appendix A.6.
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∂Qc1
∂ζ1
, C2 = q1(X1)
∂X1
∂ζ2
, H1 = q2(X2)
∂X2
∂ζ1
, H2 = q2(X2)
∂X2
∂ζ2
+
∂Qc2
∂ζ2
.
As can be seen from (1.36) and (1.37), the second-best optimal feed-in tariffs
consist of the electricity price in the respective period t = 1, 2, plus a mark-
up that takes into account (i) the marginal pollution damage from fossil-fuel
based electricity production, (ii) the strategic effects in the oligopolistic fossil-
fuel industry, and (iii) the learning spill-overs in the RES-E equipment industry.
Each of the three parts of the mark-up terms in (1.36) and (1.37), respectively,
is multiplied by a weighting factor containing the comparative-static effects with
respect to the feed-in tariffs derived at the beginning of this section. Unfortu-
nately, since the indirect effects of increasing the feed-in tariff in one period on
output in the respective other period do not vanish, the signs of the second-best
feed-in tariffs cannot be unambiguously determined. However, our numerical cal-
culations suggest that the indirect effects are likely to be small. Accordingly, we
will assume in the following that the direct effects dominate the indirect effects,
i.e. ∂kt
∂ζt
> ∂kt
∂ζ−t
, ∂yt
∂ζt
> ∂yt
∂ζ−t
, and ∂Xt
∂ζt
> ∂Xt
∂ζ−t
. This assumption enables us to inter-
pret the composition of the second-best optimal feed-in tariffs in a straightforward
fashion. For brevity, we focus on the interpretation of ζ1, but the interpretation
of ζ2 is similar.
Following our assumption concerning the magnitude of the comparative-static
effects, the weighting factor of the first mark-up term in (1.36) is positive. This
implies that if the tax rate falls short of (exceeds) marginal damage, provided
that the strategic output contraction of the fossil-fuel utilities is not too large,
this will have a positive (negative) impact on the feed-in-tariff rate, i.e. the feed-
in tariff paid to the renewable electricity generators will lie above (below) the
market price for electricity. Similarly, if output contraction due to oligopolistic
competition in the fossil-fuel industry is very large, the second-best optimal feed-
in-tariff rate will be reduced. The weighting factor of the second mark-up term
in (1.36) is also positive, implying that the existence of learning spill-overs in
the RES-E equipment industry will have a positive effect on the feed-in tariff in
the first period. If learning is purely private, the second term vanishes and the
feed-in tariff will only correct for environmental damage and distortions in the
fossil-fuel industry. The sign of the third mark-up term in (1.36) relating to the
second-period effects in the fossil-fuel industry is ambiguous since the weighting
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factor can be either positive or negative. If the weighting factor is positive and the
emission tax in t = 2 falls short of marginal damage, or if the weighting factor
is negative and the emission tax in t = 2 exceeds marginal damage, the third
term will further raise the feed-in tariff in t = 1 (provided the strategic output
contraction is not too large). The intuition for this effect is that the regulator
anticipates that fossil-fuel utilities might shift their production to t = 1 when
facing high emission taxes in t = 2. Therefore, in order to mitigate this reaction,
the regulator increases the feed-in tariff in t = 1. However, compared to the first
two (direct) effects the impact of the third mark-up term on the feed-in-tariff rate
is likely to be small. We can summarize the results as follows:
Proposition 3 Consider an electricity market as described above and perfect
competition among RES-E equipment producers. Assume an exogenous, possibly
non-optimal tax is imposed on emissions. In each period the second-best optimal
feed-in tariff is equal to the market price for electricity plus a term that corrects
for the difference between marginal damage and the emission tax rate, the output
contraction of fossil-fuel utilities and insufficient learning spill-overs, taking into
account the firms’ reactions on the feed-in tariffs. The second-best optimal feed-
in-tariff rates are given by (1.36) and (1.37), respectively.
In the case of oligopolistic competition in both the fossil-fuel and the RES-E
equipment industry, the structure of the second-best optimal feed-in tariff be-
comes a bit more complex as it also takes into account the strategic effects in
the RES-E equipment sector. Using the same techniques as for the derivation of
(1.36) and (1.37) we arrive at the following feed-in-tariff rates:
ζoc1 =P1(Q1) + [D
′
1(mk1)− τ1 + P ′1(Q1)k1]
H2m
∂k1
∂ζ1
−H1m∂k1∂ζ2
C2H1 − C1H2
−
[
B1X1(X1, ζ1)y1 + δB
2
X2
(X2, ζ2)(n− 1)∂y˜2
∂y1
+ δΓ2L(n− 1)
]H1n∂y1∂ζ2 −H2n∂y1∂ζ1
C2H1 − C1H2
+ δ[D′2(mk2)− τ2 + P ′2(Q2)k2]
H2m
∂k2
∂ζ1
−H1m∂k2∂ζ2
C2H1 − C1H2
− δB2X2(X2, ζ2)y2
H1n
∂y2
∂ζ2
−H2n∂y2∂ζ1
C2H1 − C1H2 ,
(1.38)
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ζoc2 =[D
′
2(mk2)− τ2 + P ′2(Q2)k2]
C2m
∂k2
∂ζ1
− C1m∂k2∂ζ2
[C1H2 − C2H1]
−B2X2(X2, ζ2)y2
C1n
∂y2
∂ζ2
− C2n∂y2∂ζ1
[C1H2 − C2H1]
+ P2(Q2) + [D
′
1(mk1)− τ1 + P ′1(Q1)k1]
C2m
∂k1
∂ζ1
− C1m∂k1∂ζ2
δ[C1H2 − C2H1]
−
[
B1X1(X1, ζ1)y1 + δB
2
X2
(X2, ζ2)(n− 1)∂y˜2
∂y1
+ δΓ2L(n− 1)
]C1n∂y1∂ζ2 − C2n∂y1∂ζ1
δ[C1H2 − C2H1] ,
(1.39)
where the superscript ”oc” denotes oligopolistic competition in the RES-E equip-
ment sector and C1, C2, H1, and H2 again denote the reaction of green electricity
production when the feed-in tariff rate changes in a particular period. Note that
the comparative-static effects of increasing the feed-in tariffs on the endogenous
variables with oligopolistic competition in the RES-E equipment industry are in
line with Lemma 1.14 Compared to (1.36) and (1.37), equations (1.38) and (1.39)
include an augmented second mark-up term and an additional fourth mark-up
term, representing the distortions caused by oligopolistic competition in the RES-
E equipment industry.
Assuming again that the direct comparative-static effects dominate the in-
direct effects, the weighting factor of the augmented second term in (1.38) is
positive. This implies that the feed-in tariff in t = 1 will increase compared to
the case of perfect competition in the RES-E equipment industry as it also ac-
counts for the strategic output contraction by the RES-E equipment firms, i.e.
B1X1(X1, ζ1)y1 < 0. This effect is mitigated by the fact that RES-E equipment
firms want to expand their output in the first period in order to shift their reaction
curves outwards in the second, represented by the term B2X2(X2, ζ2)(n−1)∂y˜2∂y1 > 0.
Moreover, the fourth term in (1.38) indicates that the feed-in tariff in t = 1 also
takes into account the strategic output contraction by RES-E equipment firms in
the second period. Due to B2X2(X2, ζ2)y2 < 0, this will raise the feed-in tariff if
14Please consult Appendix A.5 for details.
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the weighting factor is positive and will decrease the feed-in tariff if the weighting
factor is negative.
The composition of ζoc2 can be interpreted analogously with the predominant
effects arising from the third and the fourth mark-up term in (1.39). We therefore
summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Consider an electricity market as described above and oligopolis-
tic competition among RES-E equipment producers and assume an exogenous,
possibly non-optimal tax is imposed on emissions. In addition to the compo-
nents described in Proposition 3, the second-best optimal feed-in tariff in each
period then also accounts for the output contraction of RES-E equipment produc-
ers. The second-best optimal feed-in-tariff rates are given by (1.38) and (1.39),
respectively.
1.5.2 Welfare comparisons through simulations
In this section we will evaluate the implications of a second-best optimal feed-
in-tariff policy on welfare and compare these to the first-best solution. For this
purpose, we simultaneously solve the system of equations (1.1)-(1.4) and (1.13)-
(1.19) and calculate the social welfare when first-best policies are applied. We
also work out the social welfare of a second-best feed-in-tariff policy by simultane-
ously solving the system of equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.4), (1.29)-(1.37). Following
Fischer & Newell (2008) we assume iso-elastic electricity demand and quadratic
cost and damage functions, yielding linear electricity supply and linear marginal
damage functions (see Table 1.1). Table 1.2 summarizes the parameter values
employed in our study, most of which have been adopted from Fischer & Newell
(2008).15 The slope parameter of marginal pollution damage d is consistent with
a constant marginal damage of US-$43 per ton of CO2 (see Tol, 2005). The learn-
ing parameter b is calibrated to induce a learning rate of about 20 percent, which
is at the upper limit of most empirical studies (see Junginger et al., 2005).
15Fischer & Newell (2008) have calibrated their values to simulations that study the elec-
tricity market impact of different CO2 reduction goals taken from the Energy Information
Administration’s National Energy Modeling System (EIA, 2006).
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Table 1.1: Functional forms
Functional form Description
Ct(qt(x˜), x˜) = c1qt +
c2
2
(qt + fx˜)
2 Cost function of the RES-E generators in t = 1, 2
Kt(kt) = h1kt +
h2
2
k2t Cost function of the fossil-fuel firms in t = 1, 2
Γ1(y1) =
γ
2
y21 Cost function of the RES-E equipment producers in t = 1
Γ2(y2, L) =
γ
4
(y2 − bL)2 + γ4y22 Cost function of the RES-E equipment producers in t = 2
L = y1 + (n− 1)εy˜1 Learning by doing in the RES-E equipment industry in t = 1
Dt(mkt) =
d
2
(mkt)
2 Pollution damage in t = 1, 2
Pt(Qt) = Q
α
t Electricity demand function in t = 1, 2
Table 1.2: Parameter values in the baseline case
Parameter Base value Description
α -4 Elasticity of electricity demand
h1 0.07 Intercept of fossil-fuel utilities cost function
h2 1.8 ∗ 10−14 Scaling parameter in fossil-fuel utilities cost function
γ, b 0.1, 0.2 Scaling parameters in RES-E equipment producers cost function
c1 0.1 Intercept of RES-E producers cost function
c2, f 1.2 ∗ 10−13, 0.05 Scaling parameters in RES-E producers cost function
d 0.027 Scaling parameter in pollution damage function
ε 0.5 Learning spill-over coefficient
δ 0.95 Discount rate
For the second-best calculations, we consider three alternative scenarios for
the exogenously given emission tax: τt = 0 (no emission tax), τt =
1
2
τ ∗t (emission
tax rate equal to half its first-best value), and τt = τ
∗
t (first-best emission tax).
The results for the cases with perfect and oligopolistic competition in the
RES-E equipment industry are displayed in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4, respectively.
In each table, the first row displays the percentage differences between optimal
welfare and welfare resulting from second-best optimal feed-in tariffs, given cer-
tain fixed levels of the emission tax. The results yield two main conclusions. First,
when the exogenous emission tax is equal to the first-best level, the welfare loss
from a second-best optimal feed-in tariff policy is very small. When the exogenous
tax rate falls short of its first-best level, however, the welfare loss is considerably
higher. Thus a second-best optimal feed-in tariff is much less efficient than the
emission tax in internalizing both the environmental and competition effects in
the fossil-fuel industry. Second, in the case of imperfect competition among the
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RES-E equipment firms, the welfare losses through second-best optimal feed-in
tariffs are even bigger since the feed-in tariffs also have to correct for strategic
output contraction in the RES-E equipment sector.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 also indicate how producer and consumer surplus are af-
fected by the change from first-best to second-best optimal policies. Consistent
with the above-mentioned observations on social welfare, the impact of switching
from a first-best tax/subsidy policy to a second-best feed-in-tariff policy is much
more pronounced when the exogenous emission tax falls short of its first-best
level. The renewable electricity and the renewable equipment sector benefit from
the introduction of feed-in tariffs compared to a first-best policy, increasing their
market shares and surpluses at the expense of fossil-fuel-based electricity pro-
ducers. The implementation of second-best optimal feed-in tariffs also leads to
significant electricity price increases that negatively affect the consumer surplus.
Moreover, since dirty electricity is crowded out of the market, second-best opti-
mal feed-in-tariff policies reduce pollution damage. Note that in our calculations
the second-best optimal feed-in tariffs lie below the electricity price when the
exogenous emission tax falls short of its optimal value. This happens because the
strategic effect in the fossil-fuel sector (driven by the inelastic electricity demand)
overcompensates both marginal damage and learning spill-overs.
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Table 1.3: Deviation of different second-best feed-in-tariff policy scenarios relative
to a first-best emission tax/learning subsidy policy: Oligopoly in the fossil-fuel
industry only
∆Variable (in %) FITs with exogenous FITs with exogenous FITs with exogenous
emission tax τt = τ
∗
t emission tax τt =
1
2τ
∗
t emission tax τt = 0
∆Welfare -0.00019 -12.8395 -28.3360
∆Consumer surplus
t=1 0.00003 -6.6435 -13.3265
t=2 -0.06055 -6.9582 -12.6583
∆Producer surplus
(green electricity)
t=1 -3.04845 33129.8 60761.2
t=2 -0.93635 27386.2 56470.4
∆Producer surplus
(dirty electricity)
t=1 -0.00013 -22.3643 -32.3027
t=2 0.24836 -21.0085 -35.0382
∆Producer surplus
(RES-E equipment)
t=1 -6.4724 9696.1 15631.5
t=2 -0.4688 8812.1 15162.8
∆Electricity price
t=1 -0.00017 37.189 77.3519
t=2 0.32540 38.927 73.2385
∆Total output of
green electricity
t=1 0.00022 3214.13 4660.57
t=2 -0.41655 2869.29 4364.36
∆Total output of
dirty electricity
t=1 0.00004 -27.6829 -42.480
t=2 -0.07889 -27.6182 -42.822
∆RES-E equipment
price
t=1 6.3946 988.383 1279.48
t=2 0.2128 837.516 1132.71
∆Total number of
RES-E equipment
t=1 -2.99688 885.39 1152.45
t=2 -0.51587 848.39 1137.19
∆Damage
t=1 0.00008 -47.7023 -66.9146
t=2 -0.15771 -47.6088 -67.3067
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Table 1.4: Deviation of different second-best feed-in tariff policy scenarios relative
to a first-best emission tax/learning subsidy policy: Oligopoly in both the fossil-
fuel and the RES-E equipment industry
∆Variable (in %) FITs with exogenous FITs with exogenous FITs with exogenous
emission tax τt = τ
∗
t emission tax τt =
1
2τ
∗
t emission tax τt = 0
∆Welfare -0.00049 -12.8568 -29.7965
∆Consumer surplus
t=1 -0.0844 -6.3105 -13.313
t=2 0.0000 -5.6881 -7.515
∆Producer surplus
(green electricity)
t=1 -8.4055 33582.7 60067.2
t=2 -0.8523 31630.1 82887.5
∆Producer surplus
(dirty electricity)
t=1 0.3394 -23.8109 -32.3581
t=2 -0.00006 -26.4725 -56.2294
∆Producer surplus
(RES-E equipment)
t=1 -53.4453 4702.22 7333.17
t=2 -12.7662 8624.34 18971.9
∆Electricity price
t=1 0.44742 0.75797 77.270
t=2 -0.00006 0.10866 42.287
∆Total output of
green electricity
t=1 -0.5867 -0.9682 4663.3
t=2 -0.00009 -0.1394 5609.2
∆Total output of
dirty electricity
t=1 -0.1101 -0.18374 -42.487
t=2 0.0000 -0.02638 -46.924
∆RES-E equipment
price
t=1 11.9904 11.7026 1315.11
t=2 1.7154 1.6489 1431.46
∆Total number of
RES-E equipment
t=1 -5.9587 -6.19962 1138.29
t=2 -0.8296 -0.93460 1317.91
∆Damage
t=1 -0.220 -47.759 -66.923
t=2 0.0000 -47.862 -71.829
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1.5.3 The impact of market structure on the size of feed-
in tariffs
To investigate the impact of changes in market structure in the conventional
electricity sector on the second-best optimal feed-in tariffs, we again consider the
numerical example from the previous section and study the impact of market
structure (represented by the number of oligopolistic firms) on the second-best
optimal feed-in tariffs and market performance.
Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 illustrate the results for the case of oligopolistic
competition in the fossil-fuel industry and perfect competition among RES-E
equipment producers assuming an emission tax rate equal to zero. Similar to the
comparative-static results described in Section 1.4.1.1, more competition among
fossil-fuel utilities leads to an increasing output of fossil-fuel electricity and hence
to a decrease in electricity prices. This effect crowds out production of renewable
electricity and thus also depresses demand and prices in the RES-E equipment
sector. This mechanism is always present.
Interestingly, however, the impact on the second-best optimal level of the
feed-in tariffs is less clear. From Figure 1.1 we see that, if the demand elasticity
is low ( = 1/α = −1/4.0 and below), the second-best optimal feed-in-tariff rate
decreases as electricity markets become more competitive. The reason is that
as total output is hardly affected by increasing competition there is no large
increase in marginal damage either. Therefore, the dominating effect on the
second-best optimal feed-in tariffs is the decrease in electricity prices (first terms
in formulas (1.36) and (1.37)). So in the short run (when demand elasticity is
low), liberalizing energy markets brings about lower feed-in tariffs, which benefits
public budgets and consumers who have to pay less to subsidize renewable energy.
If, by contrast, demand elasticity is relatively high ( = 1/α = −1/2.0 and
higher), the second-best optimal feed-in-tariff rate increases as the electricity
market becomes more competitive (see Figure 1.2). The intuitive reason is that
increased output induces higher emissions and hence higher marginal damage,
whereas the strategic output corrective of the feed-in-tariff rate (term P ′1(Q1)k1 in
(1.36) and P ′2(Q2)k2 in (1.37)) decreases. To counteract this effect, feed-in-tariff
rates must be enhanced in both periods. Therefore, liberalizing the electricity
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markets has the opposite effect in the long run: (second-best optimal) feed-in
tariffs have to be raised, thus offsetting the positive effect of market liberalization
for consumers and public budgets. For intermediate values of demand elasticities
we obtain a U-shaped relationship between the number of firms and the size of
the feed-in tariff (see Figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.1: Impact of increasing the number of fossil-fuel firms with perfect com-
petition in the RES-E equipment industry and low elasticity of demand (short-
[long-]dashed lines for t = 1 [t = 2]).
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Figure 1.2: Impact of increasing the number of fossil-fuel firms with perfect com-
petition in the RES-E equipment industry and high elasticity of demand (short-
[long-]dashed lines for t = 1 [t = 2]).
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Figure 1.3: Impact of increasing the number of fossil-fuel firms with perfect com-
petition in the RES-E equipment industry and intermediate elasticity of demand
(short-[long-]dashed lines for t = 1 [t = 2]).
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In the case of oligopoly power in the RES-E equipment industry the effects
of increasing competition in the fossil-fuel sector are qualitatively similar, but
differ quantitatively (see Figures 1.4 and 1.5). In general, imperfect competition
among RES-E equipment producers induces higher prices and lower production
of RES-E equipment, which in turn leads to a lower output of clean electricity.
In addition, the second-best optimal feed-in tariffs are higher than in the case of
perfect competition since they also internalize the strategic output contraction
in the RES-E equipment sector by indirectly subsidizing that market. Another
interesting observation concerns the relative size of the feed-in-tariff in the first
compared to the second period. When the emission tax fully accounts for the
externalities in the fossil-fuel industry we obtain a higher feed-in tariff in the
first than in the second period (see Figure 1.5). By contrast, when the emission
tax is equal to zero, the feed-in tariff in the second period is higher than in the
first period (see Figure 1.4). Therefore, the statement that feed-in-tariffs should
decrease over time to account for the learning effects in the RES-E industry does
not hold in general.
Finally, Figures 1.6 and 1.7 illustrate the impact of market structure in the
RES-E equipment sector. With increasing competition on the market for RES-E
equipment, falling RES-E equipment prices trigger more market entry by RES-E
operators and both green electricity and total electricity output increase while
dirty electricity is crowded out to some extent. The impact on the second-best
optimal feed-in-tariff rates is ambiguous, depending on the chosen emission tax
level. When the emission tax is equal to zero, the second-best optimal feed-in
tariff rates decrease in both periods (see Figure 1.6). The intuitive reason for
this result is that negative externalities are reduced in both the RES-E equip-
ment industry (due to smaller oligopolistic output contraction) and in the fossil-
fuel industry (due to crowding out of dirty electricity production and thus lower
marginal damage). By contrast, when emission taxes are equal to their first-
best levels, the second-best optimal feed-in tariff rate increases in the first and
decreases in the second period (see Figure 1.7). As the emission tax now fully
internalizes all external effects in the fossil-fuel sector, the increasing feed-in tar-
iff in the first period can be explained by the positive externalities of learning
spill-overs that are now predominant in the RES-E equipment industry. Since
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no learning occurs in the second period, the feed-in tariff then decreases due to
the declining oligopolistic output contraction of RES-E equipment producers. In
addition, similar to the results shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.5, second-best optimal
feed-in-tariff rates may be higher in the second than in the first period, again
depending on the emission tax level.
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Figure 1.4: Impact of increasing the number of fossil-fuel firms with oligopolistic
competition in the RES-E equipment industry and emission taxes equal to zero
(short-[long-]dashed lines for t = 1 [t = 2]).
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Figure 1.5: Impact of increasing the number of fossil-fuel firms with oligopolis-
tic competition in the RES-E equipment industry and first-best emission taxes
(short-[long-]dashed lines for t = 1 [t = 2]).
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Figure 1.6: Impact of increasing the number of RES-E equipment firms with
oligopolistic competition in the RES-E equipment industry and emission taxes
equal to zero (short-[long-]dashed lines for t = 1 [t = 2]).
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1Figure 1.7: Impact of increasing the number of RES-E equipment firms with
oligopolistic competition in the RES-E equipment industry and first-best emission
taxes (short-[long-]dashed lines for t = 1 [t = 2]).
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1.5.4 Sensitivity analysis
To test the stability of our numerical results we conduct a sensitivity analysis
with respect to the parameters determining the degree of learning spill-overs,
the magnitude of cost reductions through learning by doing in the RES-E equip-
ment industry, and the elasticity of electricity demand. For brevity, we focus on
the impact of these parameters on the welfare differences between first-best and
second-best policies. The results for the case of perfect and oligopolistic compe-
tition in the RES-E equipment industry are displayed in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6,
respectively. In both tables the first line carries forward the results of the baseline
case (described in Tables 1.3 and 1.4), respectively, illustrating that in both cases
the impact on the relative performance of second-best policies by varying either
the ability of firms to learn or the degree of learning spill-overs is rather small.
When the emission tax is not set at its first-best level, a higher learning
ability (b = 0.3) and complete learning spill-overs (ε = 1) both slightly improve
the relative performance of second-best feed-in-tariff policies compared to the
baseline scenario. By contrast, a lower learning ability (b = 0.01) and no learning
spill-overs (ε = 0) both slightly reduce the relative performance of those policies.
By contrast, varying the demand elasticity for electricity leads to fairly large
impacts on the relative performance of second-best policies. When demand is
more elastic than in the baseline ( = 1/α = −1/3.5)16, the welfare loss in-
duced by second-best policies relative to optimal welfare is significantly lower.
By contrast, less elastic demand than in the baseline ( = 1/α = −1/4.5) leads
to a significantly higher welfare loss of second-best optimal feed-in-tariff policies.
These results indicate that in our framework of imperfect competition demand
elasticity has a much larger impact on policy performance than the parameters
relating to the learning effects and spill-overs in the RES-E equipment industry.
16Recall that α is the elasticity of the inverse demand function.
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Table 1.5: Sensitivity analysis: Oligopoly in the fossil-fuel industry only
∆Welfare relative FITs with exog. FITs with exog. FITs with exog.
to first best policy (%) tax τt = τ
∗
t tax τt =
1
2τ
∗
t tax τt = 0
Baseline -0.00019 -12.8395 -28.3360
More elastic demand (α = −3.5) -0.00009 -7.13675 -17.0856
Less elastic demand (α = −4.5) -0.19674 -20.3974 -44.0165
High learning (b = 0.3) -0.00068 -12.6169 -27.9531
Low learning (b = 0.01) 0.00000 -13.5577 -29.5668
Complete learning spill-overs (ε = 1) -0.00077 -12.6361 -27.9057
Purely private learning (ε = 0) 0.00000 -13.2521 -29.0426
Table 1.6: Sensitivity analysis: Oligopoly in both the fossil-fuel and the RES-E
equipment industry
∆Welfare relative FITs with exog. FITs with exog. FITs with exog.
to first best policy (%) tax τt = τ
∗
t tax τt =
1
2τ
∗
t tax τt = 0
Baseline -0.00049 -12.8568 -29.7965
More elastic demand (α = −3.5) -0.00887 -7.16979 -18.0884
Less elastic demand (α = −4.5) -0.67618 -20.3506 -44.5619
High learning (b = 0.3) -0.000718 -12.6247 -29.3786
Low learning (b = 0.01) 0.00000 -13.58 -31.4121
Complete learning spill-overs (ε = 1) -0.21601 -12.5984 -29.324
Purely private learning (ε = 0) -0.14676 -13.2663 -30.5291
1.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have set up a model to investigate the performance of subsidy
policies for employing renewable energy sources in electricity production such as
wind or photovoltaic power. As the existence of learning by doing and learning
spill-overs is one of the most prominent arguments advanced by policy makers in
favor of such subsidies, we have explicitly accounted for these effects by consid-
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ering an RES-E equipment industry that benefits from cost reductions through
private and public learning. We find that the regulator can obtain the first-best
allocation by implementing a tax on emissions and an output subsidy for RES-
E equipment producers. The optimal tax is characterized by two counteracting
components. It internalizes the externalities of emissions but also corrects for
the strategic output contraction by the oligopolistic fossil-fuel firms. The output
subsidy for RES-E equipment producers accounts for the learning spill-overs and,
in the case of an oligopolistic RES-E equipment industry, also for the strategic
behavior of the firms.
Since many European governments pay subsidies on clean electricity via feed-
in tariffs rather than subsidizing RES-E equipment directly, we have studied
the performance of such policies compared to the first-best alternative. Second-
best-optimal feed-in tariffs take account of the learning spill-overs in the RES-E
equipment industry. If emission taxes do not (fully) internalize the externalities
caused by using fossil-fuels, they also account for marginal pollution damage and
the strategic output contraction caused by oligopolistic market structure in the
fossil-fuel industry.
Although feed-in tariffs perform much worse than a first-best policy, our re-
sults suggest that in the presence of learning spill-overs in the RES-E equipment
industry and oligopolistic competition in the fossil-fuel sector, feed-in tariffs for
renewable electricity producers may be justified if first-best policies are ruled
out and as long as emissions are not regulated by tradable emission allowances.
Given the current situation where most European and other OECD economies’
electricity markets are still dominated by a few large conventional utilities, our
numerical results potentially call for a short-term decrease in feed-in tariff levels
and a long-term increase in those levels as electricity markets are progressively
liberalized. However, since our model considers environmental regulation of the
conventional electricity sector through emission taxes, our results cannot be di-
rectly transferred to the current situation in the European Union, where CO2
emitted by industrial sources is regulated through a cap-and-trade scheme of
emission allowances. Under such a scheme, feed-in tariffs are not very useful as
they have no further mitigating effects on emissions. In fact, they would induce a
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lower allowance price and thus provide disincentives among the conventional elec-
tricity producers to further abate emissions (del R´ıo Gonzalez, 2007; Sijm, 2005;
Sorrel & Sijm, 2003). This problem could be solved by setting a more stringent
emission cap accounting for the additional emission reductions achieved through
the feed-in-tariff policy. Taxation of CO2 emissions, by contrast, would render
this adjustment of the emission cap superfluous.
In our model we have made several simplifying assumptions to keep the anal-
ysis tractable. In particular, we have assumed only one type of homogeneous
RES-E equipment, while in reality several different types of RES-E equipment
exist, for instance wind turbines, photovoltaic modules, and bio-gas power plants.
Within each of these types further product differentiation exists. Some countries
pay a unique feed-in tariff for ”green” electricity independent of which type of
RES-E equipment is used, whereas other countries, notably Germany, have a
highly differentiated system of feed-in tariffs with a spread in feed-in rates of up
to 500 percent. It must be left to further research to account for product differen-
tiation of this kind and assess the resulting policy implications accordingly. Since
the level of second-best optimal feed-in tariffs crucially depends on the degree of
potential market power, it would be particularly interesting from an empirical
viewpoint to test for market power in the RES-E equipment sector.
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Chapter 2
An empirical model of
carbon-constrained energy
markets with an application to
dynamic portfolio allocation
2.1 Introduction
In recent years energy markets in Europe and elsewhere have undergone im-
portant transformations. For instance, European governments and regulatory
authorities have worked towards liberalizing the highly regulated national energy
markets with the aim of creating a single and competitive European market.
Moreover, the increasing use of standardized derivatives such as energy options
and futures has improved overall market transparency and liquidity and has thus
strengthened the link between the markets for different energy commodities such
as electricity, natural gas, oil, and coal. In addition, a growing awareness con-
cerning the negative environmental impacts of conventional, fossil-fuel based en-
ergy sources has led to the introduction of a wide array of environmental policy
measures. One of the most prominent environmental policies is the European
emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS). The EU-ETS has defined a cap on total in-
dustrial CO2 emissions in the European Union and has set up a market where CO2
emission rights, so called European emission allowances (EUAs) can be traded.
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Turning CO2 emissions from a free into a costly production factor alters the
costs of fossil-fuel based energy generation and has important repercussions on
production and consumption choices of all energy-related products. Therefore,
optimal production and investment decision making in energy markets requires
a clear understanding of the empirical interrelationships between energy prices,
in particular prices for electricity, natural gas, and coal, and emission allowance
prices.
In this chapter we contribute to the understanding of the interrelationships
between electricity, natural gas, coal and emission allowances and to how these
interrelations could be exploited for financial investment decisions. In particular
we develop an empirical model representing the interrelationships between energy
and allowance prices and returns and taking into account both the fundamental
price drivers in the energy and emission markets and the volatility dynamics of
the commodity returns. We propose a vector error correction model (VECM) ap-
proach with orthogonalized generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic
(GARCH) error processes. Within the latter empirical framework we can ana-
lyze both long-run relationships and short-run dynamics between CO2 and energy
prices in a very general fashion without imposing strict a-priori economic restric-
tions. In addition to the empirical analysis of the interrelationships of energy
and CO2 prices and returns, we consider an economic application where we use
forecasts generated from the empirical model for dynamic portfolio allocation.
In theory a close relationship should exist between electricity, natural gas,
coal, and emission allowances, where the latter three can be viewed as input
factors for electric power production. Therefore, the prices for the three inputs
should determine the power price in long-run market equilibrium. In the short
run, however, interactions can take place among all endogenous variables. For
instance, a constraint on CO2 emissions can influence the type of generation
plant to be employed, depending on the emission intensity of the fuel inputs.
The reason is that in the short run, CO2 abatement can be achieved through
fuel switching from CO2-intensive to less CO2-intensive fuels, e.g. from lignite to
hard coal or from hard coal to natural gas. Therefore, increasing prices of CO2
emissions will lead to the employment of less emission-intensive power plants. In
addition, changes in natural gas and coal prices can affect electricity prices both
54
2.1 Introduction
through changing fuel input costs and through changes in the demand for emission
allowances. The latter effect could occur when increasing costs of natural gas and
coal lead to decreasing demand for these fuels. In this case, less CO2 would be
emitted and, since the supply of emission allowances is fixed by the European
Commission, the price for emission allowances would decrease. Therefore, the
decreasing allowance price could (partially) absorb the impact of increasing fuel
costs on electricity prices. The price for electricity might also have feedback effects
to the input markets. For instance, a sudden increase in the supply of renewable
electricity can dampen the wholesale electricity price, crowd out conventional
electricity production and thus reduce demand and prices of fossil fuels.
Finally, there are common exogenous factors that directly or indirectly affect
prices on all four markets such as climatic conditions, economic growth, and
regulatory issues. The latter is particularly important for the relatively young
emission market, which is highly dependent on rules concerning among other
issues the inflow of allowances from other trading schemes, banking and borrowing
of allowances over several trading periods, and penalties for non-compliance.
Our study is in the spirit of Bunn & Fezzi (2007) and Fell (2010) who also
use a VECM approach to analyze the relationship between CO2, gas, and power
prices in the United Kingdom and between CO2, gas, coal and power prices
and water reservoir levels in the Nordic region of Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden, respectively. Moreover, there is a growing literature dealing with
theoretical and empirical analysis of price determinants in emission allowance
markets. In the context of the EU-ETS, the dynamic price behavior of emission
allowances under uncertainty has been analyzed theoretically by Seifert et al.
(2008), who take into account stylized facts of the European emission market. In
addition, a handful of empirical papers have analyzed the price behavior of CO2
allowances in the first trading phase of the EU-ETS. Among these, some authors
have focused on short-term price changes and volatility dynamics of allowances
relying on historical price information (Benz & Tru¨ck, 2009; Daskalakis et al.,
2009; Paolella & Taschini, 2008). Other authors have addressed the impact of
CO2 price fundamentals such as energy and weather variables on allowance prices
(Alberola et al., 2007; Hintermann, 2010; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007; Rickels
et al., 2007). They find evidence that fossil-fuel prices, fuel-switching prices,
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extreme and/or unanticipated variations in temperature and precipitation have
influenced allowance prices in the first trading phase, although these relationships
were not statistically significant throughout the entire period, probably due to
the relative immaturity of the market.
In this chapter, we present several contributions to the empirical literature on
energy and CO2 prices. First, while previous studies have focused either on mod-
eling the price determinants or the volatility dynamics in CO2 markets via single
equation models or on analyzing the interactions between energy and CO2 prices
via VAR/VECM models, we incorporate the three features in a VECM model
with orthogonal GARCH (OGARCH) errors. Moreover, within our VECM-
OGARCH framework we can analyze the impacts of unexpected shocks on energy
and CO2 prices by using an identification procedure that exploits the conditional
heteroscedasticity of the statistical error terms without imposing a-priori restric-
tions on the contemporaneous coefficient matrix. Second, we test the economic
performance of the empirical model by means of a portfolio allocation applica-
tion. Unlike most of the above-mentioned empirical studies we analyze our model
using futures prices instead of spot prices. The motivation for analyzing futures
prices is that the physical nature of electricity, natural gas, and coal involves is-
sues such as transportation and storage of the commodities, which would render
a dynamic portfolio allocation, i.e. a frequent rebalancing of portfolio weights,
more complicated and costly. Finally, we analyze the potential differences in the
long run and short run interrelationships between energy and CO2 prices with
either baseload or peakload power prices.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section will
explain the empirical model and the estimation procedure. In Section 2.3 we will
describe the portfolio allocation problem and the forecasting procedure. Sections
2.4 and 2.5 will present the data and the empirical results of both the in-sample
and the out-of-sample analysis. Finally, Section 2.6 will conclude.
2.2 The model
In this section we will derive the empirical model for power, emission allowances,
natural gas, and coal returns. We will also discuss the model estimation procedure
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and describe how to use the model for impulse-response analysis.
2.2.1 VECM with orthogonal GARCH errors
For the analysis of electricity, natural gas, coal, and CO2 prices we choose a
VECM approach providing a flexible framework to study the interactions be-
tween these variables both in the long-run equilibrium and in the short run. In
the VECM we also incorporate exogenous factors, which are not part of the equi-
librium relationship itself but are believed to affect the variables in the system
particularly in the short-run, such as weather indices, oil prices, and economic
growth rates. Finally, we model the innovations of the VECM by means of an
orthogonal GARCH approach, which allows us to identify the contemporane-
ous interactions between the endogenous variables and to analyze the impact of
shocks on the system.
In what follows let p•,t = ln(P•,t) for • = e, a, g, c denote power, CO2, natural
gas, and coal prices in natural logarithms, respectively. We collect the prices in
the vector pt = (pe,t, pa,t, pg,t, pc,t)
′, which is decomposed in a deterministic and a
stochastic part, i.e.
pt = vt + yt, (2.1)
where vt is a deterministic trend and yt follows a vector autoregressive process
with exogenous variables of order q (VAR(q) henceforth):
yt = A1yt−1 + ...+ Aqyt−q + λxt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0,Σt). (2.2)
In our case, Ai with i = 1, ..., q is a 4×4 matrix of coefficients attached to the lags
of the vector yt and λ is a 4× L matrix of coefficients where L is the number of
exogenous variables collected in the vector xt. Moreover, εt = (εe,t, εa,t, εg,t, εc,t)
′
is a 4 × 1 vector of statistical innovations, which are multivariate normal with
mean zero and time-varying covariance Σt. Inserting (2.2) in (2.1) and rearranging
yields:
pt = v
∗
t + A1pt−1 + ...+ Aqpt−q + λxt−1 + εt, (2.3)
where v∗t = f(vt, A1vt−1, ..., Aqvt−q). Equation (2.3) implies that the vector of
energy prices pt can be modeled as a VAR(q) system, which expresses the price
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vector as a function of a deterministic trend, past price values, a set of exogenous
variables, and unsystematic shocks.
Following Granger (1981) and Engle & Granger (1987) the log prices in the
vector pt are cointegrated if they are integrated of order one (i.e. if they posses a
unit root, denoted I(1) for short) and if at least one linear combination of them
exists that is integrated of order zero (i.e. the linear combination possesses no
unit root, denoted I(0) for short). The existence of cointegration relationships
between non-stationary variables implies that these variables follow stable ”long-
run equilibrium” relationships. The cointegration concept can be applied in our
context by means of a VECM(q − 1) which can be obtained by reparameterizing
(2.1):
∆pt = ∆vt + ∆yt, (2.4)
where
∆yt = Πyt−1 + Γ1∆yt−1 + ...+ Γq−1∆yt−q+1 + λxt−1 + εt. (2.5)
In this case, ∆pt = pt − pt−1 denotes the first difference of the log prices (or
equivalently log returns) and ∆vt = vt − vt−1 and ∆yt = yt − yt−1 are the first
differences of the deterministic and stochastic components, respectively. The
coefficient matrices Π and Γi are given by Π = −(I4 − A1 − ... − Aq) and Γi =
−(Ai+1+...+Aq) for i = 1, ..., q−1. The matrix Π can be written as Π = αβ′ where
α and β are (4×m) matrices of coefficients. The matrix α is usually referred to
as the loading matrix and β as the cointegrating matrix. The parameter matrices
α and β are not unique implying that identifying restrictions have to be imposed.
Inserting (2.5) in (2.4) and rearranging yields:
∆pt = v˜t + Πpt−1 + Γ1∆pt−1 + ...+ Γq−1∆pt−q+1 + λxt−1 + εt, (2.6)
where v˜t = f(∆vt,Γ1∆vt−1, ...,Γq−1∆vt−q,Πvt−1).
To model the innovations εt we employ an orthogonal GARCH (OGARCH)
specification in the spirit of Normandin & Phaneuf (2004). Among the variety
of alternative multivariate specifications, we choose an OGARCH specification
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for two main reasons. First, Normandin & Phaneuf (2004) argue that OGARCH
processes can represent well the alternating periods of volatility and smoothness
of the underlying time series. In addition, studies by van der Weide (2002) and
Alexander (2002) show that OGARCH models work well in asset allocation set-
tings. Second, the OGARCH specification describes the fundamental innovations
of energy and CO2 returns as a function of unobservable orthogonal and condition-
ally heteroscedastic shocks with loading matrix B. According to the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory we can thus interpret the unobservable shocks as risk factors.
Therefore, the OGARCH specification implicitly prices the (short-term) risk in
energy and CO2 markets. Under this specification the statistical innovations are
then given by:
εt = But, where ut ∼ N(0,Ωt). (2.7)
The vector ut = (ue,t, ua,t, ug,t, uc,t)
′ contains the unobserved fundamental innova-
tions and the matrix D = B−1 describes the contemporaneous relations between
the statistical innovations εt. It is assumed that the fundamental innovations
in ut are uncorrelated and that each u•,t for • = e, a, g, c has an unconditional
variance equal to 1, i.e. E[utu
′
t] = Ω = I4, where I4 is an identity matrix of size
4. The conditional covariance Σt is then given by
Σt = E[εtε
′
t|zt−1] = BΩtB′, (2.8)
where E[•] is the expectations operator, zt denotes the information available at
time t and Ωt follows a diagonal GARCH structure of the form:
Ωt = (I4 −C1 −C2) + C1  (ut−1u′t−1) + C2  Ωt−1, (2.9)
where Ωt = diag(ωe,t, ωa,t, ωg,t, ωc,t),  denotes element-by-element multiplication
and C1 and C2 are diagonal matrices of coefficients.
If C1 and C2 are zero matrices, i.e. Ωt is time-invariant, the fundamental
innovations become homoscedastic. In that case Σ = BB′ but B is not uniquely
identifiable. The traditional VAR/VECM model typically imposes conditionally
homoscedastic fundamental disturbances and a popular approach to identify the
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contemporaneous interrelationships between the shocks in ut consists in perform-
ing a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix Σ such that Σ = PP′
where P is a lower triangular matrix. Alternatively, the so-called structural
VAR/VECM (SVAR/SVECM) models with homoscedastic innovations require
(economically motivated) restrictions for the parameters contained in D = B−1
in order identify B.1 By contrast, with conditionally heteroscedastic fundamental
disturbances u•,t, the matrix B can be uniquely identified.2
In our framework, conditional correlations between the statistical innovations
can be obtained as
ρt = diag(Σt)
−1/2 · Σt · diag(Σt)−1/2, (2.10)
allowing us to analyze the short-run co-movements between the innovations εt.
For illustration purposes, consider a VECM with one cointegration relation-
ship m = 1 and lags q = 2. The term Πpt−1 representing the long-run relationship
in (2.6) is then written as
Πpt−1 =

α1
α2
α3
α4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
(
β1 β2 β3 β4
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β

pe,t−1
pa,t−1
pg,t−1
pc,t−1
 . (2.11)
To identify the long-run relationship between the prices, we can normalize β1 in
the vector β to unity so that β∗2 = β2/β1, β
∗
3 = β3/β1, β
∗
4 = β4/β1. The term
Πpt−1 then becomes
Πpt−1 = αzt−1 =

α1zt−1
α2zt−1
α3zt−1
α4zt−1
 , (2.12)
1In the SVAR model, the Maximum Likelihood methodology is required to estimate Dˆ =
Bˆ−1, while in the traditional VAR model the Cholesky decomposition can be performed with
an estimate of Σˆ obtained from the OLS residuals.
2For details, see Normandin & Phaneuf (2004).
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where
pe,t = β˜2pa,t + β˜3pg,t + β˜4pc,t + zt (2.13)
describes the long-run equilibrium relationship between electricity, emission al-
lowance, natural gas, and coal prices, zt is the ”long-run” error between the prices,
and the parameters β˜i = −β∗i for i = 2, 3, 4 can be interpreted as the elasticities
of EUA, gas, and coal prices with respect to the electricity price. Note that the
VECM prices the ”long-term” risk in energy and CO2 markets through the error
correction term zt (Bansal & Kiku, 2011). The system of dynamic equations in
(2.6) is then given by:
∆pe,t = v˜e,t + α1zt−1 + γ11∆pe,t−1 + γ12∆pa,t−1 + γ13∆pg,t−1 (2.14)
+ γ14∆pc,t−1 + λ′1xt−1 + εe,t,
∆pa,t = v˜a,t + α2zt−1 + γ21∆pe,t−1 + γ22∆pa,t−1 + γ23∆pg,t−1 (2.15)
+ γ24∆pc,t−1 + λ′2xt−1 + εa,t,
∆pg,t = v˜g,t + α3zt−1 + γ31∆pe,t−1 + γ32∆pa,t−1 + γ33∆pg,t−1 (2.16)
+ γ34∆pc,t−1 + λ′3xt−1 + εg,t,
∆pc,t = v˜c,t + α4zt−1 + γ41∆pe,t−1 + γ42∆pa,t−1 + γ43∆pg,t−1 (2.17)
+ γ44∆pc,t−1 + λ′4xt−1 + εc,t.
The statistical innovations ε•,t are given by:
εe,t = b11ue,t + b12ua,t + b13ug,t + b14uc,t, (2.18)
εa,t = b21ue,t + b22ua,t + b23ug,t + b24uc,t, (2.19)
εg,t = b31ue,t + b32ua,t + b33ug,t + b34uc,t, (2.20)
εc,t = b41ue,t + b42ua,t + b43ug,t + b44uc,t. (2.21)
Finally, we assume u•,t ∼ N(0, ω•,t) for • = e, a, g, c, where the time-varying
61
2.2 The model
variances ω•,t follow GARCH(1,1) processes, i.e.
ωe,t = (1− c11 − c12) + c11u2e,t−1 + c12ωe,t−1, (2.22)
ωa,t = (1− c21 − c22) + c21u2a,t−1 + c22ωa,t−1, (2.23)
ωg,t = (1− c31 − c32) + c31u2g,t−1 + c32ωg,t−1, (2.24)
ωc,t = (1− c41 − c42) + c41u2c,t−1 + c42ωc,t−1. (2.25)
It will be useful for the following sections on portfolio allocation to express
the full VECM model in (2.6) compactly in a conditional model of log returns:
rt = µt + εt, (2.26)
where µt = v˜t + Πpt−1 +
q−1∑
j=1
Γjrt−j + λxt−1 (2.27)
and εt ∼ N(0,Σt).
In (2.26) and (2.27) rt ≡ ∆pt defines the vector of returns, µt ≡ E[rt|zt−1] is
the conditional mean, and Σt ≡ E[(rt − µt)(rt − µt)′|zt−1] is the conditional
covariance.
2.2.2 Impulse responses
The contemporaneous and dynamic interactions between the returns of electric-
ity, natural gas, coal, and emission allowances can be analyzed by computing the
impulse-response functions of a one-time shock on the fundamental innovations
ut = (ue,t, ua,t, ug,t, uc,t)
′ in (2.7), where the initial impact of shocks on the endoge-
nous variables is determined by the contemporaneous coefficients in the matrix
B and the effect of the shocks at larger horizons is governed by the parameters
Γi in the VECM in (2.6).
For illustration purposes, consider the case q = 2 and υ˜t = υ. Defining
rt−1 = Lrt where L is the lag operator, we can rewrite the model (2.26) as
follows:
rt = (I4 − Γ1L)−1(µ˜t + εt), (2.28)
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where µ˜t = υ + Πpt−1 + λxt−1 and εt is defined by equation (2.7). Solving (2.28)
yields
rt = µ˜t + Γ1µ˜t−1 + Γ21µ˜t−2 + ...+ εt + Γ1εt−1 + Γ
2
1εt−2 + ...,
= µ˜t + Γ1µ˜t−1 + Γ21µ˜t−2 + ...+ But + Γ1But−1 + Γ
2
1But−2 + .... (2.29)
The response of the endogenous variables in rt to a shock on one of the fun-
damental innovations at an arbitrary horizon h can be obtained by partially
differentiating (2.29) with respect to u•,t−h for • = e, a, g, c. For instance, the
initial response of electricity returns to a shock on the structural innovations of
emission allowances is determined by ∂re,t/∂ua,t|h=0 = b12 (see equation (2.18)).
A similar logic applies for higher horizons h > 1 where the dynamics enter via
Γh1 .
2.2.3 Estimation procedure
We estimate model (2.26) in three main steps. The first step consists of estimating
the long-run coefficients β by means of the Johansen reduced rank procedure
(Johansen, 1995). The second step consists of estimating the short-run coefficients
v, α,Γi, and λ by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). For the computation
of the standard errors of the VECM parameters, we use the heteroscedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix estimator proposed by White (1980).3
In the third step, following Normandin & Phaneuf (2004), we use the OLS
estimates of the statistical innovations εˆt to estimate the contemporaneous and
GARCH parameters B, C1, and C2, respectively, by means of maximum likeli-
hood. The log-likelihood of the sample assuming that the statistical innovations
are conditionally Gaussian is given by
L(Θ|ε) = −4T
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
T∑
t=1
log(|Σt|)− 1
2
T∑
t=1
εˆ′tΣ
−1
t εˆt, (2.30)
where ε = (εˆ1, ..., εˆT )
′ are the observations and Θ is a vector containing the
3We also experimented with Generalized Least Squares estimation but the results were
qualitatively similar.
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elements of B, C1, and C2. The log-likelihood is maximized over the parameter
space Θ using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) optimization algorithm.
2.3 Portfolio allocation and dynamic trading stra-
tegies
In this section we will present an application of our empirical model to a portfolio
allocation problem of an investor holding power, natural gas, coal, and emission
allowance futures in his portfolio. Such a portfolio analysis could be relevant
for investors following hedging or speculation motives that will be described in
the next section. We will then present the derivation of optimal time-varying
portfolio weights for different investment objectives and describe the methodology
for forecasting the conditional mean and covariance from our empirical model.
Finally, we will discuss measures to test the performance of dynamic trading
strategies based on the different investment objectives.
2.3.1 Trading commodity futures
A futures contract is a derivative contract whose value depends on the value of
an underlying asset such as an equity or commodity. It consists of an agreement
between two entities to buy or sell an asset at a certain maturity date at today’s
price of the futures contract. More precisely, the buyer of a futures contract buys
the underlying asset at the current price (long position) and sells it at a future
date at an unknown price. On the other hand, the seller of a futures contract
sells the underlying asset at the current price (short position) and buys it back at
a future date at an unknown price. Thus, the buyer (seller) of a futures contract
benefits from increasing (decreasing) prices of the underlying asset in the future.
A futures contract generally contains standardized features such as the quan-
tity and quality of the underlying asset, the date of delivery, the units of price
quotation, the minimum price changes, and the form of settlement. The main dif-
ference between commodity and financial futures concerns the settlement of the
contracts, which in the case of commodity futures usually involves the physical
delivery of the underlying commodity. Physical delivery of commodity futures
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raises important issues that do not arise in the case of financial futures where the
physical attribute is missing, such as storage facilities and costs, capacity con-
straints, transport costs, and the quality of the asset. However, some commodity
futures may also be cash-settled according to the spot price of the underlying
commodity at the respective settlement date.
The final settlement price of a futures contract is determined at the end of the
last trading day and delivery of the underlying commodity or cash-settlement is
executed at this price. A futures contract can also be offset prior to its maturity
date by entering into an equal opposite transaction. Participation in futures
trading serves three main objectives: hedging, speculation, and arbitrage that
will be briefly explained in the following.
• Hedging: A market participant who wishes to reduce the risk associated
with the price development of an asset can use futures contracts to hedge
against this risk. For example, a producer of coal-generated electricity who
wants to hedge against the risk of coal price increases in the future may
conclude a hedging transaction by buying a corresponding amount of coal
futures at the current market price (long hedge). If the coal price effectively
increases in the future, he can offset the additional input costs through the
revenues from selling the coal futures. On the other hand, if the coal price
decreases in the future he can offset the loss on the futures position through
lower production input costs. Therefore, the objective of hedging is not to
make profits but to fix a price for the future.
• Speculation: A market participant who wants to make profits by speculating
on future price movements of a commodity without having to handle the
issues of transportation and storage of the commodity can open a long
(short) position in a corresponding futures contract depending on whether
he speculates on the commodity price to increase (decrease) in the future.
• Arbitrage: A market participant who takes advantage of the divergence
between prices of the same product across different markets can obtain
arbitrage profits by taking offsetting positions in the two markets. Similarly,
arbitrage opportunities arise when the price of a futures contract deviates
65
2.3 Portfolio allocation and dynamic trading strategies
from its fair value, which, according to the cost-of-carry model, is given by
the discounted value of the spot price and the present value of all storage
costs. Thus, arbitrage ensures that the futures price converges to the spot
price of the underlying commodity upon expiry of the futures contract.
2.3.2 The portfolio allocation problem
In the following we will analyze the optimal dynamic portfolio choice of a risk
averse investor in a mean-variance framework. For this purpose, let τ denote an
arbitrary point in time such that τ ∈ (1, 2, ..., T ). For simplicity of exposition,
we consider an investor with investment horizon h at τ + h|h=1. The investors’
preferences are defined over the conditional mean and covariance of future returns,
given by µτ+1|τ ≡ E[rτ+1|zτ ], and Στ+1|τ ≡ E[(rτ+1−µτ+1|τ )(rτ+1−µτ+1|τ )′|zτ ],
respectively, where zτ denotes the current information available at time τ . We
further let µp,τ+1, and σ
2
p,τ+1 denote the conditional mean and variance of the
portfolio returns rp,τ+1 at time τ + 1. Following Han (2006), we analyze the
portfolio allocation problem under three different mean-variance objectives.
Strategy 1: The investor seeks to maximize his expected mean-variance utility
function at time τ given by
max{E[u(Wτ+1)] = µp,τ+1 − γ
2
σ2p,τ+1}, (2.31)
with µp,τ+1 = w
′
1,τµτ+1|τ + (1− w′1,τ1)if ,
and σ2p,τ+1 = w
′
1,τΣτ+1|τw1,τ ,
where Wτ+1 denotes terminal wealth, w1,τ is a vector of portfolio weights, γ is
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and if is the return on the risk-free asset.
The solution to the maximization problem yields the optimal portfolio weights:
w1,τ =
1
γ
Σ−1τ+1|τ (µτ+1|τ − 1if ). (2.32)
Strategy 2: The investor wishes to minimize volatility by minimizing the
conditional variance for a given level of conditional expected return. The investor
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then solves
min{σ2p,τ+1 = w′2,τΣτ+1|τw2,τ} (2.33)
s.t. w′2,τµτ+1|τ + (1− w′2,τ1)if = µ∗p,
where w2,τ and µ
∗
p are the vector of optimal portfolio weights and the target
expected return, respectively. The resulting portfolio weights are
w2,τ = Σ
−1
τ+1|τ (µτ+1|τ − 1if )
µ∗p − if
κτ
(2.34)
with κτ = (µτ+1|τ − 1if )′Σ−1τ+1|τ (µτ+1|τ − 1if ).
Strategy 3: The investor aims at maximizing the conditional expected return
for a given level of conditional volatility σ∗p. The objective function then becomes
max{µp,τ+1 = w′3,τµτ+1|τ + (1− w′3,τ1)if} (2.35)
s.t. w′3,τµτ+1|τ + (1− w′3,τ1)if = (σ∗p)2,
where the vector of optimal portfolio weights w3,τ is given by
w3,τ = Σ
−1
τ+1|τ (µτ+1|τ − 1if )
√
(σ∗p)2
κτ
. (2.36)
2.3.3 Forecasting methodology
The trading strategies discussed in the previous section will be analyzed at var-
ious rebalancing horizons h. Let Π̂, Γ̂i, λ̂, B̂, Ĉ1, Ĉ2 denote estimated parameters
of the VECM-OGARCH model. Following Lu¨tkepohl (2007), forecasts of the
conditional mean for horizons h = 1, 2, ..., H at time τ are computed recursively
as follows:
µ̂τ+h|τ = v̂τ+h + Π̂zτ+h−1|τ + Γ̂1rτ+h−1|τ + ...+ Γ̂q−1rτ+h−q|τ + λ̂xτ+h−1|τ . (2.37)
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Given Ω̂τ+1 obtained from (2.9), forecasts of the conditional variance for horizons
h = 2, ..., H at time τ are computed recursively as follows:
Σ̂τ+h|τ = B̂Ω̂τ+h|τB̂′, (2.38)
Ω̂τ+h|τ = I4 + (Ĉ1 + Ĉ2)h−1(Ω̂τ+1 − I4). (2.39)
2.3.4 Performance measures
To evaluate the risk and return performance of the dynamic trading strategies gen-
erated from the different investment objectives we follow Han (2006) in computing
three measures for risk-adjusted returns, the ex-ante and ex-post Sharpe ratios
(Sharpe, 1966), and the Modigliani risk-adjusted perfomance measure (Modigliani
& Modigliani, 1997). The Sharpe ratios are calculated as follows:
SR =
(µp − if )
σp
, (2.40)
where µp and σp are the ex-ante or ex-post mean and standard deviation of the
portfolio returns and if is the risk-free interest rate. According to (2.40) the
Sharpe ratio measures the excess return of an investment per unit of risk. There-
fore, a higher Sharpe ratio implies a higher compensation for the risk incurred
compared to the risk-free rate. However, the Sharpe ratio has a major weakness
as it is difficult to interpret the difference between the Sharpe ratios of differ-
ent trading strategies, for instance how much better is a trading strategy with
SR = 0.3 compared to a strategy with SR = 0.1.
Alternatively, the Modigliani risk-adjusted performance measure (M2) com-
putes the risk-adjusted return of a portfolio relative to the (market) benchmark.
It can be derived from the Sharpe ratio and has the advantage of yielding the
investment’s performance relative to the benchmark in percentage terms. This
makes the Modigliani measure easier to interpret than the Sharpe ratio. The M2
measure is given by
M2 =
σb
σp
(µp − if )− (µb − if ) = σb(SRp − SRb), (2.41)
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where µb, σb, and SRb are the mean, the standard deviation, and the Sharpe ratio
of the benchmark portfolio, respectively. Therefore, the M2 measure expresses
the return an investment with a given risk and return would have achieved if it
had the same risk as the benchmark portfolio. A higher value of M2 thus implies
a higher risk-adjusted return of an investment or trading strategy compared to
the benchmark (Simons, 1998).
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Endogenous variables
We use prices of future contracts of power, natural gas, coal, and EU allowances
(in natural logarithmic scale) as endogenous variables in the VECM. All contracts
are traded on the European Energy Exchange (EEX), one of the major energy
exchanges in continental Europe. Our analysis focuses on the second trading
phase of the EU-ETS from 2008 – 2012 since according to Rickels et al. (2007) and
Hintermann (2010), common stochastic trends in the EUA and fossil-fuel prices
were absent in the first trading phase, most probably due to the immaturity of
the emission market. In particular, our sample period ranges from July 2007,
when natural gas trading was launched at the EEX, until November 2009.
We use futures contracts with similar maturities in order to avoid price differ-
ences arising from different maturity dates. In particular, the power, natural gas,
and coal futures contracts are year futures with delivery in January 2010. Since
EUA futures contracts already reach maturity in December, we use the futures
contract with the closest possible maturity to the other futures, i.e. the December
2009 futures. All prices are converted to e/tCO2.4 An alternative would have
been to measure all prices in e/MWh, but to our knowledge there is no standard
way of converting emission allowances denoted in tCO2 to MWh.
4The coal price is converted from US-Dollar ($) to Euro (e) with the exchange rate pub-
lished by the European Central Bank. To convert the prices from MWh to tCO2 we use the
following emission factors: 0.2016 tCO2/MWh for natural gas, 0.3384 tCO2/MWh for bitu-
minous coal, and 0.572 tCO2/MWh for the German power mix in 2008 (including fossil-fuel,
nuclear, and renewable energy). The emission factors for gas, coal, and power are provided by
Umweltbundesamt (2010) and Umweltbundesamt (2011), respectively.
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Figure 2.1 shows plots of the prices of power (baseload and peakload), emission
allowance, natural gas, and coal futures. All price plots display a sharp increase
of the commodity prices in 2007 and 2008, mainly driven by increasing demand
for fossil-fuels such as crude oil and coal from developing countries such as China
and India. This development was followed by a sudden price drop starting in
the second half of 2008, when the financial crisis triggered on the U.S. subprime
credit market began to impact on the global economy. Similarly, the low price
levels in 2009 were characterized by declining demand for energy due to the
economic downturn. In the case of emission allowances, 2007 was the last year of
the first trading period, which had been characterized by a large excess supply
of emission allowances, causing EUA spot prices to drop to zero by the end of
the year. Therefore, the high price level of EUA futures in 2007 shows that the
market was already expecting a tighter allowance allocation in the second trading
period.
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Figure 2.1: Prices of power, natural gas, coal, and EUA futures
Table 2.1 summarizes the main characteristics of the EEX futures contracts.
Cascading of futures means that before the beginning of the delivery period ev-
ery open position in year futures is replaced with equivalent positions in month
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futures for the delivery months from January until March and quarter futures
for the second through to the fourth delivery quarter, where the delivery peri-
ods taken together correspond to the delivery year. Similarly, open positions in
quarter futures are cascaded into equivalent positions in month futures before
the commencement of the delivery period. In other words, before the beginning
of the delivery period a trader holding an open position in a natural gas year
future with delivery in January 2010 will receive three natural gas month fu-
ture contracts for the months from January to March 2010 and three natural
gas quarter future contracts for the second, third, and fourth quarter of the year
2010. Ultimately, the EEX natural gas futures are settled physically, i.e. the
buyer (seller) of a natural gas month future is obliged to buy (deliver) the agreed
quantity of gas during every delivery day of the delivery month at the final set-
tlement price.5 Similarly, the German power month future is settled physically
through the delivery of power into the area of the German transmission operator
Amprion. By contrast, the EEX coal month future is settled financially, where
the final settlement price is established on the basis of the underlying coal index
from the Argus/McCloskey Coal Price Index Report. Thus, EEX coal futures can
be traded for hedging or speculation purposes, but not with the aim of obtaining
physical delivery of coal. Finally, the EUA future is settled through delivery on
the first trading day in December of the corresponding delivery year.
5Natural gas contracts for two different market areas can be traded on the EEX (Gaspool
and NetConnect Germany), which together correspond to 95% of the natural gas volume sold
in Germany.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of EEX year futures contracts
Contract Underlying Delivery Period Fulfilment
German Power Physical delivery Jan 2010 Cascading/
Future of power Physical settlement
Natural Gas Physical delivery Jan 2010 Cascading/
Future (NCG) of natural gas Physical settlement
Coal ARA Argus/McCloskey Jan 2010 Cascading/
Future API 2 coal price index Cash settlement
EUA EU allowances for the Dec 2009 Delivery
Future 2nd commitment period
2.4.2 Exogenous variables
As exogenous variables in the VECM we use Brent crude oil spot returns (in
natural logarithm, denoted in e/tCO2), earnings growth in the utility sector, and
several weather-related indices.6 Although oil is not a major primary energy input
used in European utilities, its price level and volatility is generally considered
an important determinant of other energy-related prices and volatilities. We
therefore consider oil returns as an exogenous variable. In addition, we calculate
earnings growth of the DAX Utilities Xetra Index, which we interpret as a proxy
for economic growth in the utility sector.7
In addition, energy and CO2 prices may be affected by climatic conditions. For
instance, temperatures above or below their average level lead to above-average
energy demand (for heating and cooling), inducing an upward pressure on energy
and CO2 prices. Moreover, above-average precipitation reduces demand for con-
ventional energy sources due to higher production by hydroelectric utilities and
will thus have a mitigating impact on energy and CO2 prices. We also compute
squared terms of the temperature and precipitation series. The reason is that
there may be nonlinear relationships between climate and energy demand. For
6For the sake of brevity, here we only describe the weather indices used in the main model
specification. Appendix B.1 provides the description of the weather indices used in the alter-
native specifications.
7The DAX Utilities Index is a sectorial index including electricity and water utilities, oil
and gas distribution utilities, and multi-utilities.
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instance, when the reservoirs of hydroelectric utilities approach their capacity
limits, additional precipitation is expected to have a smaller effect on hydroelec-
tric production than when reservoirs are empty. By contrast, temperature may
have an increasing marginal effect on energy demand, because energy demand
increases for both very low and very high levels of outside temperature. Ac-
cording to Hintermann (2010), traders in the energy markets are likely to take
into account not only the weather on a given day, but also past and forecasted
weather. We therefore follow his approach in calculating 5-day moving averages
of the daily weather deviations from their historical mean.
We use daily climate data from more than 50 weather stations in Europe
(Germany, France, Spain, and Italy). We aggregate the temperature data by
multiplying each series with its respective regional population weight since, pre-
sumably, temperatures in more populated regions might have a larger impact on
energy prices than temperatures in less populated regions. Similarly, we weigh
the precipitation series according to hydroelectric capacity in each country.8
Finally, we construct seasonal dummy variables that are vectors containing
zeros and ones as entries. For instance, entries in the summer dummy receive
the value 1 when the day falls into the summer season (April-October) and 0
otherwise. The weather data is obtained from the European Climate Assessment
and Dataset (http://eca.knmi.nl). The data on Brent crude oil spot prices and
the DAX Utilities index (price index and price-earnings ratio) are obtained from
Datastream. Table 2.2 summarizes the exogenous variables used in the main
model specification.
Table 2.2: Exogenous variables
Index Description
OILt Brent spot returns
EARt Earnings growth rate of the DAX Utilities Xetra Index
MATt, MAT
2
t 5-day moving average of temperature deviation and squared term
MAPt, MAP
2
t 5-day moving average of precipitation deviation and squared term
DSt, DWt Dummy for the summer (S) and winter (W ) season
8Appendix B.1 provides a detailed description of the construction of the weather indices.
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2.4.3 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics of the log returns of power (baseload and peakload),
emission allowances, natural gas, and coal futures are summarized in Table 2.3.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the distribution of log returns. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show
plots of the log returns, the squared log returns and the corresponding autocorre-
lation functions. Together with Table 2.3 the plots indicate that the future price
series have typical asset price characteristics such as non-stationarity in levels
(see Figure 2.1), non-normal distribution of returns, excess kurtosis, and volatil-
ity clustering. Although the log returns are mostly uncorrelated, the squared log
returns exhibit some autocorrelation, which appears to die out slowly at higher
lags. To confirm the non-stationarity of the log price series we perform several
unit-root tests. The unit-root test results are provided in Appendix B.2.
In addition, Table 2.3 shows that the average returns of power, natural gas,
and emission allowances were negative for the analyzed sample period. This
suggests that an investor would have had a negative return had he or she bought
and held a position in one of these commodities. To what extent an investor
would have improved such an outcome within a portfolio of these assets will be
treated in Section 2.5.2.1.
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of log returns
Log returns Mean Std. dev. Kurtosis Skewness
Power baseload -0.0294 1.4385 7.4985 -0.2079
Power peakload -0.0550 1.7818 6.6904 -0.1176
EUA -0.0145 0.4307 4.3270 -0.4375
Natural Gas -0.0775 2.2193 6.6619 0.2716
Coal 0.0001 0.0599 9.4682 -0.8517
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Figure 2.2: Histograms of log returns of power, natural gas, coal, and EUA futures
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Figure 2.3: Log returns and squared log returns of futures contracts of power,
natural gas, coal, and EUA futures
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Figure 2.4: Autocorrelation functions for log returns and squared log returns of
power, natural gas, coal, and EUA futures
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2.5 Results
In this section we will describe the results of the empirical analysis of power,
CO2, gas, and coal returns. We will first present the results of the in-sample
analysis studying the long-run equilibrium and short-run interactions between the
endogenous variables. We will then calculate their impulse-response functions and
analyze the impact of unexpected shocks on the commodity returns. Second, we
will describe the results of the out-of-sample analysis, using the model forecasts
for a dynamic portfolio application. Two empirical models are specified, including
either the log return of baseload (BL) power or the log return of peakload (PL)
power as endogenous variable.
2.5.1 In-sample analysis: Empirical interrelationships be-
tween energy and CO2 returns
2.5.1.1 Cointegration testing
Before estimating our empirical model we have to test for the presence of coin-
tegration relationships between the log prices in pt. Cointegration between the
log prices of power, CO2, gas, and coal implies that one (or more) ”long-run
equilibrium” relation(s) exist between those prices. The number of cointegration
relationships between the observable variables is indicated by the rank of the ma-
trix Π in equation (2.27). To test for the number of cointegrating relations, we
use the Johansen trace test introduced by Johansen (1995), which evaluates the
following hypothesis:
H0 : rk(Π) = m versus H1 : rk(Π) > m,
where m = 0, ..., k − 1 are the number of cointegration relations and k is the
dimension of the vector of observable variables.9 In our case, since we have four
variables in pt, the maximum cointegration rank of Π is three. We estimate the
model including an intercept in the VECM (we do not find statistically significant
evidence of a trend) and one lag in the endogenous variables (the lag order was
9The eigenvalue test yields qualitatively similar results.
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selected via Schwarz criterion). The results of the trace test are reported in Table
2.4, indicating that we can reject the null of no cointegration at the 1% significance
level for the model with baseload power prices and at the 5% significance level for
the model with peakload power prices, respectively. Since we cannot reject H0 :
rk(Π) = 1 for both models at any significance level, we include one cointegration
relationship in the subsequent analysis. The empirical results presented in the
following sections are based on the finding of a cointegration rank of one.
H0 Test Statistic Critical Values
Baseload Peakload 1% 5% 10%
specification (BL) specification (PL)
0 62.56 60.72 60.81 53.94 50.50
1 20.26 24.12 40.78 35.07 32.25
2 6.63 6.82 24.69 20.16 17.98
3 1.25 0.92 12.53 9.14 7.60
Table 2.4: Johansen trace test for pe,t, pa,t, pg,t, pc,t. Estimation including a
constant and one lag in the VECM.
2.5.1.2 Long-run estimation analysis
The estimation results for the long-run relationship between electricity, emission
allowances, natural gas, and coal prices are reported in Table 2.5, where the
estimated cointegration coefficients (β̂) represent the equilibrium relationship be-
tween the price of electricity and the prices of the other endogenous variables. In
the baseload specification pe,t is given by:
pe,t = 0̂.1954pa,t + 0̂.1711pg,t + 0̂.3299pc,t + zt.
In the peakload specification pe,t is given by:
pe,t = 0̂.1495pa,t + 0̂.3463pg,t + 0̂.2169pc,t + zt.
In line with economic intuition the signs of the long-run coefficients in the above
equations are positive, implying that an increase in one of the variables will have
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a positive impact on electricity prices. As we model log prices we can directly
interpret the long-run coefficients as price elasticities. Hence, a 1% increase,
for instance, in natural gas prices would lead to a 0.17% increase in baseload
electricity prices.
Interestingly, the long-run coefficient attached to natural gas prices is almost
twice as high in the peakload specification than in the baseload specification,
whereas the long-run coefficient attached to coal prices are considerably higher in
the baseload specification than in the peakload specification. The reason could
be that in periods of high electricity demand (i.e. peakload) the marginal plant
is typically a gas-fired power plant, whereas in periods of baseload electricity
demand the marginal power plant is typically coal-fired.
Baseload specification Peakload specification
pe,t pa,t pg,t pc,t pe,t pa,t pg,t pc,t
1.000 -0.1954 -0.1711 -0.3299 1.000 -0.1495 -0.3463 -0.2169
- [-9.519] [-13.627] [-15.950] - [-5.208] [-19.731] [-7.501]
Table 2.5: Estimated long-run coefficients of the cointegration relationship (β̂)
with t-ratios in brackets
Figure 2.5 provides a plot of the (demeaned) error-correction term zt (also
known as the ”long-run equilibrium” error) in the baseload specification, repre-
senting the part of the power price pe,t that is not explained by the prices for
EUA, gas, and coal pa,t, pg,t, pc,t, respectively. As can be seen from Figure 2.5,
the error-correction term is mean reverting and fluctuates around a zero mean.
In other words, power prices have to decrease (increase) when they are too high
(low) with respect to the ”long-run” trend, given by the linear combination of
pe,t, pa,t, pg,t, and pc,t. The error-correction term zt also exhibits some jumps
between July 2008 and February 2009, which corresponds to the period where
the underlying commodity prices sharply increased and then collapsed.
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Figure 2.5: Error correction term (demeaned) in the baseload specification.
2.5.1.3 Short-run estimation analysis
The coefficients of the cointegration vector describe the long-run equilibrium
relationship between the endogenous variables but do not provide information
concerning the short-run dynamics of the system. The estimation results of the
short-run dynamics for model specification 1 are presented in Table 2.6. In model
specification 1, the exogenous variables include crude oil returns, earnings growth
in the utility sector, 5-day moving averages of temperatures and rainfall devia-
tions from their historical averages and squared terms of the latter two variables.
For robustness, we also estimate the model with alternative specifications, where
we vary the weather indicators included in the exogenous variable matrix. To
save on space we provide the results of the alternative model specifications 2-4 in
Appendix B.3.
In general, we find that the results of the short-run estimation analysis are
quite robust across the different model specifications. However, the specifications
including baseload electricity prices show a better performance in terms of the
error-correction coefficients than the peakload specifications. This is in line with
the results of the cointegration test, where the null of no cointegration relationship
could only be rejected at the 10% level in the peakload specification. Besides the
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error-correction coefficients, the short-run dynamics show very similar results for
the baseload and peakload power specifications. While in the long run there is a
considerably different relationship between power prices, fossil-fuel, and emission
prices, depending on whether peakload or baseload power prices are considered,
driven by the different types of power plants employed at the margin, we do not
detect such a difference in the short run. This implies that in the short run the
price determinants for baseload and peakload power are largely the same.
The first row in Table 2.6 reports the estimates for the error-correction coef-
ficients (α̂) determining the speed of adjustment of the variables to the long-run
equilibrium. The error-correction coefficients are statistically significant at the 5%
level for electricity, emission allowances, and natural gas returns in the baseload
specification and for electricity and emission allowances in the peakload speci-
fication. The error-correction coefficient is not statistically significant for coal
returns, indicating that the long-run equilibrium error zt does not have explana-
tory power for coal returns. This is consistent with the fact that the underlying
coal price index of the futures contract is determined by demand and supply on
the world market.
Concerning the short-run interrelationships between the returns of the endoge-
nous variables (’Endo.’ in Table 2.6), past electricity returns have predictability
power for natural gas and coal returns in all model specifications. Moreover,
EUA returns are explained by their own lagged returns, and gas returns have
predictability power for coal returns. In addition, past EUA, gas, and coal re-
turns do not have predictability power for electricity returns. This contrasts the
findings of Bunn & Fezzi (2007) and Fell (2010) who have pointed out a significant
impact of past gas and EUA returns on current electricity returns. Moreover, we
find no significant short-run interactions between EUA returns and coal and gas
returns, respectively.
Among the exogenous variables (’Exo.’ in Table 2.6), past oil returns have pre-
dictability power at the 5% significance level for EUA returns. Moreover, EUA,
coal, and gas returns are explained by lagged earnings growth in the utilities sector
at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Among the weather variables
included in specification 1, past squared winter temperatures have predictabil-
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ity power for EUA returns at the 5% significance level. Both past precipitation
indices have predictability power for coal returns at the 10% significance level.
In our context interpreting the signs of the weather coefficients is not a sim-
ple task. Since we will use our model for forecasting, the conditional mean µt
in (2.27) is strictly based on past information and thus on lagged exogenous
variables. Therefore, we cannot consider the instantaneous effect of weather on
the endogenous variables. Moreover, weather events generally might be less pro-
nounced for prices of futures contracts than for spot contracts.
The contemporaneous interactions among the electricity, EUA, gas, and coal
returns are described via the parameters attached to the fundamental innovations
ut (’Cont.’ in Table 2.6). The coefficients attached to the fundamental error term
of the electricity return equation ue,t are statistically significant at the 5% level
in both model specifications. This implies that an unexpected shock on the elec-
tricity returns would lead to statistically significant instantaneous increases of
electricity, EUA, natural gas, and coal returns. Moreover, the fundamental inno-
vations related to emission allowance returns ua,t have a positive and statistically
significant impact for electricity and EUA returns at the 5% level, and for natural
gas returns at the 10% level. The fundamental innovations related to natural gas
and coal returns ug,t and uc,t have explanatory power at the 5% level for their
own returns, respectively. In addition, coal returns have a statistically significant
contemporaneous impact at the 5% level on gas returns in the baseload specifica-
tion. Finally, the last four rows in Table 2.6 (’Vol.’) show that almost all ARCH
and GARCH parameters are statistically significant at the 5% level indicating
that the statistical innovations of the VECM are conditionally heteroscedastic.
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Independent Baseload specification 1 Peakload specification 1
variables re,t ra,t rg,t rc,t re,t ra,t rg,t rc,t
Cons. υ 35.5836 53.7195 21.0960 19.5721 17.5394 32.8297 9.7926 7.9356
[4.56] [3.69] [2.03] [1.55] [4.41] [3.77] [1.46] [1.08]
zt−1 -0.1223 -0.1844 -0.0724 -0.0673 -0.0658 -0.1228 -0.0366 -0.0298
[-4.56] [-3.69] [-2.03] [-1.55] [-4.42] [-3.77] [-1.46] [-1.08]
re,t−1 0.1180 -0.1094 0.2586 0.2421 0.1121 -0.1191 0.2074 0.2178
[1.61] [-0.58] [2.60] [2.50] [1.57] [-0.58] [2.14] [2.08]
Endo. ra,t−1 0.0220 0.1438 -0.0038 -0.0370 0.0174 0.1489 0.0178 -0.0190
Γ̂1 [0.68] [1.91] [-0.09] [-0.80] [0.61] [2.0] [0.45] [-0.42]
rg,t−1 0.0243 0.0400 -0.1048 0.1049 0.0495 0.0209 -0.0976 0.1097
[0.65] [0.61] [-1.49] [1.72] [1.56] [0.32] [-1.40] [1.78]
rc,t−1 -0.0558 -0.1289 0.0045 -0.1065 -0.0616 -0.1310 0.0395 -0.0802
[-1.06] [-1.30] [0.08] [-1.55] [-1.49] [-1.44] [0.75] [-1.26]
OILt−1 -0.0192 -0.1008 0.0507 0.0341 -0.0000 -0.0993 0.0493 0.0337
[-0.69] [-2.19] [1.24] [0.75] [-0.00] [-2.17] [1.21] [0.74]
EARt−1 -0.0087 -0.0549 -0.0250 -0.0293 -0.0020 -0.0521 -0.0228 -0.0273
[-0.88] [-3.17] [-1.79] [-2.46] [-0.20] [-3.14] [-1.69] [-2.34]
MAPt−1 0.0033 0.0029 -0.0046 0.0106 0.0040 0.0044 -0.0041 0.0110
[0.77] [0.35] [-0.73] [1.76] [1.09] [0.51] [-0.65] [1.81]
MATWt−1 -0.0300 -0.0211 -0.0396 -0.0163 -0.0349 -0.0299 -0.0353 -0.0105
[-0.76] [-0.31] [-0.67] [-0.26] [-1.14] [-0.44] [-0.61] [-0.17]
Exo. MATSt−1 0.0019 0.0242 -0.0434 0.0215 -0.0094 0.0007 -0.0516 0.0134
λ̂ [-0.05] [0.37] [-0.80] [0.36] [-0.28] [0.01] [-0.93] [0.22]
MAP 2t−1 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004
[1.26] [0.90] [0.21] [1.79] [0.85] [0.84] [0.04] [1.62]
MATW 2t−1 -0.0032 -0.0479 -0.0178 0.0042 0.0018 -0.0479 -0.0181 0.0040
[-0.34] [-2.54] [-1.06] [0.22] [0.26] [-2.53] [-1.07] [0.22]
MATS2t−1 0.0125 0.0080 -0.0127 0.0016 0.0161 0.0161 0.0095 0.0009
[0.66] [0.26] [-0.55] [0.06] [0.96] [0.31] [-0.56] [0.03]
ue,t 0.7600 0.5811 0.5266 0.7372 0.5862 0.4866 0.4857 0.6965
[4.84] [4.21] [4.66] [4.43] [3.58] [3.34] [3.54] [3.44]
ua,t 0.2282 2.2348 0.1748 0.1598 0.1921 2.3110 0.2715 0.2223
Cont. [3.90] [6.60] [1.78] [0.96] [3.45] [5.53] [2.58] [1.48]
B̂ ug,t 0.0598 0.2119 1.3825 0.0531 0.0278 0.1206 1.3867 0.1166
[1.69] [1.89] [16.54] [0.68] [0.92] [1.15] [23.08] [1.37]
uc,t 0.0029 -0.0678 0.2778 1.0386 -0.1192 -0.1366 0.1774 1.0884
[0.05] [-0.33] [2.83] [4.95] [-1.77] [-0.70] [1.59] [6.59]
ωe,t ωa,t ωg,t ωc,t ωe,t ωa,t ωg,t ωc,t
ω•,t−1 0.8839 0.8417 0.9042 0.9476 0.8929 0.8578 0.1680 0.9366
Vol. [9.80] [5.46] [4.76] [4.38] [6.68] [5.18] [0.96] [6.56]
Ĉ u2•,t−1 0.1067 0.1232 0.0464 0.0461 0.0991 0.1174 0.1710 0.0513
[5.05] [2.06] [0.11] [1.76] [3.83] [2.23] [2.88] [2.39]
Table 2.6: VECM with orthogonal GARCH errors, specification 1: mean/variance
equations and contemporaneous coefficients. OLS estimation of the mean equa-
tion with heteroscedasticity consistent t-ratios in brackets. Maximum likelihood
estimation of the contemporaneous coefficients and variance coefficients with t-
ratios in brackets. Bold (italic) entries indicate significance of the coefficients at
the 5% (10%) significance level.
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Figure 2.6 shows plots of the time-varying volatilities of electricity, EUA, gas,
and coal returns in baseload specification 1. Similar to the plots of the log returns
(Figure 2.3), the time-varying volatility plots display periods of higher and lower
volatility and volatility clustering. In the power, EUA, and coal markets, the
volatility is rather low in the beginning of the sample period, then increases in
the second half of the sample, and declines towards the end of the sample period.
The increase in volatility falls into the period of the global financial crisis, which
started in the late summer of 2007 and lasted until (at least) spring 2009. The
natural gas market, apart from the higher volatility during the financial crisis,
also displays a peak in volatility in the first half and increasing volatility towards
the end of the sample period. Moreover, the occurrence of volatility seems to
coincide across the markets, which is particularly evident in the power and coal
markets.
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Figure 2.6: Time-varying volatilities of electricity, EUA, natural gas, and coal
returns in baseload specification 1.
In addition, Figure 2.7 displays the time-varying correlations amongst the
statistical innovations ε̂t. All correlations are positive and, as expected, the
highest correlations can be observed between electricity returns and returns of
85
2.5 Results
the three ”input factors” coal, gas, and emissions allowances. The lowest time-
varying correlations are found between EUA and gas returns, and EUA and coal
returns, respectively. Moreover, the correlations between EUA and gas returns
and EUA and coal returns move closely together. The same co-movement holds
for the correlations between power and gas returns, and gas and coal returns,
respectively. In addition, there are large variations in the correlations over time.
For instance, the correlation between power and coal returns varies considerably
(lying between 0.3 and almost 0.9), whereas the correlation between power and
EUA returns remains relatively stable (ranging between 0.5 and 0.72). The time-
varying correlations for the peakload specification 1 are very similar, except that
the correlation between power and coal is significantly lower than in the baseload
specification. As was already mentioned before, this could be due to the fact
that a stronger relationship exists between baseload power and coal returns than
between peakload power and coal returns.
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Figure 2.7: Time-varying correlations between electricity, EUA, natural gas, and
coal returns in baseload specification BL.1.
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2.5.1.4 Impulse-response analysis
In the following, we will describe the responses of electricity, emission allowance,
natural gas, and coal returns to unexpected one-standard-deviation shocks enter-
ing the system through the fundamental innovations u•,t with • = e, a, g, c given
by equation (2.7). The unconditional variances of the fundamental innovations
are normalized, i.e. V ar[u•,t] = 1. Therefore, we can interpret the impulse re-
sponses as unit changes of the endogenous variables following a one-unit shock
on the corresponding fundamental residuals.
The dynamic responses of all variables to the fundamental shocks are shown
in Figure 2.8 for baseload specification 1 (BL.1), where the four plots in Fig-
ure 2.8 display the impulse-response functions (IRF) of baseload power returns,
emission allowance returns, natural gas returns, and coal returns to shocks on the
fundamental innovations ue,t, ua,t, ug,t, and uc,t, respectively, under identification
through heteroscedasticity (IH).10 Following our explanation in Section 2.2.2, the
values of the coefficients in the contemporaneous coefficient matrix B̂ determine
the initial impacts of one-time shocks at horizon h = 0 on the endogenous vari-
ables, whereas at higher horizons h > 0 the responses are determined by the
short-run dynamics of the VECM.
A common feature of all plots in Figure 2.8 is that a particular commodity’s
return generally shows the strongest instantaneous reaction to shocks on its own
fundamental innovations, respectively. Apart from the strong instantaneous re-
actions to their ”own” fundamental shocks, EUA, gas, and coal returns exhibit
the strongest instantaneous response to a shock on the fundamental innovations
related to power returns ue,t. This indicates that the contemporaneous interac-
tions between returns of the output electricity and returns of its three inputs coal,
gas, and emission allowances are higher than the contemporaneous interactions
among the returns of the inputs. Finally, all the shocks are transitory and fade
out after approximately three days.
As can be noted from the first plot in Figure 2.8, power returns exhibit a
positive instantaneous reaction to a one-unit shock on the fundamental innova-
tions related to EUA returns, which is statistically significant at the 5% level.
10The impulse responses obtained for the peakload specification PL.1 are very similar.
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By contrast, power returns show almost no sizable reaction to shocks on gas and
coal returns. The impulse responses of EUA returns illustrated in the second
plot in Figure 2.8 show a positive instantaneous reaction to a one-time shock on
electricity returns, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Similarly, an
unexpected shock on gas returns leads to a positive contemporaneous reaction
of EUA returns, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. By contrast,
EUA returns have a negative instantaneous reaction to a one-time shock on coal
returns. This observation may be interesting from a policy perspective since it
indicates that, due to the fixed supply of emission allowances, an increase in the
coal price may be accompanied by a decrease in the EUA price (due to lower
demand for EUAs).11 Moreover, this would imply that the negative reaction of
EUA prices mitigates the effect of increasing coal prices on the power price. By
contrast, the reason why the reaction of EUA returns to shocks on gas returns
is positive may be that increasing gas prices lead to increased demand for coal
(i.e. there is fuel switching from gas to coal), thus increasing demand and prices
of EUAs. In the third plot in Figure 2.8 natural gas returns exhibit a positive
instantaneous response to fundamental shocks on both power and coal returns
(statistically significant at the 5% level) and EUA returns (statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% level). Finally, the fourth plot in Figure 2.8 illustrates that coal
returns have a positive response to shocks on all the endogenous variables, where
the instantaneous reactions to shocks on power and coal returns are statistically
significant at the 5% level.
11Recall that a negative return rt implies that the current price in t is lower than the price
in t− 1.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse-response functions (IRF) under identification through het-
eroscedasticity (IH) in baseload specification 1. The first, second, third, and
fourth plot illustrate the impulse responses of baseload electricity, EUA, natu-
ral gas, and coal returns, respectively, to one-time shocks on the fundamental
innovations ut = (ue,t, ua,t, ug,t, uc,t)
′.
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2.5.2 Out-of-sample analysis: Dynamic portfolio alloca-
tion
This section will present the results of the out-of-sample analysis, where we use
the forecasted returns and covariances given by (2.37) and (2.38) to perform
the dynamic portfolio allocation analysis described in Section 2.3. The present
portfolio analysis builds upon a finance-based approach and does not take into
account factors that typically play an important role in energy markets, such as
capacity constraints, delivery and purchase obligations and times. These issues
would need to be considered and would add complexity, for instance, in the case
of an energy company wishing to optimize its energy portfolio. We perform the
out-of-sample analysis with model specification 1 discussed in the previous sec-
tions. The reason for not considering the other specifications is that the matrix of
exogenous variables contains too many zero entries (due to the dummy variables
and the extreme-weather variables) and thus it is not feasible to use these specifi-
cations for forecasting. This problem may be solved by obtaining a longer sample
period with sufficient non-zero entries in the matrix of exogenous variables.
2.5.2.1 Performance of dynamic trading strategies
In the following we will describe the economic performance of the dynamic trad-
ing strategies for the alternative investment objectives presented in Section 2.3.2
(minimum volatility, maximum return, and maximum utility). We will also con-
sider different portfolio rebalancing horizons h =1,5,10, where h is the number
of working days after which the weights of the assets held in the portfolio are
readjusted (i.e. daily, weekly, and bi-weekly).12
In our baseline scenario we calculate the portfolio performance measures using
an annualized risk-free rate of if = 5%, an annualized target return of µ
∗
p = 8% for
the minimum-volatility strategy, an annualized target variance of σ∗p = 12% for
the maximum-return strategy, and a coefficient of absolute risk aversion of γ = 6
for the maximum-utility strategy.13 The benchmark portfolio used to calculate
12Our analysis assumes that there are no transaction costs associated with the adjustment of
the portfolio. In the presence of transaction costs, the results for the dynamic trading strategies
might change.
13This is in line with the parameter values used in Han (2006).
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the M2 measure consists of a buy-and-hold strategy, implying that the optimal
portfolio weights are set only once based on the estimated in-sample means and
covariances of the energy returns and there is no portfolio rebalancing. The
performance results of the dynamic trading strategies are presented in Table 2.7
for two in-sample estimation periods (T ∗ = 200 and T ∗ = 400).
The positive values of the ex-ante and ex-post Sharpe ratios (SR) in Table
2.7 indicate that profitable trading strategies can be generated based on our en-
ergy portfolio with the underlying VECM-OGARCH model. Since for all the
commodities except for coal, the mean returns were negative over the sample
period, this indicates that holding an optimal portfolio of the commodities im-
proves the performance compared to investing in a single commodity. Moreover,
since the ex-ante SR’s are based on the forecasted portfolio mean and standard
deviation and the ex-post SR’s on their actual realizations, the former generally
overestimate the profitability of a given trading strategy. In terms of the rela-
tive performance of the different trading strategies, strategies 2 and 3 (maximum
return and maximum utility) outperform the minimum-volatility strategy. How-
ever, the results for the M2 measure in the last column of Table 2.7, describing
the relative performance of the dynamic trading strategies over a static strategy,
indicate that under the baseline calibration, the dynamic portfolio rebalancing
does not lead to an improved performance compared to a simple buy-and-hold
strategy. This result may be due to the generally high level of volatility of the
energy returns in the present sample period. Moreover, the results depend cru-
cially on the underlying choices of the target portfolio return and covariance,
the risk-free rate, and the coefficient of risk-aversion. Therefore, we perform a
sensitivity analysis for alternative values of these parameters in Section 2.5.2.3.
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Investor’s objective Horizon Ex-ante SR Ex-post SR M2
In-sample estimation period: T ∗ = 200
Min. volatility 1 1.074 (1.199) -0.000 (-0.138) -0.014 (-0.022)
(Strategy 1) 5 0.897 (1.245) 0.106 (0.218) -0.059 (-0.042)
10 0.981 (1.388) 0.143 (0.283) -0.109 (-0.097)
Max. expected return 1 1.380 (1.551) 0.043 (0.055) -0.009 (-0.009)
(Strategy 2) 5 1.420 (1.663) 0.085 (0.359) -0.079 (-0.048)
10 1.610 (1.943) 0.139 (0.463) -0.210 (-0.203)
Max. expected utility 1 1.669 (1.811) 0.079 (0.129) -0.005 (-0.004)
(Strategy 3) 5 2.010 (2.111) 0.073 (0.464) -0.015 (-0.011)
10 2.390 (2.621) 0.133 (0.527) -0.045 (-0.055)
In-sample estimation period: T ∗ = 400
Min. volatility 1 0.426 (0.418) -0.141 (-0.132) -0.026 (-0.025)
(Strategy 1) 5 0.281 (0.290) -0.012 (0.021) -0.053 (-0.049)
10 0.268 (0.420) -0.076 (0.043) -0.130 (-0.093)
Max. expected return 1 0.562 (0.555) -0.088 (-0.074) -0.009 (-0.009)
(Strategy 2) 5 0.446 (0.448) 0.104 (0.073) -0.026 (-0.034)
10 0.404 (0.420) 0.150 (0.068) -0.088 (-0.123)
Max. expected utility 1 0.804 (0.760) -0.096 (-0.083) -0.003 (-0.003)
(Strategy 3) 5 0.759 (0.809) 0.017 (-0.065) -0.008 (-0.010)
10 0.510 (0.538) 0.257 (0.074) -0.004 (-0.015)
Table 2.7: Ex-ante and ex-post Sharpe ratios and Modigliani risk-adjusted perfor-
mance measure for different in-sample estimation periods and rebalancing hori-
zons in baseload specification BL.1 (PL.1) with if = 5%, µ
∗
p = 8%, σ
∗
p = 12%,
γ = 6. Horizons for portfolio rebalancing in working days: h = 1, 5, 10.
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2.5.2.2 Time-varying portfolio weights
Figure 2.9 illustrates the optimal time-varying portfolio weights for the baseline
scenario with T ∗ = 200. In the figure, positive (negative) weights imply that
the investor goes long (short) in the respective commodity, i.e. he or she buys
(sells) the corresponding futures contract. At each point in time, the sum of
all portfolio weights must equal 1 and hence, the sum of commodity weights∑
w•,t with • = e, a, g, c represents the share invested in the risky portfolio and
(1−∑w•,t) is the share invested in the risk-free asset at time t.
Several interesting observations arise from the plots of optimal portfolio weights.
First, in the minimum-volatility strategy (strategy 1) the share of the portfolio
invested in the risky energy commodities is lower than under the other trading
strategies for all rebalancing horizons and hence, a larger share is invested in
the risk-free asset. This is an intuitive result given that there is a considerable
amount of volatility in the energy returns (see Figure 2.6). Second, the portfolio
weights of the risky commodities increase with the rebalancing horizon for all
three trading strategies suggesting that the model exploits long-run information
(presumably via zt). Finally, among the risky commodities the highest absolute
portfolio weights are attached to power futures and these weights also exhibit a
higher variation compared to the portfolio weights of other energy commodities.
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Figure 2.9: Optimal portfolio weights for different trading strategies at various
rebalancing horizons and T ∗ = 200 in baseload specification BL.1. Strategy 1:
Min. volatility, Strategy 2: Max. expected return, Strategy 3: Max. expected
utility. Horizons for portfolio rebalancing: 1 day, 1 week, 2 weeks. Positive
(negative) weights imply that the investor goes long (short) in the respective
commodity.
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2.5.2.3 Sensitivity analysis
We test the sensitivity of the performance of the different trading strategies with
respect to the parameters assigned to the risk-free rate, the target portfolio return,
the target portfolio volatility, the risk-aversion coefficient, and the horizon for
portfolio rebalancing. For robustness we perform the sensitivity analysis for two
alternative in-sample estimation periods. The results of the portfolio performance
in terms of the M2 measure are illustrated in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 for T ∗ = 200
and T ∗ = 400, respectively. Note that varying the risk-free rate impacts on all
trading strategies, while varying the target return, the target volatility, and the
risk-aversion coefficient only impacts on strategy 1 (min. volatility), 2 (max.
return), and 3 (max. utility), respectively. In general, varying the parameter
values and the rebalancing horizon can lead to quite considerable changes in the
value of M2 for a given trading strategy.
In Figures 2.10 and 2.11, the upper panel illustrates the sensitivity of M2
with respect to the risk-free rate for the three trading strategies. The plots in
the upper panel of both figures show that increasing the risk-free rate if leads to
an improvement of the performance of all dynamic trading strategies compared
to a static strategy for both in-sample estimation periods. The only exception is
given by strategies 2 and 3, where the relative performance of dynamic trading
decreases in if at higher rebalancing horizons (h > 7) and T
∗ = 200.
The plots in the lower panel of both figures illustrate the sensitivity of M2
with respect to the target portfolio return, the target portfolio volatility, and the
coefficient of risk aversion, respectively. In the minimum volatility strategy, M2
decreases in the target return and increases in the rebalancing horizon for both
in-sample estimation periods. A similar result arises for the maximum return
strategy. Finally, under the maximum utility strategy, M2 increases in the risk-
aversion coefficient and decreases in the rebalancing horizon.
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2.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have set up a VECM model with orthogonalized GARCH errors
to analyze the interactions between electricity, coal, natural gas, and European
emission allowances futures. The VECM takes into account the ”long-run equilib-
rium” relationship between electricity prices and prices of its three input factors,
the short-run interactions between the commodity returns, and the influence of
exogenous variables such as weather indices, crude oil returns, and economic
growth. In addition, the orthogonal GARCH structure of the residuals allows for
the identification of contemporaneous interactions between the commodities.
Our empirical results indicate that power, natural gas, coal, and emission
allowance prices are cointegrated, implying that a ”long-run equilibrium” rela-
tionship exists between these prices. In addition, the estimated elasticity of the
natural gas price with respect to the peakload power price is roughly twice as
high than the elasticity with respect to the baseload power price, whereas the
opposite holds for the elasticity of the coal price with respect to the power price.
This may result from the fact that gas-fired power plants are at the margin in
periods of high electricity demand and coal-fired power plants are at the margin
in periods of normal or low electricity demand.
In the short-run, we find that past EUA and crude oil returns, earnings growth,
and winter temperatures have predictability power for EUA returns. Past elec-
tricity returns and earnings growth have predictability power for natural gas
returns, while past electricity and gas returns, earnings growth, and precipitation
have predictability power for coal returns. In contrast to the findings by Bunn &
Fezzi (2007) and Fell (2010), electricity returns seem to be largely unaffected by
the short-run dynamics in both the baseload and the peakload specification. In
addition, the ARCH and GARCH parameters are highly significant, indicating
that the time-varying volatility structure of the residuals is an essential compo-
nent in models of energy and CO2 returns. Moreover, we find that almost all
contemporaneous interactions between energy and CO2 returns are statistically
significant. The impulse-response functions of the endogenous variables show
that the instantaneous reactions of EUA, gas, and coal returns are particularly
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strong with respect to an unexpected shock on power returns. By contrast, unex-
pected shocks on gas and coal returns do not seem to contemporaneously affect
electricity returns. In the case of a shock on coal returns, this may be due to the
negative instantaneous reaction of EUA returns, which may mitigate the overall
impact of the shock on electricity returns. This dampening effect on electricity
returns could arise when increasing production costs of coal-based electricity de-
crease demand and thus prices of emission allowances. By contrast, the positive
instantaneous reaction of EUA returns to a shock on gas returns may hint at
fuel-switching from natural gas to more emission-intensive coal. Moreover, we
find that the dynamic interactions between energy and CO2 returns in the short
run are very similar independently of whether we use baseload or peakload power
returns. This indicates that peakload and baseload power prices are driven by
the same factors in the short run.
In the out-of-sample portfolio application, we find that our model can generate
profitable trading strategies for different investment objectives and rebalancing
horizons, although the dynamic strategies cannot generally outperform a static
buy-and-hold strategy. Moreover, the results of our sensitivity analysis indicate
that increasing the risk-free market rate and the investor’s coefficient of risk-
aversion both improve the relative performance of the dynamic strategies over
a static strategy, while increasing the target return and target volatility of the
portfolio both decrease the relative performance of the dynamic strategies.
It is important to keep in mind that the sample covers a period with sharply
increasing energy prices in 2007 and the first half of 2008 followed by dramatic
price decreases during the economic slowdown in the second half of 2008 and
2009. In our sample energy and CO2 returns are thus characterized by a high
level of volatility. Therefore, it would be interesting to compare the present re-
sults with those obtained from a larger sample period. A larger sample with more
observations would also enable us to use other weather indices in the forecasting
procedure. Moreover, future research on dynamic portfolio allocation could in-
corporate issues that typically play an important role in energy markets such as
capacity constraints, delivery and purchase obligations and times.
———————————————–
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Chapter 3
Emission allowance trading and
market power
3.1 Introduction
Emissions trading schemes have become increasingly popular in recent years. One
of the first comprehensive and successful trading schemes was the SO2 emission
trading scheme established in the United States (U.S.) in 1990 under the Acid
Rain Program of the Clean Air Act (Clean Air Act Amendments 1990). In 1997,
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol was the first attempt to implement an in-
ternational trading scheme for greenhouse gas emissions covering the majority of
industrialized countries. It allows countries that have committed to reduce their
CO2 emissions to trade emission allowances with one another and use them to
meet part of their reduction target. In 2005 the European Union launched the
European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) for combating CO2 emissions, cov-
ering roughly 50 percent of total CO2 emissions in the EU. Under this scheme,
firms from designated sectors can trade CO2 emissions allowances across the entire
European Union. Other emissions trading schemes implemented at present in-
clude the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme in Australia, the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic
States of the U.S., the Japanese Voluntary Emission Trading Scheme, and the
New Zealand Emission Trading Scheme. Tradable emission allowances are also
popular for managing smaller-scale pollution problems such as local or regional
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water and air pollution. Prominent examples include the particulate emission
allowance market established in Santiago de Chile in 1992 and the Hunter river
salinity trading scheme operating in New South Wales, Australia, since 1995.
Under a system of tradable emission allowances, the emission target is achieved
by setting a cap on the total amount of pollution and distributing a correspond-
ing number of emission allowances. Firms participating in a tradable allowance
scheme have to hold an allowance for each unit of pollutant they emit. If a firm’s
emissions are higher than the number of allowances it holds, it either has to carry
out measures to reduce pollution or buy additional allowances in the allowance
market. This decision is based on a comparison between the marginal abatement
cost (i.e. the cost of reducing an additional unit of pollution) and the market
price for emission allowances (i.e. the cost of emitting an additional unit of pol-
lution). The price for pollution is then determined through supply and demand
in the emission allowance market.
Companies obliged to reduce emissions by participating in emission trading
schemes face additional costs because emissions are thus turned from a free into a
costly production factor. This alters the production decisions of companies and,
to the extent that they are able to pass on the additional costs to final goods
prices, also affects the consumption choices of consumers. In principle, this is
a desirable outcome because allowance prices should (ideally) reflect the social
cost of pollution that would not be accounted for otherwise. However, improper
implementation of tradable allowance schemes may give rise to distortions that
harm both the effectiveness and the cost efficiency of such a scheme.
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate tradable emission allowance schemes
with special reference to their anti-competitive effects due to market power on
either the allowance market, the output market, or both. In a nutshell, there are
three main sources for anti-competitive effects arising from emission allowance
trading. First, large firms may exercise market power on the allowance market by
holding down supply or suppressing demand in order to manipulate prices to their
advantage. Second, firms may abuse the allowance market to put other firms,
with whom they compete on the output market, at a competitive disadvantage.
The strongest form of such abuse is market foreclosure. Finally, there may be
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other distortions and abuses caused by special or ill-defined rules on the allowance
market or other markets.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section
we will briefly explain the economic efficiency of emissions trading in the ab-
sence of market imperfections. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we will then highlight how
market power may be exercised on allowance markets under free allocation and
auctioning, respectively. Section 3.5 will revolve around the potential for cartel
agreements on allowance markets. In Section 3.6 we will then turn to the issue
of how allowance markets may be manipulated to gain advantage on the output
market. The empirical evidence for the abuse of market power on allowance mar-
kets will be described in Section 3.7. In particular, we will analyze two prominent
cases of (alleged) allowance market abuse by power utilities in Germany and Cal-
ifornia. Finally, Section 3.8 will provide a summary of the main results and some
policy conclusions.
3.2 The economic efficiency of emissions trading
A major advantage of market-based policies such as emissions trading over most
command-and-control regulations is that the former policies usually have a better
performance in terms of their economic efficiency. In general, economic efficiency
refers to the ability of a policy instrument to achieve a certain aggregate emission
target at minimal cost. This is the case when each polluting entity bears the same
cost in abating the last unit of pollution. In other words, economic efficiency re-
quires that marginal abatement costs are equalized across all polluters. When
the aggregate emission target is subject to a cost-benefit analysis, the econom-
ically efficient outcome is achieved when the total economic cost, consisting of
abatement cost plus social damage from pollution, is minimized. While marginal
abatement cost represents the cost of abating one additional unit of pollution,
marginal damage reflects the damage of one additional unit of pollution emitted.
The optimal emission level, and hence the optimal allocation of abatement effort,
requires the marginal abatement cost to equal the marginal social damage of pol-
lution. Therefore, both an increase of emissions beyond the optimal point and
above-optimal abatement lead to total costs that are higher than the optimum.
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If it is properly implemented (especially if the regulator issues the optimal
number of tradable allowances) and if each polluter is relatively small compared
to the whole market, a system of tradable emission allowances will lead to cost-
efficient emission reduction. The condition that firms be small is an important
one, because to achieve efficiency firms must take the market price for allowances
as given or at least must believe that they are unable to influence this price by
holding back or selling a large number of allowances. Figure 3.1 exemplifies the
underlying mechanism for two polluting firms. The two firms exhibit different
marginal abatement costs represented by the curves MAC1 and MAC2, respec-
tively. The marginal abatement cost curves are decreasing, reflecting the fact
that it becomes more and more expensive to further reduce emissions. The pos-
itively sloped marginal damage curve implies that marginal damage increases in
the level of pollution. The optimal, cost-minimizing emission level E∗ then lies
at the intersection of the aggregate marginal abatement cost and the marginal
damage curve. This level E∗ corresponds to the total quantity of emission al-
lowances L the emission trading authority allocates to the two firms. Assuming
perfect competition, the trading of allowances among the two firms gives rise to
a uniform allowance price. Both firms compare the allowance price with their
marginal abatement cost and buy (sell) allowances as long as the price is below
(exceeds) their marginal abatement cost. In market equilibrium, at price p∗, firm
1 and firm 2 demand allowances corresponding to the emission levels e1 and e2,
respectively. Therefore, cost-efficiency requires that marginal abatement costs be
equal for all emitters. This principle does not only hold for different firms, but
also for different industries, sectors, and even countries.
Under perfect competition the initial allocation of allowances among the firms
does not influence cost-efficiency of the market outcome (Montgomery, 1972).
However, this result changes in the presence of market power. In the next section
we will discuss possible distortions that may arise due to market power. In such
cases the efficiency principle of equal marginal abatement costs may be violated.
A system of tradable emission allowance may also have repercussions on the
output markets in which polluting firms are operating to sell their final output
goods. An important question is what happens to the output price if the emission
cap is reduced. To answer this question, it is important to note that a firm has, in
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Figure 3.1: Economic efficiency of emission allowance trading
principle, at least two options for reducing emissions. First, it can try to reduce
emissions per unit of output while holding output constant. This will normally
increase the firms’ unit costs, possibly making them prohibitively high, and thus
spill over to consumer prices. The second option is to reduce output while holding
emissions per unit of output constant. Lower output also translates into higher
consumer prices, since the output good becomes scarcer. In general, the optimal
strategy for each polluter is a combination of both, i.e. reducing output and
reducing emissions per unit of output. Although technological progress helps to
mitigate output contraction, the output price will rise more steeply, when the
emission target becomes more ambitious.
Under a system of tradable allowances the question arises whether the price
for emission allowances will be passed on to the consumer price and whether and
to what extent it should be passed on. The answer is a definite ”yes”. Perhaps
surprisingly, this answer is independent of the allocation scheme. Under both free
and costly allocation of allowances, the emission allowance price must and will
be passed on to the consumer price. To see this more clearly, let us think of a
simple case where emissions are strictly proportional to the level of output, and
where there is no further abatement technology. This is approximately true for
CO2 emissions resulting from combustion processes. Figure 3.2 illustrates this
situation. Since emissions are strictly determined by output, total emissions and
total output can be measured in the same units. In the figure Ec denotes the
unregulated emission level under business as usual policy, while E ′ denotes the
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emission target, which is lower than Ec. To achieve the lower emission target and
hence output level, the price must increase from pc to p′. For this purpose, the
regulator has to issue a total quantity of emission allowances equal to E ′. If these
allowances are auctioned off, the allowance price must be equal to q. The total cost
of buying allowances is represented by the area A. If the allowances are allocated
to the firms for free, the firms also have to increase the market price from pc to
p′. The reason is twofold. From the perspective of a single firm, each firm has an
opportunity cost of selling an allowance because this means less output and thus
less profit. So a firm will only be willing to sell an allowance at a particular price.
This opportunity cost, however, must be reflected by the market price for the
output good. The second reason is that if the firms did not increase the market
price or were not allowed to pass on the opportunity cost of selling allowances to
the consumer price, this would result in market disequilibrium. Given the total
amount of allowances E ′, any price lower than the market clearing price p′ would
mean that demand would exceed supply and thus some consumers would have to
be rationed. In the case of free allowances, firms enjoy so-called ”windfall” profits,
which are also represented by the area A. In Europe, the existence of windfall
profits has been heavily criticized by politicians who had previously participated
in designing the European allowance trading scheme with free allocation. Even
the German competition authority claimed that passing on the market prices of
allowances to the output price is illegal if emission allowances are allocated for
free (Section 3.7.1.1 provides a detailed description of this case). We have shown
that this is economically not feasible without accepting a disequilibrium situation.
It should further be mentioned that the degree of pass-through of allowance
prices to output prices depends heavily on the market structure, in particular on
the degree of the firms’ market power in the output market. In the case of CO2
emission trading schemes, the impact of allowance prices on electricity pricing is
of particular interest. Electricity markets are often characterized by a more or
less high degree of market concentration, where one or several firms are able to
exercise market power. This particular market setting has been studied both from
theoretical and empirical perspectives and the results are highly controversial
(see Gull`ı, 2008, for an overview). Depending on the modeling framework and
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Figure 3.2: Cost pass-through of allowance prices under free and costly allocation
the assumptions concerning the demand function and price elasticity, the pass-
through of allowance prices to electricity prices may be below or above the level
expected in a competitive market. In his own analysis, Gull`ı (2008) finds that
in the short term, allowance cost pass-through also significantly depends on the
structural features of the electricity markets, i.e. on the power-plant mix, the
available capacity in the market (whether there is excess capacity or not), and
the price of CO2 allowances (whether it is above or below the level making fuel-
switching from coal to gas profitable). In the next sections, we will describe
the circumstances under which market power may arise on emission allowance
markets. We will also highlight the consequences of market power abuse for
allowance and output prices, emissions, and social welfare.
3.3 Market power on the allowance market un-
der free allocation
As in any other market, large firms are able to exercise market power also in
allowance markets. This means that some firms do not consider the market price
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for allowances as given but try to manipulate the price via potentially large-scale
purchases and sales. The firms’ motivation to try influencing allowance prices
can be twofold: Large net buyers want to reduce the financial burden arising
from the emission constraint and large net sellers want to keep the price high so
as to earn high revenues from selling. In both cases, the possibility of exerting
market power depends on the ability of firms to influence prices on the allowance
market, either unilaterally or collectively. To do so, these firms (price-setters)
must represent a large share of total allowance demand over and against their
competitors (price-takers).
If a dominant firm is a net seller of allowances, it will exercise monopoly
power by selling less and abating less than is socially optimal. This situation
is illustrated in Figure 3.3, where marginal abatement costs of one large firm
(M) and a group of competitive fringe firms (interpreted as a single firm F )
are represented by the curves MACM and MACF , respectively. Assume that M
receives an initial free allocation of allowances IM . Under perfect competition, the
allowance market is in equilibrium when marginal abatement costs are equalized,
leading to allowance price pc. Accordingly, in a competitive allowance market,
(IM−E∗M) is the amount of excess allowances that firm M would sell to the fringe
firms F at price pc and the dashed rectangle represents the revenues M would earn
from its allowance sales. Under market power, however, M has an incentive to
hold back some allowances so that the price rises to pm. It sells fewer allowances
(IM − EM) to the fringe firms F than under perfect competition and thus has
to incur lower abatement costs since it keeps more allowances for its own use,
i.e. (EM −E∗M). The allowance revenues at price pm plus the avoided abatement
costs are then represented by the two shaded areas. While the dominant firm
has lower net costs than in the absence of market power, the industry as a whole
incurs a higher cost than under (perfect) competition and the allowance price is
higher than optimal.
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Figure 3.3: Market power when the large firm is a net seller of allowances
Conversely, if a dominant firm is a net buyer of allowances, it will exercise
monopsony power by buying less and abating more than is socially optimal. This
situation is illustrated in Figure 3.4, where the market price for emission al-
lowances under perfect competition is again given by pc. Assume again that M
receives an initial free allocation of allowances IM , which is now below its opti-
mal level of emissions E∗M . Under perfect competition, M would buy (E
∗
M − IM)
additional allowances at price pc, leading to costs equal to the dashed rectangle.
Under monopsony power, M demands fewer allowances than is socially optimal
so that the price goes down to pm. It will therefore emit less (EM) and abate
more (E∗M − EM) than under perfect competition and the expenditure for ad-
ditional allowance purchases and emission abatement is then represented by the
two shaded areas. Again, the dominant firm incurs lower net costs than in the
absence of market power, but the total costs for the industry as a whole is higher
than in the social optimum.
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Figure 3.4: Market power when the large firm is a net buyer of allowances
Hahn (1984) was the first to advance a theory highlighting the possibility of
market power in allowance markets. He considers a stylized model with one large
polluting firm and a competitive fringe of many small polluting firms taking the
allowance price as given. Hahn shows that market power vanishes if the dominant
firm receives exactly the ”efficient” amount of allowances, i.e. the amount that
minimizes its total cost. In this case, the dominant firm has no incentive at all
to participate in allowance trading and to exploit its dominant position. Hence,
allowances are traded only among the competitive fringe firms, resulting in a
socially efficient market outcome. The potential gain from a reduced allowance
price is lower, the higher is the marginal abatement cost. So the extent to which
firms use their market power also depends on the characteristics of their marginal
abatement cost curves. Moreover, the elasticity of allowance demand from the
price-taking competitors also influences the strategic behavior of large firms. If
allowance demand from price-takers is elastic, a reduced price will increase their
demand for allowances. As a result, the firms operating strategically have both
to increase their abatement efforts and to accept lower profits. Conversely, if
allowance demand from price-takers is inelastic, firms acting strategically will
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have greater influence on the allowance price, their abatement activity will be
lower, and their profits will be higher. Requate (2006) and more recently Malueg
& Yates (2009) show that the results of the Hahn model are much more general.
They also hold true if there are several large firms forming an oligopoly vis-a`-vis
the competitive fringe firms.
What practical relevance does the problem of exercising market power actually
have, and what are the potential policy consequences? First of all, optimal allo-
cation of emission allowances to large firms is almost impossible in practice, since
this would require the regulatory authority to have complete information about
the emitters’ marginal abatement costs. Should large buyers or sellers therefore
be excluded from trade? The answer is a definite ”no”, since some trade is always
better than no trade. One recommendation could be, however, to not obviously
over-allocate (under-allocate) allowances to large firms if it is clear that they will
sell (buy) allowances. Such case-by-case allocation is however hardly feasible as
it is likely to violate the principle of competitive neutrality.
The second question centers on the allowance markets in which firms are
likely to be sufficiently large to exercise market power. Here it is important
to distinguish market shares in output markets from the percentage of trade
volumes on the allowance market. In some sectors, notably utilities, firms may
have a large market share in the output market, while their share of allowances
in the allowance market is relatively small. This is usually the case for large
allowance markets such as the U.S.-SO2 market and the EU-ETS where firms
from different sectors trade emission allowances. In most anti-trust legislations,
the market-share threshold for which a conjecture about abuse of market power
can be raised is at least 20 percent. In both the U.S.-SO2 market and the EU-
ETS, the trade volumes of even the largest buyers and sellers are well below this
level. The problem of market power may arise, however, in small markets for
specific pollutants.
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3.4 Market power on the allowance market un-
der auctioning
If allowances are auctioned off by the regulator instead of being distributed for
free, the situation is not much different. There are no large sellers, but there
may be large buyers. Following the Hahn model, the distortion is the larger, the
greater is the deviation of the initial allocation from the final allocation. Accord-
ing to this argument, auctioning off allowances can in principle exacerbate the
distortion arising from monopsony power. Indeed, price manipulation may occur
if the auction mechanism is not properly designed. For instance, in a sealed-bid,
uniform-price auction, each bidding firm submits a demand schedule specifying
the number of allowances it is willing to buy at any given price. This mechanism
creates incentives for large firms to strategically shade their bids in order to re-
duce the allowance price. Alternatively, a large firm could stop participating in
the auction at all and limit itself to buying allowances on the resale market after
the auction. In both cases, large firms may demand fewer allowances than they
would under competitive market conditions.
There are several measures for mitigating the potential influence of large play-
ers in allowance auctions. One possibility is to establish a total limit for the
amount of allowances that entities may purchase in a single auction. For exam-
ple, the trading rules of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the
United States limit the number of allowances that may be purchased in any sin-
gle auction to 25 percent of all allowances for sale in that auction. Economists,
however, are skeptical about limitations of this kind as they might also impede
economically useful allocations. Moreover, if auctions are open to entities with-
out compliance obligations such as traders, brokers, or NGO’s, this will enhance
competition and limit opportunities for price manipulation.
Another potential way of handling the problem of bid-shading while retaining
the relative simplicity of the uniform-price auction in comparison with other
possible auction mechanisms (e.g. discriminatory-price auctions) is to allow for
rebates or paybacks of auction revenues to the firms. Montero (2008) proposes
such a mechanism that incentivizes firms to bid truthfully, i.e. according to their
true demand, regardless of their size. With this mechanism, auction revenues are
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returned to the firms in such a way that each firm’s final payment is equal to
the externality it imposes on the other firms. As a result, truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy (i.e. it generates the highest utility for the bidder, irrespective
of the behavior of the others), and therefore the auction result becomes cost-
efficient.
It is fair to say that there is no clear picture as yet on the question of whether
auctioning off allowances actually increases the likelihood of price manipulation.
Montero (2009) conjectures that an allowance-auctioning system is less likely to
induce the exercise of market power than free allocation. This view may be
challenged for the following reason: Under free allocation it is not clear a priori
who is a seller and who is a buyer. Even if firms are large, the volume of trade
may be low (since the firms’ initial allocation may be close to their optimal
demand). Thus some large firms may not engage in much trading, while other
large buyers and sellers may neutralize each other with respect to market power
effects. Under a system of auctioned allowances, by contrast, it is clear from the
outset that large firms will demand a large amount of allowances. This may not
only provide incentives for bid shading but also induce collusion among the large
bidders (see Section 3.5). Nor is there as yet any clear and obvious empirical
evidence of major price manipulations by large traders on allowance markets.
Moreover, there is no practical experience with the recent proposal by Montero
(2008) about rebates of allowance auction revenues.
3.5 Cartel agreements
Besides the usual distortions through oligopolistic market power, which are not
illegal per se, large sellers or buyers could in principle also form a cartel vis-a`-vis
small firms and agree to hold down the supply of allowances or jointly shade their
bids in order to reduce the allowance price. Besides being illegal, such behavior is
less likely in a allowance market than in a conventional goods market. The reason
is that, for instance, there is no clear borderline in practice between large and
fringe firms, so potential cartelists would be uncertain about how to ringfence
their cartel. Moreover, large firms may be sellers and buyers, as reported by
Rico (1995) in the case of the U.S. sulfur market. It is interesting to note that
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the above-mentioned mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) is also suitable for
preventing bidding cartels on allowances auctions since that mechanism turns out
to be immune against cartel formation.
3.6 Abusing allowance trading to manipulate out-
put markets
Allowance markets have repercussions on the associated output markets. We
have already argued in Section 3.2 that allowance prices are passed on to output
prices independently of whether allowances are initially allocated to the firms
free of charge or at cost. We have also argued that this is in principle a desirable
outcome. In fact, it is even socially optimal for consumers to bear part of the
burden of reducing emissions. However, at least in theory there are several ways
of abusing allowance trading systems to create distortions on the output market.
In particular, firms may try to use allowance trading (a) to impede competitors
on the output market by raising their costs on the allowance market, (b) as
a collusive device for the benefit of a whole cartel, and (c) to increase market
concentration.
3.6.1 Impeding competitors and market foreclosure
The logic of impeding competitors is as follows: Assume that firm A has a rela-
tively clean technology and would in principle be a seller (under free allocation) or
a small buyer (under auctioning) of allowances. In addition, one or several of A’s
competitors on the output market (say, firms B and C) have dirty technologies
and thus a high demand for allowances. Instead of selling spare allowances or
buying only a small amount, A may have an incentive to preempt the allowance
market in order to increase the abatement cost for its competitors B and C. For
this purpose, A may decide not to use all the allowances it holds, but rather to
hoard some of them. This strategy aims at decreasing the rivals’ output market
share and may even force rivals to exit or prevent new firms from entering the
market.
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Misiolek & Elder (1989) were the first to highlight this strategic opportunity,
finding that hoarding of allowances by a dominant firm prevents its competitors
from pursuing their optimal production and abatement strategies. This results in
an additional strategic effect because the dominant firm now has an incentive to
sell even fewer (or buy even more) allowances than in the simple model by Hahn
(1984) of pure market power on the allowance market. Misiolek and Elder note
that, depending on the initial allowance allocation, the strategic effect can either
worsen or improve the inefficiencies identified by Hahn.
Von der Fehr (1993) and Sartzetakis (1997) extend the argument by Misiolek
and Elder by studying the effects of raising rivals’ cost strategies in an oligopolis-
tic setting. They find that such strategies are profitable and that profitability
increases with the stringency of the regulation and the abatement cost level.
They show, however, that the effect of raising rivals’ cost strategies on economic
welfare is ambiguous and depends on the technological efficiency of the dominant
firm relative to its rivals. More precisely, if the dominant firm expands its market
share at the expense of a less efficient rival, overall efficiency and thus welfare
may increase despite the decrease in industry output.
3.6.2 Using allowance trading to collude on the output
market
Making agreements between firms to raise prices and limit production is consid-
ered hard-core cartel conduct and forbidden by almost every country’s anti-trust
law (e.g. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Article 101 (former Art 81) of
the European Treaty). However, a group of firms could tacitly form a cartel by
letting one firm hoard allowances so that it limits the capacity of all other firms.
This may lead to lower output, higher prices, and higher profits to the benefit of
all participating firms. Such a strategy may not even be illegal prima facie since
it is usually legal for firms to sell or buy inputs amongst themselves. However, if
the cartel authority discovers such an abuse, it might be treated in a similar way
as a merger case.1 The California NOx case described in Section 3.7.1.2 displays
1A transfer of a considerable value of assets enabling one firm to control the production of
another is considered a merger according to the European merger regulation and the national
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some of the features of this type of conduct.
3.6.3 Increasing market concentration through allowance
trading
The third possible kind of anti-competitive behavior is increasing market concen-
tration through allowance trading. Instead of increasing rivals’ cost by raising
prices for allowances one or several dominant firms could buy up all the allowances
owned by weak competitors. This may even happen on a voluntary basis if small
firms have an initial endowment of allowances and find it more profitable to sell
the allowances and leave the market. Such a transfer of allowances from small
to large firms will obviously result in higher market concentration. Accordingly,
the market structure could change from (more or less perfect) competition to
oligopoly. If the number of firms in the market decreases, prices on the final
goods market would be expected to rise. In analogy to the argument proposed
by Sartzetakis (1997), this is not necessarily the case since less efficient firms
are prone to sell to more efficient ones. Increasing market concentration through
allowance trading is more likely under a allowance system with unlimited validity
than under a system where new allowances are issued each year. Indeed, there
is empirical evidence for such concentration processes. After the introduction
of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for fisheries in Iceland the fishery fleet
shrank substantially, while at the same time economic efficiency of the Icelandic
fishery was considerably improved (Arnason, 2005).
In conclusion, it is impossible to prevent strategic behavior on the allowance
market altogether. However, an increasing number of market participants allevi-
ate the potential inefficiencies arising from market power. In practice, crowding-
out on the output market due to market power on the allowance market is limited
for a number of reasons. First, dominant firms only benefit from such a strat-
egy if their competitors on the allowance market are largely identical with their
competitors on the output market. In most allowance markets for air pollution
control, it is reasonable to assume that among all firms participating in allowance
trading many of them operate in different output markets. Therefore, hoarding
laws of several OECD countries.
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of allowances would be associated with high costs and relatively small benefits for
dominant firms, since such conduct would not only affect their direct competi-
tors but also firms operating on other output markets. Moreover, the allowance
price is certainly not the only factor determining the competitive position of a
firm. Both strategic manipulation and market concentration through preemption
are more likely to become a problem in smaller local allowance markets than
in large markets. Therefore, market power may be a more important aspect of
water-pollution than of air-pollution control. Finally, the implementation of ap-
propriate market monitoring mechanisms and information sharing between the
regulation authorities involved may help in detecting attempts to manipulate
allowance prices.
3.7 Empirical evidence for the abuse of market
power
There is only limited evidence that market power has caused concern in existing
tradable emission allowance schemes. This is partly due to limited data availabil-
ity. In order to formally test market power, one would need to estimate marginal
abatement cost curves and compare these to actual allowance prices. A departure
from the marginal cost-pricing rule would provide an indication of market power.
To the best of our knowledge, studies of this kind are not available so far.
In the prominent examples of the United States SO2 emission trading scheme
and the European CO2 emission trading scheme, market power has never been a
serious issue. In both cases, allowance markets are characterized by a large num-
ber of participants and high trading volumes, thus reducing the potential price
impact of one or a few dominant players. Accordingly, the risk of allowance mar-
ket manipulations is larger, the fewer firms participate in the allowance system.
It is therefore more likely to become in problem in localized allowance markets,
such as markets for water pollution control. We will highlight this issue by re-
ferring to two cases, the Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) allowance trading at
the Fox river in Wisconsin, United States, and the Hunter River Salinity Trad-
ing Scheme (HRSTS) in New South Wales, Australia. In the following sections,
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we will first consider emission markets where allowances are mainly allocated for
free (EU-ETS, Reclaim, Fox river BOD trading) and then extend our analysis to
auctioned allowance markets (RGGI and HRSTS).
3.7.1 Special observations on grandfathered allowance mar-
kets
Though there has been no clear-cut evidence of allowance market manipulation
in the context of the European emission trading scheme, there are two issues
worth noting. The first concerns the relationship between the emission allowance
market and the imperfectly competitive electric power industry. This relationship
was at the core of a debate during the first trading period from 2005 to 2007, in
which the ability of electric utilities to pass through the cost of CO2 allowances to
wholesale prices was criticized. Since emission allowances were allocated for free,
some firms were able to reap additional, so-called windfall profits. As was set out
in Section 3.2, this criticism ignores the fact that cost pass-through is a desired
effect from an efficiency point of view, independently of whether firms pay for
the allowances or receive them for free. Accordingly, one controversial issue was
posed by the decision on the part of the German competition authority to impose
a 25 percent limit on the pass-through of emission allowances to electricity prices
(see Section 3.7.1.1).
It is very important to understand that the pass-through of allowance costs is
not an indicator of market power on the allowance market. Perhaps surprisingly,
it can in fact be quite the opposite, as the degree of pass-through from allowance
to output prices is likely to be higher under competition than under market power.
The intuition for this phenomenon is as follows. Under perfect competition, a
firm’s marginal cost of production is close to the market price. If additional costs
are added to marginal production cost, the firm will either reduce its output
(in case of strong competition from foreign competitors that are not subject to
emissions trading), or firms will pass through the additional cost of emission
allowances to the consumers. A firm exercising market power, by contrast, sets
its price at that point of the demand function where consumers’ demand starts
to get elastic. Since a further increase of the price will therefore cause too much
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demand reduction, a firm with market power does not find it profitable to pass
through its additional cost fully to consumers. This effect is a typical effect,
though not a general rule. Under certain demand and technology conditions,
imperfect competition on electricity markets may also enable power companies
to enforce a higher pass-through rate compared to competitive markets (see Gull`ı,
2010, for a theoretical analysis). In fact, Gull`ı (2008) summarizes a number of
empirical studies showing that the pass-through rates of EU allowance prices to
electricity prices vary significantly between countries and periods and may range
from zero to more than 100 percent.
Figure 3.5 illustrates why the pass-through of allowance prices to final output
prices under perfect competition is usually lower than under imperfect compe-
tition (monopoly). For this purpose, constant marginal costs (MC) and linear
demand are assumed. Under perfect competition firms make no profit and (in a
closed economy) have to fully pass-through the allowance price (pa) to the con-
sumers. The monopolist, by contrast, sets his price (pm) at the point where the
marginal revenue curve intersects the marginal cost curve. If there is a price for
emission allowances, he will pass on less than 100 percent of the allowance price
to consumers because otherwise he would incur reduced profits. Note that under
increasing marginal cost, pass-through will be less than 100 percent, even when
the emission market is perfectly competitive.
 
 
  
∆   
   
∆   
   
                  
            
      
                                
Perfect competition Monopoly 
Figure 3.5: Allowance price pass-through in competitive markets and under
monopoly. Perfect competition: ∆pc = pa. Monopoly: ∆pm = 1
2
pa.
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Besides the debate on the allowance price pass-through, another issue that has
raised some questions concerning the potential for market power in the European
emission market relates to the development of European allowance prices after
May 2006. At that time, the significant over-allocation of emission allowances
during the first trading period was revealed, leading to a sharp drop in the al-
lowance price. However, the allowance price did not immediately fall to zero
as might have been expected, given that there was an evident over-supply of
allowances in the first trading period and banking of allowances for the second
period was not permitted. Instead, the allowance price on the spot exchanges
remained significantly positive during the year 2006, eventually converging to
zero in the second half of 2007. This poses a number of questions concerning the
factors that determined the allowance price during this period and why the price
did not fall to zero immediately. One suggested answer might be that it was in
the interests of some powerful players such as energy utilities to keep the price
positive, for instance to justify higher electricity prices. This kind of allegations,
however, have never been proven.
In fact, the strongest empirical evidence with regard to market power on
emission allowance markets comes from the Reclaim market in California, where
electric power facilities seem to have used the NOx allowance trading system
to exercise market power in the California electricity market. Several studies
conclude that some power utilities, which were able to exercise market power
on the California electricity market, paid significantly higher NOx prices than
their competitors in order to cost-justify higher electricity prices (see Section
3.7.1.2 for details). Since many of the features are very specific to the Californian
context, this problem cannot be generalized to all allowance trading schemes.
Nevertheless, the experience in California certainly highlights the importance of
transparent and liquid allowance markets in preventing anti-competitive behavior.
Concerns over strategic manipulations are also common in localized allowance
markets with a small number of participants. One such example is the allowance
trading system established for discharges of biological oxygen demanding wastes
(BOD) into the lower Fox river in Wisconsin. The Fox River Program was estab-
lished in 1981 and covers five pulp and paper mills and two municipal wastewater
treatment plants, located on each of the three segments of the river. Although an
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analysis previous to the implementation of the scheme had predicted significant
potential gains from allowance trading (of annually seven million U.S. dollar),
the actual trading activity has been negligible. According to Nishizawa (2003),
only two trades took place from the establishment of the scheme in 1981 until
2003. Von der Fehr (1993) conjectures that this may be the case because firms
within the same industry do not want to sell allowances to buyers with whom
they compete in the output market. However, such strategic considerations are
probably not the most important reason to explain this outcome. As stated in
a report by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2001), there are other
reasons for the limited trading activity. First, the BOD Program establishes se-
vere restrictions on the ability of sources to trade allowances. Trading is allowed
only if the buyer is a new facility, is increasing production, or is unable to meet
the required discharge limits despite optimal operation of its treatment facili-
ties. Second, there is uncertainty about the legal viability of the allowances being
traded, since the Clean Water Act does not explicitly allow trading. And finally,
the relevant facilities developed a variety of compliance alternatives that were not
contemplated when the regulations were drafted.
3.7.1.1 The prohibition of CO2 allowance price pass-through by the
German competition authority
In the year 2005, following complaints by several companies from electricity-
intensive industrial sectors concerning the cost pass-through of CO2 allowances to
electricity prices, the German competition authority (Bundeskartellamt) opened
an investigation of potentially abusive electricity price increases by the German
energy utilities RWE and EON. Together, RWE and EON had a dominant po-
sition on the German electricity market at that time, both in terms of the pro-
duction and the distribution of electricity. Accordingly, the German competition
authority had to analyze whether the electricity price increase due to the pass-
through of allowance costs significantly deviated from what would have occurred
in a competitive market.
In their initial assessment of the case, the Bundeskartellamt principally sup-
ported the view that even if allowances are allocated for free, they still represent
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an opportunity cost and should therefore be included in the firms’ cost calcu-
lations. However, the competition authority presented two major arguments
against (full) allowance cost pass-through to electricity prices. First, the au-
thority stressed that the competitive conditions in other sectors participating in
emissions trading (in particular mineral oil, steel, cement, paper) did not allow the
pass-through of allowance costs. Second, the authority claimed that the concept
of opportunity cost holds only if the allowances are effectively available for sale
but not if they are used for production. For the period under question, the com-
petition authority asserted that only a relatively small amount of the allowances
allocated to the utilities could have been used for other purposes than compliance
such as sale on allowance exchanges. In fact, for the compliance period from 2005
to 2007, RWE was a net buyer of 13.6 million CO2 allowances. Therefore, the
Bundeskartellamt decided that only those allowances for which realistic oppor-
tunities for alternative uses existed could be factored into the electricity price.
Accordingly, the Bundeskartellamt judged that there could be no objection to a
pass-through of no more than 25 percent of the allowance value.
In its response to this ruling, RWE formally committed itself to selling a
significant amount of electricity capacity to its industrial customers via several
independent auctions (i.e. not via the conventional energy exchange in Leipzig,
EEX), in which the price of freely allocated emission allowances would be set at
zero.2 The total amount of electricity to be auctioned off from 2008 to 2011 adds
up to 46 million MWh, which roughly corresponds to the annual electricity sales
of RWE to industrial customers in Germany. The Bundeskartellamt accepted the
formal commitment proposed by RWE and subsequently closed the investigation.
However, it turned out that the auction results were not much different from
the electricity wholesale prices on the EEX because the auction participants had
effectively considered the allowance prices when making their bids. Therefore, the
formal obligation made by RWE has proven ineffective in terms of the outcome
desired by the Bundeskartellamt.
2In fact, the starting price in the auctions was set to the full cost of an (amortized) hard coal
or lignite utility minus the cost of the freely allocated emission allowances (Bundeskartellamt,
2007).
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From an economic point of view, however, the investigation by the Bun-
deskartellamt was mistaken in the first place. First, the cost pass-through of
emission allowances in a competitive market should not be zero, as suggested by
the Bundeskartellamt. As we have already argued, the pass-through rates in an
imperfectly competitive setting may even be lower than under perfect competi-
tion. The lower pass-through rates in the industrial sectors mentioned by the
competition authority can rather be attributed to other factors such as interna-
tional competition from less closely regulated countries incurring lower carbon
costs or none at all.3 Second, the concept of opportunity costs applies to all
freely allocated emission allowances, independently of whether they are available
for sale on the allowance market or used for production. If firms are not allowed
to factor the allowance costs into their pricing decisions, this will lead to market
disequilibrium, as the discussion in Section 3.2 has demonstrated.
3.7.1.2 The NOx allowance price bubble in California’s Reclaim mar-
ket
While in the context of the EU-ETS alleged allowance price manipulations due to
market power could never formally be proven, the developments in the California
Reclaim market have given rise to more convincing evidence of allowance price
manipulations. In California, after several years of relatively low allowance prices
due to overly generous initial allowance allocations, the prices for NOx allowances
under the Reclaim program increased sharply during 2000 and 2001, while at the
same time some facilities had difficulty in achieving their emission targets.
According to Kolstad & Wolak (2008), several factors contributed to this
development. First, the demand for electric power increased heavily in 2000
and 2001, greatly exceeding the available supply. As alternative power sources,
such as hydro power, did not materialize due to adverse weather conditions, the
increased demand had to be met by production from older, less efficient power
plants. Second, due to the relatively low NOx allowance prices during the first
years of the program, the affected facilities had invested little in pollution control
3Chapter 4 provides a full discussion of competitiveness issues in the context of emissions
trading.
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technologies. During the year 2000 the allowance market reached the ”cross-
over point”, implying that there were no longer excess allowances available for
purchase. At this point the lack of (installed) abatement technology became
apparent and further contributed to the allowance price increase. Finally, the
dramatic increase in NOx allowance prices coincided with a substantial increase
in the amount of market power exercised in the California electricity market
(Borenstein et al., 2002; Joskow & Kahn, 2002; Wolak, 2003).
Based on these observations, Kolstad & Wolak (2008) analyze the interac-
tions between the NOx allowance market and the California electricity market.
The authors present evidence that some electric power facilities paid significantly
higher NOx prices than other allowance market participants while at the same
time holding a larger share of unused allowances during 2000 and 2001 compared
to previous years. Kolstad & Wolak (2008) conjecture that the inflated NOx
prices were then used to cost-justify higher bids in the day-ahead and real-time
California electricity markets.
To appreciate this argument properly, some specific features of the electricity
market in California during that period need to be explained. First, the power
generation facilities showed a considerable disparity in NOx emission rates, im-
plying that increases in the allowance price could have changed the least cost
dispatch of the generation units. Electricity suppliers operating facilities with
different NOx emission rates may thus have benefited from an increase in the
price of NOx allowances since it enabled them to obtain additional profits from
generation units with lower NOx emission rates. Second, the California electricity
market covers a geographically larger area than the Reclaim market. Accordingly,
electricity suppliers with generation facilities both in and outside the Reclaim
market may have had an incentive to increase the price of NOx allowances in
order to place higher bids for all the electricity they produce.
It should be emphasized that many of the above observations are quite unique
to the Californian context in the specific period under study. For instance, the
fact that there was no uniform market price for NOx allowances facilitated the
use of allowances to raise electricity prices. Due to the bilateral nature of al-
lowance transactions, electricity suppliers interested in raising allowance prices
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could do so without affecting the prices paid by other buyers. Under a trans-
parent market-clearing mechanism, such behavior would have been less likely.
Therefore, the allowance price manipulation evidenced in the Reclaim market is
not related to the ”raising rivals’ costs” strategy discussed before. In the Reclaim
market electricity suppliers rather tried to charge prices close to the monopoly
price, which violates the prohibition of abusing a dominant position in line with
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. By generating high allowance prices they
were able to prove high costs and thus camouflage monopoly prices as high-cost
competitive prices. Since several firms participated in this kind of conduct, a
tacit agreement on concerted action cannot be ruled out.
3.7.2 Special observations on auctioned allowance mar-
kets
So far, there is little practical experience with emission markets where all al-
lowances are sold through auctions. At present, such markets include the RGGI
market and the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme. Under the RGGI, no ev-
idence of anti-competitive conduct was detected for the auction process, barriers
to participation in the auctions, or the auction results in the first six allowance
auctions in 2009 (Potomac Economics, 2010). Although allowance prices both in
the RGGI auctions and on the secondary market decreased considerably during
the first year of operation, this is rather attributable to changes in expectations
regarding the future use of allowances than to anti-competitive behavior. This
result is reinforced by the strong participation of firms in the allowance auctions
(at least 46 bidders participated in each auction) and growing trading activity on
the secondary market.
Similarly, there has been no apparent collusion or anti-competitive behavior
in the biannual auctions held under the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme
since 2004. In all auctions, the total amount of 200 allowances were distributed
between eight to 11 companies. Moreover, average allowance prices increased
from 507 Australian dollar in 2004 to 947 Australian dollar in 2008 (DEC, 2004;
NSW Government, 2010).
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From the empirical evidence on market power in emission markets we can
draw two main conclusions. First, if allowance markets are sufficiently large, price
manipulation and other abuses of market power are less likely to happen. This
observation, however, does not rule out the use of tradable emission allowances
on a local and regional level, where the number of firms is typically small. For
example, the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme seems to work well despite
a relatively small number of participants. The Fox River Trading Program has
proven disappointing in terms of the actual trading activity, but the small volume
of trade can be explained by shortcomings in the system’s design and restrictive
trading rules rather than by potential strategic behavior of the participants. The
second conclusion addresses the importance of transparency in allowance markets,
in particular the uniformity of allowance prices across all market participants. If
allowances are traded periodically using a market-clearing price mechanism and
ensuring anonymity for buyers and sellers, allowance price manipulations such as
those observed under the Reclaim program are less likely to occur.
3.8 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have given an overview of possible competitive distortions
created by emission trading systems. Two main types of distortions have been
identified, those arising from the exercise of market power on the allowance market
and those due to the (ab)use of the allowance trading system to improve the
competitive position on the output market.
Under a system of free allowance allocation, large allowance sellers have an
incentive to use more allowances for compliance than is efficient to keep the
allowance prices high and make profits from selling allowances. This is the usual
monopoly/oligopoly effect. In addition, under both free and auctioned allowance
systems, large buyers have an incentive to shade their demand to keep prices
low. This type of conduct creates differences in the marginal abatement costs
across firms and thus leads to a deviation from the least-cost solution. This kind
of conduct vanishes, however, if the number of participants is sufficiently large.
For large existing allowance markets, notably the U.S. sulfur and the European
CO2 market, it has not been a severe problem so far. It might become a problem
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if auctioning were introduced and large buyers started shading their demand.
Moreover, illegal agreements and the formation of large seller or buyer cartels
can never be ruled out. Whether the impact of such concerted action is more
severe under free allocation of allowances or under auctioning is an open question
and crucially depends on how allowance auctions will be designed.
Allowance markets can also be abused to influence the output market. In
this context, following a raising rivals’ cost strategy is especially profitable for
a firm that has a lower emission coefficient than its competitors and hence a
lower demand for allowances. In the extreme case, (some) competitors will leave
the market. In addition, under free allocation, firms may jointly decommission
a certain share of the allowances in order to increase their rent. Finally, firms
with market power may want to increase allowance prices to disguise monopoly
prices as high-cost competitive prices. All these practices are less likely to be
profitable, and thus less likely to occur, if the number of participants is large and
the industries participating in allowance trading are heterogeneous.
It is important to emphasize that setting up a system of tradable allowances
with a binding cap always feeds back to the output market. Depending on market
structure, elasticity of demand and supply, and marginal abatement cost curves,
allowance prices will pass through to consumer prices. This is in itself socially
desirable and cannot be considered an abuse per se, except in special cases. This
feedback, however, typically also results in a lower number of firms and higher
market concentration, thereby increasing the risk of market power.
The bottom line is that if allowance markets are large and encompass firms
from different sectors, if the trading procedure is transparent, and if there is
a unique price, the risk arising from market power and its potential abuse is
low. This does not, however, mean that smaller allowance markets should not be
established. Smaller allowance markets can be very effective for local pollutants if
compliance with strict thresholds is ecologically advisable. Since a single trader
in a small market has potentially more influence to manipulate prices than in
a large market, competition commissions and anti-trust authorities should keep
an eye on smaller allowance markets with respect to strategic abuse, but also
observe auctions with large buyers to avoid concerted action. So far, anti-trust
enforcement on allowance markets has been very limited. In part, this can be
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attributed to the slow development of emission markets caused by the fact that
initial allowance allocations are generally large such that the emission constraints
only become binding after some time has elapsed.
Moreover, there is hardly any research so far on anti-competitive effects in
other allowance trading systems different from cap and trade. It is to be ex-
pected that similar effects to those described above can arise on green and white
certificate markets. With respect to baseline-and-credit schemes there is less risk
of abusing the system to exercise market power. The reason is that the scope
of such markets is still too small compared to cap-and-trade markets. Baseline-
and-credit schemes may be abused, however, by firms trying to manipulate the
baseline of projected emissions in order to gain a competitive advantage.
Finally, it should be emphasized that although anti-competitive effects can
arise on and through allowance markets, the resulting distortions should not be
over-stated. Efficiency gains from trading compared to command-and-control reg-
ulation are likely to dominate possible efficiency losses through anti-competitive
effects on allowance markets. A comparison of tradable allowances systems with
emission taxes is more difficult. An emission tax system is less likely to be abused
for anti-competitive behavior unless firms lobby for exemptions. However, a full
comparison between emission allowances and emission taxes must consider many
other criteria and is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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Chapter 4
Emission allowance trading and
competitiveness
4.1 Introduction
The potential impact of emission allowance trading on the competitiveness of
firms, industries, or even countries is a hotly debated issue. Particularly in the
context of international climate policies, many countries are reluctant to impose
unilateral emission limits because they fear a loss of competitiveness for their
national industries on global output markets. In addition, the implementation of
emissions trading may also raise competitiveness issues at the national level.
Competitiveness is a very broad term that can encompass a variety of as-
pects such as trade flows, terms of trade, carbon leakage, domestic employment,
and production. It is common to define competitiveness in terms of a firm’s
ability to maintain or expand its market position based on its cost structure
(cf. Reinaud, 2005). As a general rule, environmental policy instruments should
be competition-neutral, meaning that they should have the same effect on all
emitters in terms of equal marginal abatement costs. In principle, a system of
tradable allowances fulfills this requirement since the same price holds for all
emitters. In Chapter 3 cases have been described where market power on the al-
lowance market may lead to distortions among firms. In the following, the focus
lies on competitive distortions that may arise from uneven conditions (a) between
firms, industries, and jurisdictions regulated under the same allowance trading
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scheme, (b) between industries in one jurisdiction regulated under different policy
instruments, and (c) at the international level between countries with different
environmental regulations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section will
give a general overview of the factors affecting firm competitiveness under a sys-
tem of tradable emission allowances. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we will then analyze
the different classes of competitive distortions arising from emissions trading both
within a system of tradable allowances and on the international level, i.e. between
countries or regions that have implemented emissions trading and countries or
regions that have not. In Section 4.4 we will investigate potential remedies for
(international) competitive distortions arising from emissions trading. In Section
4.5 we will then review the empirical evidence on the impact of the European
emissions trading scheme on firm competitiveness and describe the results of var-
ious simulation models analyzing the (potential) carbon leakage effects of different
global emissions trading policy scenarios. Finally, Section 4.6 will summarize the
main results of this chapter and provide some policy conclusions.
4.2 Factors affecting firm competitiveness un-
der emission allowance trading
The competitiveness of firms may be adversely affected by emissions trading
due to the additional costs they incur compared to their unregulated or less
regulated competitors. As a result, the affected firms have to decide between
two alternatives. Either they pass through these additional costs to their output
prices at the expense of a loss in market share or they do not (fully) pass through
the additional costs and accept a reduction in profits while maintaining their
market shares. Ultimately, the costs of emission regulation may be so large that it
becomes profitable for firms to shift their production to other regions or countries
with weaker regulations.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the main factors determining the impact of an emissions
trading scheme on firm competitiveness. The first and most important factor is
the energy intensity of the firms’ production, which can be broken down into two
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aspects. On the one hand, firms or industries with higher energy intensity have to
purchase more emission allowances, directly increasing their production costs. On
the other hand, energy-intensive firms or industries face an indirect cost increase
because electricity prices are likely to increase as a result of emissions trading.
The indirect effect through rising electricity prices also affects firms that do not
participate in emissions trading. Accordingly, energy intensity has a negative
effect on competitiveness.
The second factor to affect firm competitiveness is the ability to pass through
higher costs to output prices. If firms or industries operate in a context with
relatively low demand elasticity and little competitive pressure, they are in a
better position to pass through allowance costs and thus their competitiveness
is less seriously affected. Conversely, firms or industries competing in global
output markets generally face a higher risk of losing competitiveness because they
cannot pass through allowance costs without losing market shares to international
competitors that do not incur these additional costs.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1 competitiveness is also influenced by the ability of
firms or industries to abate emissions or to substitute emission-intensive inputs.
Competitiveness is less seriously affected if a firm can easily and inexpensively
implement abatement measures or switch to less emission-intensive inputs. Fi-
nally, the fourth factor to impact on competitiveness is the incentive created by
the emissions constraint to invest in innovative low-carbon technologies. If inno-
vations in low-carbon technologies succeed in penetrating the market, this may
lead to a positive effect on competitiveness, particularly in the long run.
The overall effect of emissions trading on competitiveness depends on the
relative strength of these different factors. In particular, while the effects associ-
ated with energy intensity, cost pass-through, and abatement opportunities will
certainly affect competitiveness in the short run, a positive long-run effect on
competitiveness from low-emission technological innovations is less certain. The
latter effect depends both on the incentives provided by the emission trading
scheme to develop innovative technologies and on the direction taken by interna-
tional climate policy in the future.
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Figure 4.1: Impact of emissions trading schemes on competitiveness
4.3 Competitiveness effects within a system of
tradable allowances
Within a system of tradable emission allowances, competitive distortions may re-
sult from sector- or country-specific allowance allocation rules leading to different
marginal abatement costs across participating companies, sectors, or countries.
In reference to this issue, the Green Paper on emissions trading by the European
Commission asserts that there is ”a trade-off between providing greater equality
of treatment and more simplicity, on the one hand, and Member States main-
taining greater autonomy, on the other” (COM, 2000). Based on this argument,
allowance allocation was not coordinated between the member states in the first
two trading phases of the EU-ETS, leading to differential treatment of otherwise
similar companies and sectors across the EU (Bo¨hringer & Lange, 2005; Woerd-
man, 2001). For instance, while most member states distributed all the emission
allowances for free, some states auctioned off a certain share of the allowances.
Most member states distributed the free allowance allocations according to histor-
ical emissions, while other member states applied industry-specific benchmarks.
Moreover, the member states implemented different exemption criteria and spe-
cial allocation rules, different allowance reserves for new entrants, and different
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definitions of installation closure. These numerous exemptions and special al-
location rules plus the lobbying efforts by the relevant industries to obtain the
highest possible allowance allocations led to an over-generous initial allocation,
particularly in the first trading phase.1 As a result, even with free allocation of
allowances, the so-called assignment factors (i.e. the ratio between the amount
of emission allowances allocated and historical emissions) were quite different for
firms from various European member states (Bo¨hringer & Lange, 2005; van der
Laan & Nentjes, 2001). Therefore, the European Union has decided to abolish
the National Allocation Plans in favor of harmonized allocation rules from the
third trading phase onward.
However, no satisfactory solution is feasible with any scheme allowing for free
allocation of allowances, since competitive neutrality would require the assign-
ment factors to be equal. Bo¨hringer & Lange (2005) show that, given the Kyoto
commitments for the different European countries, there is a trade-off between
competitive neutrality and cost efficiency. Competitive neutrality is either not
feasible if emission targets in the non-trading sectors are required to be efficient or
it induces large inefficiencies in the abatement efforts in the non-trading sectors.
Therefore, the simplest and most effective way to alleviate both cost-inefficiencies
and competitive distortions between firms, sectors, and countries within an emis-
sions trading scheme is by auctioning off a large share (or all) of the allowances.
On the other hand, the competitiveness of companies participating in emis-
sions trading may be affected differently depending on whether the main compe-
tition they face is national or international. In industries producing mainly for
the domestic market, companies are more likely to pass through the additional
cost of emission restrictions to their product prices and are thus less adversely
affected by emissions trading. Conversely, industries mainly selling their products
on international markets have little opportunity to pass through the allowance
costs if their international competitors face weaker emission limits or none at all.
In the latter case, free allowance allocation may be seen as a suitable way of
compensating firms for the additional costs they will necessarily incur. However,
1One might argue that the European regulators were prepared to accept the loss of efficiency
and competition neutrality to secure the support of the important industrial lobbying groups
for an emissions trading scheme.
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as will be discussed in Section 4.5.3, free allowance allocation has its drawbacks
in balancing out the competitive disadvantages of firms at an international level.
Another source of distortions arises from the fact that emissions trading sys-
tems usually cover only a part of the emitters in a certain country while the other
emitters are regulated by alternative policies. For instance, the EU-ETS includes
most industrial sectors, but not the transport sector or households. While this
is partly due to difficulties in measuring and controlling emissions in the latter
sectors, dividing the economy into an ETS and a non-ETS sector may lead to
an unequal distribution of the reduction burden between these two sectors.2 In-
deed, several studies on the EU-ETS conclude that the lion’s share of emission
reductions is borne by sectors not participating in emissions trading, leading to
substantially higher total costs than an emissions trading scheme embracing all
CO2-emitting sectors (Bo¨hringer et al., 2005; Peterson, 2006). The unequal treat-
ment of ETS versus non-ETS sectors may also lead to competitive distortions if
competing firms face different costs caused by environmental regulation. We have
already argued that there is always an efficiency trade-off between equal treat-
ment of ETS and non-ETS sectors, on the one hand, and competitive neutrality
across member states, on the other.
Finally, in analyzing the effects on competitiveness it is important to con-
sider both the direct and the indirect costs of emissions trading. As mentioned
above, the direct costs comprise abatement efforts and allowance purchases (or
equivalently the opportunity costs of holding allowances if they are allocated for
free), whereas the indirect costs result from input price increases due to emission
trading such as increases in energy prices. In the case of energy-intensive firms,
the indirect costs often represent a much more onerous burden than the direct
costs of emissions trading. So even if several regions or countries are regulated
by the same emissions trading scheme, as this is the case in the European Union,
different competitiveness effects may arise from different structures of the energy
production industries. In European countries with a high share of nuclear or hy-
dro power (France, Sweden, etc.), the impact of emissions trading on electricity
prices can be expected to be much less substantial than in countries with a high
2In principle, a rather simple way around the measurement problem is to measure CO2
emissions based on the emission intensity of fuel inputs.
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dependence on fossil fuel utilities, particularly on emission-intensive coal (Ger-
many, United Kingdom, etc.).3 This may give rise to location advantages for the
first-mentioned countries and lead to a relocation of energy-intensive industries to
these countries. The shift to less emission-intensive energy sources is a desirable
effect of any emissions regulation and does not lead to a deterioration of envi-
ronmental quality. However, the evaluation of relocation decisions becomes more
complicated when it is associated with a shift of production to countries with less
stringent environmental standards, as we will discuss in the next section.
4.4 Competitiveness effects at the international
level
At the international level competitive distortions may arise between countries
with different environmental regulations. Emitters in countries with stricter envi-
ronmental standards and hence higher marginal abatement and production costs
may be disadvantaged compared to emitters in countries with less strict regu-
lations or none at all. The potential effect is that certain industries will move
their production to less tightly regulated countries, thus increasing emissions else-
where. This effect is known as carbon leakage. In fact, this problem is not directly
related to a specific policy instrument like tradable allowances but rather to the
overall stringency of environmental regulation.
To protect the relevant industries from competitive disadvantages, many emis-
sions trading schemes define special rules for industries facing the risk of carbon
leakage. According to Dro¨ge (2009), these rules can be divided into two broad
categories: behind-the-border measures and border measures (also called border-
carbon-adjustment measures). Behind-the-border measures include direct finan-
cial compensations and free allocation of allowances. Border-carbon-adjustment
(BCA) measures comprise tariffs or taxes on imports, issuing tradable allowances
3If electricity could be traded freely between countries, it would be expected to observe a
unique electricity price across Europe. But due to relatively high transportation cost (transmis-
sion losses) and transmission bottlenecks between countries, electricity prices still vary widely
from one country to another.
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according to carbon content of imports, rebates for exports, or full border adjust-
ment.
One popular behind-the-border measure is to exclude the relevant industries
from allowance auctions and to distribute emission allowances for free instead.
As discussed above, this is an imperfect measure for mitigating regulated firms’
competitive disadvantage since these firms still face the emission costs in their
marginal production decisions. Moreover, long-term free allocation has a subsidy
effect and represents a major fiscal opportunity cost for governments (Stephenson
& Upton, 2009).
BCA measures are alternative ways to account for the fact that goods from
some countries are not subject to emission restrictions and therefore do not in-
clude the CO2 content in their prices. One potential remedy is to levy a border
carbon adjustment tax or tariff on imported goods reflecting the costs of CO2
emissions implicitly contained in the product. Alternatively, importers could be
required to purchase tradable allowances according to the carbon content of im-
ported goods. Provisions for BCA instruments can be found in several climate
policy bills proposed by the U.S. Senate (e.g. the Lieberman-Warner and the
Bingaman-Specter bills).4
BCAs may differ from region to region according to the respective carbon in-
tensity of production. Since carbon intensities vary substantially across regions,
this gives import taxes an advantage over other adjustment policies. However,
pricing imports according to their CO2 content only corrects the cost disadvan-
tages of domestic producers at home, but it does not alleviate competitive distor-
tions abroad. To offset the latter effect, a country can also grant a border rebate
for exports to under- or unregulated countries. Finally, combining BCAs for both
imports and exports leads to full border adjustment, where only the emissions
from domestic consumption are regulated. Such a full border adjustment policy
is equivalent to the destination principle in value-added tax systems.
4The Lieberman/Warner Climate Security Act requires the emission content of im-
ports from unregulated countries to be covered through the purchase of interna-
tional allowances (http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-s3036/text). Under the Binga-
man/Specter Low Carbon Economy Act importers have to hold emission allowances
when the emissions in the unregulated producing country exceed a baseline level
(http://energy.senate.gov/public/ files/END07842 xml1.pdf).
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Yet another option to account for international competitive distortions is to
grant rebates to all domestic production, independently of whether it is consumed
at home or abroad. This mechanism eliminates the cost disadvantages of emission
regulation, but unlike the full border adjustment policies it does not provide in-
centives to reduce the domestic consumption of emission-intensive products. Full
production rebates for energy-intensive, trade-sensitive industries correspond es-
sentially to an output-based allowance allocation with updating and thus entails
numerous efficiency problems. Accordingly, a full domestic rebate would be an
inferior option compared to border carbon adjustments. Moreover, it should be
noted that policies combating leakage do not necessarily reduce global emissions
(Fischer & Fox, 2009). The reason is that all adjustment policies either increase
the cost of foreign production or decrease the cost of domestic production. As
a result, domestic production (and with it domestic emissions) increases com-
pared to a situation without adjustment while at the same time reducing foreign
production (and foreign emissions).
A further concern about compensating measures such as border carbon ad-
justments is that these may be abused as a substitute for trade policy and thus
to bypass free trade agreements (Evenett & Whalley, 2009). Such compensa-
tion measures may therefore be in conflict with WTO rules. On the one hand,
GATT provisions (in particular Articles I and III) are premised on outlawing
discrimination in international trade. On the other hand, these rules have been
interpreted as allowing border tax adjustments with respect to taxes on inputs
which are ”physically incorporated” into the final product. It is an open question
whether energy can be interpreted as a physical input.5 However, many voices
express doubts about legal compatibility and feasibility of BCA measures (cf.
Cosbey, 2008; Fischer & Fox, 2009; Sabelstro¨m & Jegou, 2008; Stephenson &
Upton, 2009).
Besides the legal difficulties with BCA measures their effectiveness and ad-
ministrative feasibility is called into question. Effectiveness is challenged because
firms may find a variety of ways to evade the controls imposed by BCA (Cos-
bey, 2008; Houser et al., 2008). For instance, Houser et al. (2008) argue that
a scheme that imposes border adjustment on Chinese steel may cause increased
5For a detailed discussion see OECD (2006), chapter 5, and Cosbey (2008).
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flows from China to Japan, and increased flows from Japan to the U.S., without
in the end protecting U.S. steel producers. Moreover, BCA measures are difficult
to administer because it is far from obvious how to measure the carbon content
in particular products (Cosbey, 2008). It is further questionable whether BCA
measures provide an incentive for developing countries to implement domestic
emission reduction measures. According to Sabelstro¨m & Jegou (2008), only a
relatively small share of overall production in emerging economies would in fact
be touched by BCA implemented in the USA and/or in the EU since most of the
demand for energy-intensive products comes from the emerging countries them-
selves. Therefore, it is unlikely that BCA measures will significantly change the
production methods in developing countries. Finally, BCA may even induce a
carbon war between developed and developing countries and eventually redirect
trade (Mandelson, 2006).
Before turning to the empirical evidence on the effects of emissions trading on
competitiveness and carbon leakage, it is important to emphasize that a firm’s
(international) competitiveness depends on a multitude of factors such as labor
costs, supply of skilled labor, proximity to product markets, market competition,
ability to pass-on cost increases and trade costs (Ponssard & Walker, 2008; Sijm,
2005). The additional costs associated to emissions trading are probably not
the most important of these factors. Therefore, as long as the costs caused by
emissions trading are not too high, relocation decisions are less likely to occur,
especially if the relevant industries are capital-intensive.
4.5 Empirical evidence
Most of the empirical studies analyzing the effects of emissions trading schemes on
competitiveness focus on the European Emissions Trading Scheme, which is by far
the largest greenhouse gas emission trading scheme in existence.6 In particular,
6Compared to the U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade system, the EU-ETS is much larger in terms of
the number of covered sources (about 11,500 in the EU versus 3,000 in the U.S.), the emissions
cap (about 2000 million tons CO2 in the EU versus 9 million tons SO2 in the U.S.), and the
value of distributed allowances (about 30,000 million Euro (at a price of 15 Euro/ton of CO2)
versus 4,000 million Euro (at a price of 550 USD/ton of SO2 and an exchange rate of 1,25
USD/Euro.)) Source: Ellerman & Buchner (2007), own calculations.
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detailed studies have been carried out at a national level for Germany and the
United Kingdom (UK) by Graichen et al. (2008) and Hourcade et al. (2007),
respectively. These studies assess the following issues:
• Which sectors are likely to face significant increases in direct or indirect
costs due to the emissions trading scheme?
• Which sectors face high exposure to international trade and may thus be
at risk of carbon leakage?
4.5.1 Sectors affected by direct and indirect cost increases
through emissions trading
Graichen et al. (2008) and Hourcade et al. (2007) analyze the cost effects of
emissions trading based on the concept of ’value at stake’, which is defined as the
sum of potential direct and indirect costs of a given industry in relation to its gross
added value. The direct costs of an industry depend on the emission intensity of
production, comprising energy and process emissions. The indirect costs depend
on electricity consumption and the pass-through of CO2 costs to electricity prices.
Assuming full cost pass-through and an allowance price of 20 Euro per ton of CO2,
the studies find that for most industries covered by the EU-ETS the maximum
value at stake is below two percent of gross added value. The industrial activities
with a maximum value at stake of more than 10 percent are summarized in Table
4.1. Taken together, these activities represent roughly one percent of the gross
domestic product in the UK and two percent of the gross domestic product in
Germany.7 The different industry impacts in the two countries are partly due
to structural differences in energy production. In the UK, the marginal power
generation unit is provided by a natural gas-based power plant, while in Germany
the marginal generation unit is usually a hard coal-based power plant. Since hard
coal is more emission-intensive than natural gas, the indirect cost effect due to
increasing electricity prices is higher in Germany than in the UK.
7Similar figures have been obtained by Bruyn et al. (2008) for the Netherlands, CISA (2008)
for Australia, and both Morgenstern et al. (2007) and Aldy & Pizer (2009) for the USA.
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Table 4.1: Potentially exposed industries under unilateral CO2 pricing in Ger-
many and the United Kingdom
Maximum value at stake Germany United Kingdom
(% of gross added value)
> 50% cement, lime
> 40%− 50% lime
> 30%− 40% cement
> 20%− 30% fertilizers & nitrogen basic iron & steel
> 10%− 20% basic iron & steel, refined petroleum
aluminum, paper & products, aluminum,
paperboard, other basic fertilizers & nitrogen,
inorganic chemicals,
coke & refined
petroleum products
Sources: Graichen et al. (2008); Hourcade et al. (2007).
4.5.2 Sectors affected by emissions trading due to inter-
national competition
High values at stake due to unilateral CO2 pricing are not a matter of concern in
industries facing a low degree of international competition. By contrast, increases
in production costs as a result of unilateral climate policy in highly trade-exposed
industries can distort competitive conditions in favor of international competitors
from less regulated countries. This holds both for exports of domestic produc-
tion to foreign markets and for import penetration in the domestic market. In
the studies on Germany and the UK, trade intensity is used as a proxy for the
intensity of international competition in a certain industry. Trade intensity (TI)
is calculated by relating the sum of traded goods to the total market supply:
Non EU TI =
Non EU exports + Non EU imports
Domestic output + EU imports + Non EU imports
. (4.1)
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To measure trade intensity within the EU (4.1) changes to:
EU TI =
EU exports + EU imports
Domestic output + EU imports + Non EU imports
. (4.2)
Clearly, trade intensity is only a rough indicator since the intensity of com-
petition depends on many other factors such as transport costs, exchange rate
uncertainty, product differentiation, and market segmentation. The analysis of
trade intensities shows, however, that some of the sectors most affected by cost in-
creases through exposure to emissions trading are not presently subject to strong
international competition. For instance, the trade intensities for the lime and
cement sectors, which are both heavily affected by carbon-related costs, are five
percent or less in both Germany and the UK. Table 4.2 summarizes the industries
in Germany and the UK with trade intensities of more than 10 percent.
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Table 4.2: Trade intensities for different industrial sectors in Germany and the
United Kingdom
Trade intensity Germany United Kingdom
> 50% dyes & pigments coke oven products,
other textile weaving
> 40%− 50% industrial gases
> 30%− 40% other basic inorganic
chemicals
> 20%− 30% other glass, copper products,
copper products, non-wovens, malt,
aluminum aluminum, other basic
inorganic chemicals,
refined petroleum products
> 10%− 20% paper & paperboard, rubber tires & tubes,
veneer sheets, plastics, basic iron & steel,
fertilizers & nitrogen, pulp & paper,
hollow glass, veneer sheets,
basic iron & steel, fertilizers & nitrogen,
glass fibers, hollow glass
ceramic tiles
Sources: Graichen et al. (2008); Hourcade et al. (2007).
Bringing both indicators together, Graichen et al. (2008) and Hourcade et al.
(2007) identify those industrial sectors with both values at stake and trade inten-
sities of above 10 percent as being at risk of losing international competitiveness
due to unilateral CO2 pricing. In both Germany and the UK, these sectors are
iron and steel, fertilizers and nitrogen, and aluminum and aluminum products.
In addition, the German sectors for paper and paperboard and basic inorganic
chemicals are exposed to losses in international competitiveness through CO2 reg-
ulation, mainly because of the high indirect costs of electricity. In the UK, the
sector for refined petroleum products is also facing the risk of losing competitive-
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ness, mainly due to the high intensity of trade with non-EU countries. Altogether,
Graichen et al. (2008) and Hourcade et al. (2007) suggest that only a relatively
small number of sectors face a large risk of losing international competitiveness.
In fact, a study by Smale et al. (2006) analyzing the impact of emissions
trading on firm profits and market prices indicates that most EU-ETS sectors are
even expected to benefit in the first two trading periods, with prices and profits
rising overall and only modest production drops in the steel and cement industries.
The only exception is aluminum smelting, which is exposed both to large increases
in marginal cost and to high levels of international competition, with potential
relocation of production outside the EU as a consequence of emissions trading.
The firms’ potential for making substantial profits in the first two trading periods
arises from the free allocation of emission allowances. Since allowance prices are
added to the marginal production costs independently of whether allowances are
auctioned off or allocated for free, there is a potential for ”double compensation”,
as Grubb & Neuhoff (2006) call it.
Yet another study by Demailly & Quirion (2007) focuses on the competi-
tiveness effects in the highly internationally exposed iron and steel industry. The
authors suggest that this industry faces only small output reductions but a strong
increase in profitability due to emissions trading in the EU. Even for a scenario
where free allocation of allowances is reduced from 100 to 50 percent, the nega-
tive impact on profits is found to be very small. In fact, for the USA Goulder
& Mathai (2000) find that on average only 13 percent of allowances had to be
allocated for free to compensate firms for additional costs arising from greenhouse
gas reductions.
4.5.3 Leakage effects
The issue of CO2 emission leakage due to unilateral carbon pricing has been ad-
dressed in several simulation studies. In this context, a detailed analysis of the
European cement industry by Demailly & Quirion (2006) shows that a significant
leakage effect arises under free allocation based on historical emissions, compen-
sating for about half of the emission reductions in the EU. Using a model of
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global trade, Fischer & Fox (2009) simulate the effect of a unilateral CO2 emis-
sion price of 50 U.S. dollar per ton of CO2, implemented jointly by the United
States and Canada. For different border adjustment policies they analyze the
effects on competitiveness and leakage in several industrial sectors (i.e. electric-
ity, refined petroleum products, chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, pulp and paper,
and iron and steel). Fischer & Fox (2009) find that most adjustment policies are
able to reduce the loss in production compared to a situation without adjustment.
Moreover, full border tax adjustment and home rebates (output-based free allo-
cation) turn out as the most effective policies. However, the authors also reveal
that none of the policies is effective in reducing average leakage, defined as the
change in foreign emissions relative to domestic emission reductions. For both
the United States and Canada, leakage rates are considerable under all policies,
ranging between ten percent (in the electricity sector) and 90 percent (in the re-
fined petroleum products sector) in the United States and between 18 percent (in
the pulp and paper sector) and 105 percent (in the refined petroleum products
sector) in Canada.
An important caveat in connection with the analysis by Fischer & Fox (2009)
is that it ignores existing climate policies in other countries, including the Euro-
pean Emissions Trading Scheme. Accordingly, the estimated leakage rates may
be overstated. Moreover, analyzing competitiveness and leakage separately for
different sectors ignores the fact that policies targeting a specific sector have im-
portant indirect effects on other closely connected sectors and ultimately on the
(world) economy as a whole. In this context, several economy-wide studies show
that leakage varies significantly depending on the size of country coalitions adopt-
ing comparable climate policies (see Dro¨ge, 2009, for an overview). According to
Dro¨ge (2009), the typical leakage estimate is in the order of 20 percent. The chal-
lenge for future research is to develop comprehensive models that jointly analyze
the effects of different policies on competitiveness, leakage, and overall emissions
from all sectors (whether participating in emissions trading or not) and for all
countries (domestic and foreign).
One such attempt has been made by Bo¨hringer et al. (2010) who analyze the
effects of a unilateral 20 percent reduction of CO2 emissions in the U.S. and/or
the EU, combined with several anti-leakage policies, on the global distribution
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of welfare, competitiveness, and carbon leakage.8 They study different policy
scenarios compared to a baseline case without any climate policies, namely (a)
allowance auctioning and no anti-leakage policies, (b) output-based free allocation
to energy-intensive industries, (c) rebates for energy-intensive exports, (d) tariffs
on energy-intensive imports, and (e) a combination of export rebates and import
tariffs. The main results by Bo¨hringer et al. (2010) can be summarized as follows.
First, they find that welfare losses do not only occur in countries pursuing climate
policies but also in countries that are trading partners. In particular, the welfare
loss is substantially higher in the EU than in the U.S., mainly because the U.S.
has cheaper abatement options both concerning energy efficiency improvements
and fuel switching in electricity production. Since EU countries are more trade-
intensive, most other countries are worse off in the case of unilateral EU climate
policy than under unilateral U.S. climate policy. Among the trading partners, the
welfare effects are particularly negative in oil and coal exporting countries (e.g.
Russia, the OPEC countries, Mexico) and may even be positive in oil and coal
importing countries (e.g. India, Japan). This is because climate policy induces
changes in global energy prices through the reduced demand for CO2-intensive
fossil fuels, which then leads to decreasing coal and crude oil prices and increasing
natural gas prices.
The second result obtained by Bo¨hringer et al. (2010) is that anti-leakage
policies do not substantially decrease the welfare costs borne by the U.S. and/or
the EU. In both the U.S. and the EU welfare costs are smallest under border
adjustment policies. Conversely, the implementation border adjustment leads to
large welfare costs in the other countries, particularly in countries exporting coal,
crude oil, and energy-intensive goods. For the world as a whole, however, the
differences in welfare costs arising from the alternative adjustment policies are
negligible.
The third result put forward by Bo¨hringer et al. (2010) is that global emission
leakage is higher (up to 38 percent) when only the EU undertakes climate policy,
as compared to the case where only the U.S. or both the EU and the U.S. reduce
emissions (up to 19 and 22 percent, respectively). The reason is twofold. First,
the European economy has a larger share of imports and exports than the U.S..
8Bo¨hringer et al. (2010) also provide a brief overview of related studies.
144
4.5 Empirical evidence
Second, since energy-intensive industries in the EU are less emission-intensive
than in the U.S., industrial relocation away from Europe implies a higher leakage
rate. Moreover, in line with the findings of Fischer & Fox (2009), Reinaud (2005),
and Burniaux et al. (2008) the different anti-leakage policies can only moderately
reduce the global leakage effect in the model of Bo¨hringer et al. (2010). The reason
is that the largest share of leakage is caused by changing global fossil-fuel prices.
Since an emission constraint in a particular country or region will lead to lower
demand and thus lower prices for fossil fuels on the world market, other countries
or regions without emission constraint will respond by increasing their demand
for fossil fuels, thereby offsetting (a part of) the emission reductions. However,
anti-leakage policies can only compensate rather imperfectly for indirect leakage
effects through the energy market because they account for the CO2 content of a
particular product but cannot influence the changes in global demand and prices
for fossil fuels.
Finally, in terms of the competitiveness effects in energy-intensive sectors,
Bo¨hringer et al. (2010) find that the production of chemical products, non-ferrous
metals (and in the EU also iron and steel) is most strongly affected by unilateral
climate policy, and that full border-adjustment policies can reduce the negative
impacts on energy-intensive production to some extent. In the unregulated coun-
tries, the exports of energy-intensive goods mostly benefit from unilateral climate
policy in the EU and/or the U.S., even when the most effective anti-leakage poli-
cies, i.e. import tariffs and full border adjustment, are in force. In addition, the
regional impacts differ considerably, mainly driven by different carbon intensities
in production and the use of different technologies and energy inputs.
Bo¨hringer et al. (2010) nevertheless conclude that the controversial debate
on anti-leakage policies overstates the importance of the leakage problem. Ac-
cording to their analysis, the main impacts on global welfare, emissions, and
production are caused by the unilateral climate policy itself, i.e. the 20 percent
reduction of CO2 emissions in the U.S. and/or the EU. The authors claim that
anti-leakage policies can mitigate the negative effects arising from the underly-
ing climate policy objective only to a very limited extent, i.e. only in particular
sectors or countries. In addition, they assert that developing countries do not
145
4.6 Concluding remarks
generally benefit from unilateral climate policies undertaken by developed coun-
tries because reductions both in energy demand and in energy-intensive imports
will have negative effects, particularly in the fossil-fuel exporting countries. On
the other hand, energy-intensive sectors in developing countries do not generally
lose as a result of anti-leakage policies. They may even benefit from lower import
prices for fossil fuels. These results are confirmed by several other general equi-
librium studies finding that BCA measures indeed induce a global welfare decline
and net benefits from reductions in carbon leakage are uncertain (Alexeeva-Talebi
et al., 2008; Burniaux et al., 2008; Manders & Veenendaal, 2008).
4.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have analyzed the potential repercussions a system of tradable
emission allowances may have on competitiveness of firms, regions, and countries
both on the national and on the international level. Within the same trading sys-
tem, such competitive distortions may be caused by unequal treatment of firms
located in different jurisdictions, generating unequal sectoral burdens and inef-
ficient abatement efforts. This applies to markets where firms operating in the
same allowance market face different competitive conditions, as was (and still
is) the case in the European Union under the first two trading phases of the
EU-ETS. Such differential treatment may also occur when different industries in
one jurisdiction are regulated under different policy instruments. The problem of
competitive neutrality within the same allowance market but across different ju-
risdictions can best be solved through an auctioning system for allowances. More-
over, since tradable allowance systems create indirect costs via the pass-through
to energy prices, countries with heterogeneous energy generation structures are
differently affected by allowance trading.
A second source of competitive distortions may result from environmental
policies of varying stringency, leading to international competitive disadvantages
for industries located in countries or regions with stricter emission limits than
others, because they cannot pass on the carbon costs to global market prices.
This problem is not specific to allowance trading but would also arise if a dif-
ferent environmental policy were employed. The different stringency of envi-
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ronmental policies worldwide may also give rise to carbon leakage if production
costs increase in countries with stricter emission targets and production thus is
shifted to countries with less strict emission targets or none at all. In the long
run, (re)investment may also move from countries with tight emission policies to
those with little or no regulation. Carbon leakage may also occur via the en-
ergy market because lower demand for energy in countries with strict emission
policies tends to push down energy prices, thereby increasing energy demand in
other parts of the world. Finally, there is also a risk of intertemporal leakage.
This type of leakage arises when the announcement of tighter climate policy on a
worldwide scale causes fossil-fuel source owners to speed up resource exploitation
in order to sell as much of their fossil-fuel resources as possible before emission
caps are implemented worldwide (Sinn, 2008).9 Carbon leakage effects may be
considerable, and while there is debate about the total size of leakage, it could
range from almost zero to more than 100 percent, depending on the industrial
sector. Countermeasures to mitigate carbon leakage, including free allowance al-
location and border-carbon-adjustment measures have only limited impact since
a large part of the leakage effect is caused by changes in global energy prices. In
addition, the most effective policy measures in addressing the leakage problem
may not be effective in addressing the international competitiveness issues. Un-
fortunately, the problem of large stringency differences in environmental policy
across countries cannot be solved in a perfectly satisfactory way by unilateral
policies. Therefore, solving the problems related to international competitiveness
and leakage ultimately requires more and better international coordination.
9We have not touched upon intertemporal leakage in detail because it does not give rise to
the sort of competitive distortions considered in this chapter.
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In this thesis I have studied various facets of carbon mitigation policies. In Chap-
ter 1, I have examined the optimal design of a tax-subsidy policy taking into
account pollution and market power in the fossil-fuel energy sector and learn-
ing spill-overs and market power in the renewable energy industry. In Chapter
2, the dynamic interactions between emission allowance and energy prices and
their application to portfolio allocation have been assessed. In Chapter 3, I have
investigated the different forms and potential impacts of market manipulations
due to market power in emissions trading schemes. Finally, I have scrutinized the
potential distortions of (inter)national competitiveness arising through emissions
trading in Chapter 4. In the following, I will provide some general conclusions
and policy recommendations.
The results obtained in the first chapter indicate that currently implemented
feed-in tariff policies to increase the share of renewable energies are highly in-
efficient for several reasons. The first efficiency problem arises because feed-in
tariffs promote the generation of renewable energies, whereas the learning ef-
fects presumably occur in the production of renewable energy equipment such
as wind turbines and solar panels. From an economic point of view only the
learning spill-overs arising from renewable equipment production should be sub-
sidized because the firms already take into account the cost reductions they may
achieve through private (i.e. firm-specific) learning. The second efficiency prob-
lem is caused by overlapping regulations. In many countries, for instance in
Europe, feed-in tariffs coexist with emissions trading systems. However, the cap
on total emissions implemented through these systems fully compensates for the
additional emission-reducing effect through renewable energy generation. The
efficiency losses through overlapping regulations may be solved by implementing
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an emission tax instead of emissions trading. However, the results in the first
chapter show that, when combined with an emission tax in the fossil-fuel sec-
tor, second-best optimal feed-in tariffs have a very complicated structure and do
not provide considerable increases in social welfare compared to a pure emission
tax policy. The reason is that the learning spill-over effects in the renewable
energy industry are largely dominated by the effects caused through imperfect
competition in the fossil-fuel sector. In the model presented in Chapter 1, I have
analyzed a feed-in tariff that is not differentiated according to the type of re-
newable technology. I expect, however, that incorporating this additional feature
would further increase both the complexity and the inefficiency of this instru-
ment. By contrast, if the regulator raises the tax rate or tightens the emission
cap, increasing emission prices would ”automatically” improve the competitive
position of renewable energies vis-a`-vis conventional energies.
The results of the second chapter indicate that the European emission market
has matured considerably in the second period of emission allowance trading. In
the first trading period from 2005-2007 allowance prices were largely influenced
by issues related to the design of the trading system such as the excess allocation
of emission allowances to the firms, whereas the influence of energy prices and
other fundamental allowance price drivers was rather weak and did not hold con-
sistently throughout the complete period. In the second trading period I find that
a stable long-run equilibrium relationship exists between emission allowance and
energy prices, namely electricity, natural gas, and coal. Moreover, it is interesting
from a policy perspective that the effect of increasing coal prices on electricity
prices in the short run is absorbed to some extent by a decrease in allowance
prices. The reason is that increasing costs for coal drive down demand for emis-
sion allowances. This dampening effect on wholesale electricity prices can be seen
as an advantage of emissions trading over emission taxes (as an alternative pol-
icy instrument to regulate emissions). Since emission tax rates are fixed by the
regulator, they are not able to react to unexpected fuel price shocks. In times of
considerably increasing fossil-fuel prices this positive side-effect of emissions trad-
ing could potentially lower the financial burden imposed on electricity-intensive
industries and households compared to an alternative regulation through emission
taxes.
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The results in the third and fourth chapter point out numerous sources for
potential distortions on emission allowance markets such as distortions arising
from market power and through unequal regulation across firms, industries, or
countries. The potential for anti-competitive effects due to market power is an
important issue in the context of emissions trading. Therefore, competition au-
thorities should observe emission markets especially when the number of par-
ticipants is relatively small. Moreover, a careful design of the essential rules of
the trading system can help to prevent anti-competitive behavior. In particular,
policy makers should try to make sure that the allocation rules for allowances,
both through auctioning or free allocation, do not provide incentives for strategic
bidding behavior, strategic detention and strategic sale of allowances, that there
is a standardized price-setting mechanism leading to a unique allowance price,
and that transparent trading rules are established, guaranteeing liquid spot and
secondary markets.
In the context of unequal regulation across firms, industries, and countries
not all of the distortions are inherent to emissions trading. For instance, inde-
pendent of whether emissions are regulated through tradable allowances, taxes,
standards, or other instruments, a varying stringency of the regulation will give
rise to deviations between the marginal abatement costs of the affected entities
and thus lead to higher than optimal total costs of the policy. The empirical
evidence for Europe indicates that in general terms the impact of emissions trad-
ing on the international competitiveness of firms is still relatively small. In fact,
competitiveness is influenced by a wide range of factors, among which the carbon
constraint is, at least currently, probably not the most important one.
Distortions through unequal treatment on the international level can lead
to considerable carbon leakage. For the time being there is no clear picture
concerning the overall magnitude of carbon leakage. Estimating the rate of carbon
leakage is difficult because leakage may occur through different channels, directly
through the emission constraint and indirectly through changes in global energy
prices. Since changing energy prices also affect countries without proper climate
policy, these countries do not necessarily benefit from unilateral climate policies
elsewhere. Moreover, there is no unilateral measure to perfectly compensate for
both international competitive distortions and leakage. The best remedy to tackle
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both problems would be to enlarge the coalition of countries engaging in climate
policy. Within a trading system, competitive neutrality and cost-efficiency can
best be achieved by allocating emission allowances trough auctions, as long as
the auction mechanism does not provide incentives for anti-competitive behavior
of large firms.
Taken all the results presented in this thesis together, it becomes clear that no
single policy instrument can possibly achieve all desired climate policy objectives
together, while being both economically efficient and effective in terms of reaching
the policy target. Therefore, as long as there are as diverse and often conflicting
policy targets as currently observed in many countries, there will always be a
trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness of a given policy. One example for
such a policy conflict is the 20-20-20 target in the European Union, consisting of
a 20 percent cut in emissions, a 20 percent share of renewable energies, and a 20
percent increase in energy efficiency, to be achieved until 2020. On the one hand,
effectiveness in terms of meeting the 20-20-20 target will necessarily be to the
detriment of economic efficiency, because the instruments employed to increase
production of renewable energies and to improve energy efficiency will have a
counterproductive effect on the European emission allowance market. On the
other hand, the current market price for CO2 emission allowances in Europe of
roughly 16e/ton CO2 indicates the availability of much cheaper abatement op-
tions compared to, for instance, most currently available renewable energy tech-
nologies. A market-based climate policy approach through either emission taxes
or a system of tradable emission allowances would allow firms to first exploit the
cost-effective emission abatement potentials before moving to higher-cost options
such as renewable energy production. Therefore, such an approach would en-
sure economic efficiency of the climate policy and, in the medium to long term,
also lead to the achievement of other policy objectives besides the reduction of
emissions.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of the comparative-static effects of
market concentration with oligopolistic com-
petition in the fossil-fuel industry only
In order to analyze the impact of market structure in the fossil-fuel industry on
output, prices and the policy instruments we differentiate equations (1.2)–(1.4),
and (1.13)–(1.19) with respect to the number of fossil fuel utilities. Simplifying
via the envelope theorem then yields the following system of equations:
Aggregate electricity production:
∂Q1
∂m
=
∫ X1
0
∂q1(x˜)
∂m
dx˜+ q1(X1)
∂X1
∂m
+m
∂k1
∂m
+ k1 (A.1)
∂Q2
∂m
=
∫ X2
0
∂q2(x˜)
∂m
dx˜+ q2(X2)
∂X2
∂m
+m
∂k2
∂m
+ k2 (A.2)
Electricity production of the intra-marginal RES-E firms:
∂q1(x˜)
∂m
=
P ′1(Q1)
C1qq(q1(x˜), x˜)
∂Q1
∂m
∀x˜ ≤ X1 (A.3)
∂q2(x˜)
∂m
=
P ′2(Q2)
C2qq(q2(x˜), x˜)
∂Q2
∂m
∀x˜ ≤ X2 (A.4)
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Electricity production of the fossil fuel utilities:
0 = [P ′1(Q1) + P
′′
1 (Q1)k1]
∂Q1
∂m
+ [P ′1(Q1)−K ′′1 (k1)]
∂k1
∂m
− ∂τ1
∂m
(A.5)
0 = [P ′2(Q2) + P
′′
2 (Q2)k2]
∂Q2
∂m
+ [P ′2(Q2)−K ′′2 (k2)]
∂k2
∂m
− ∂τ2
∂m
(A.6)
Production of the RES-E equipment firms:
0 =
∂b1
∂m
− [Γ1y1y1 + δΓ2LL(1 + (n− 1)ε)]
∂y1
∂m
+
∂σ1
∂m
− δΓ2y2L
∂y2
∂m
(A.7)
0 =
∂b2
∂m
− Γ2y2y2∂y2
∂m
− Γ2y2L(1 + (n− 1)ε)
∂y1
∂m
(A.8)
Emission taxes:
∂τ1
∂m
= P ′′1 (Q1)k1
∂Q1
∂m
+ [P ′1(Q1) +mD
′′
1(mk1)]
∂k1
∂m
+D′′1(mk1)k1 (A.9)
∂τ2
∂m
= P ′′2 (Q2)k2
∂Q2
∂m
+ [P ′2(Q2) +mD
′′
2(mk2)]
∂k2
∂m
+D′′2(mk2)k2 (A.10)
Output subsidy for the RES-E equipment firms:
∂σ1
∂m
= −δ(n− 1)εΓ2LL(1 + (n− 1)ε)
∂y1
∂m
− δ(n− 1)εΓ2y2L
∂y2
∂m
(A.11)
Total number of RES-E equipment:
∂X1
∂m
= n
∂y1
∂m
(A.12)
∂X2
∂m
= n
∂y2
∂m
(A.13)
Electricity prices:
∂p1
∂m
= P ′1(Q1)
∂Q1
∂m
(A.14)
∂p2
∂m
= P ′2(Q2)
∂Q2
∂m
(A.15)
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RES-E equipment prices:
∂b1
∂m
= P ′1(Q1)q1(X1)
∂Q1
∂m
− C1X1
∂X1
∂m
(A.16)
∂b2
∂m
= P ′2(Q2)q2(X2)
∂Q2
∂m
− C2X2
∂X2
∂m
(A.17)
Substituting ∂q1(x˜)
∂m
and ∂q1(x˜)
∂m
from (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.1) and (A.2) leads to
the following expressions for the change in aggregate electricity production:
∂Q1
∂m
=
1
1− P ′1(Q1)CC1
[
m
∂k1
∂m
+ q1(X1)
∂X1
∂m
+ k1
]
(A.18)
∂Q2
∂m
=
1
1− P ′2(Q2)CC2
[
m
∂k2
∂m
+ q2(X2)
∂X2
∂m
+ k2
]
, (A.19)
where CC1 =
∫ X1
0
1
C1qq(q1(x˜),x˜)
dx˜ and CC2 =
∫ X2
0
1
C2qq(q2(x˜),x˜)
dx˜. We can now
write the system of equations in matrix form and solve for the comparative-static
effects. We assume that Γ2Ly2 is sufficiently small, which together with Condition
1 implies that the effect of learning on the marginal costs of RES-E equipment
producers in the second period is not too large. We can then unambiguously sign
the effects as follows, where Det denotes the determinant of the matrix:
Det =
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{[
(Γ1y1y1 + C
1
Xn)
[
(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1
]
+ n(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)P
′
1q
2
1
][
(Γ2y2y2 + C
2
Xn)
[
(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2
]
+ n(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)P
′
2q
2
2
]
+ δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2[(K ′′1 +mD′′1)(P ′1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1]
[ Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2)
[
(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2
]
+ Γ2LLC
2
Xn
[
(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2
]
+ Γ2LLn(K
′′
2 +mD
′′
2)P
′
2q
2
2
]}
> 0
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∂k1
∂m
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{[
(Γ2y2y2 + C
2
Xn)((K
′′
2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2)
+ (K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)nP
′
2q
2
2
][
D′′1k1[(Γ
1
y1y1 + nC
1
X)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + nP ′1q21]
+ P ′1k1(Γ
1
y1y1 + C
1
Xn)
]
+ δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)[
(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2
][
(P ′1CC1 − 1)− P ′1k1
]
+ δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2Γ2LLk1(K ′′2 +D′′2m)nP ′2q22
[
D′′1(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1
]
+ δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)Γ2y2Lk2K ′′2nP ′1P ′2q1q2
}
< 0
∂k2
∂m
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{[
(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1
][
P ′2 +D
′′
2(P
′
2CC2 − 1)
]
[
Γ1y1y1k2(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn) + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)
]
+ (Γ2y2y2 + C
2
Xn)nk2[P
′
2 +D
′′
2(P
′
2CC2 − 1)][
C1X(K
′′
1 +D
′′
1m)((P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1q21) + C1XmP ′1
]
+D′′2k2nP
′
2q
2
2
[
Γ1y1y1 [(K
′′
1 +D
′′
1m)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1]
+ n[C1X(K
′′
1 +D
′′
1m)((P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1q21) + C1XmP ′1]
+ δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2Γ2LL
[
(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1
]]
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)Γ2y2Lk1K ′′1nP ′1P ′2q1q2
}
< 0
∂q1(x˜)
∂m
= − 1
Det
C2qqP
′
1
{[
k1K
′′
1 (Γ
1
y1y1 + C
1
Xn)
]
[
(Γ2y2y2 + C
2
Xn)[(K
′′
2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2] + (K ′′2 +D′′2m)nP ′2q22
]
+ δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)
[
(1 + (n− 1)ε)k1K ′′1
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)
[(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2] + Γ2LLk1K ′′1 (1 + (n− 1)ε)(K ′′2 +D′′2m)nP ′2q22
+ Γ2y2Lk2K
′′
2 (K
′′
1 +D
′′
1m)nP
′
2q1q2
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< 0
∂q2(x˜)
∂m
= − 1
Det
C1qqP
′
2
{[
(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1
]
[
Γ1y1y1k2K
′′
2 (Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn) + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2k2K ′′2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)
]
+ k2K
′′
2n(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)
[
C1X [(K
′′
1 +D
′′
1m)(CC1 − P ′1) +mP ′1]
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+ Γ2y2LK
′′
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}
< 0
155
A.1 Proof of the comparative-static effects of market concentration
with oligopolistic competition in the fossil-fuel industry only
∂Q1
∂m
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{
k1K
′′
1 (Γ
1
y1y1 + C
1
Xn)[
(Γ2y2y2 + C
2
Xn)
[
(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2
]
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′′
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(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1
]
+ k1K
′′
1 (K
′′
2 +D
′′
2m)nP
′
1P
′
2q1q
2
2
}
< 0
∂y2
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{
Γ2y2Lk1K
′′
1 (1 + (n− 1)ε)P ′1q1
[
(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2
]
− k2K ′′2P ′2q2
[[
Γ1y1y1 + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2Γ2LL + C1Xn
]
[
(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1
]
+ (K ′′1 +D
′′
1m)nP
′
1q
2
1
]}
< 0
∂b1
∂m
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{
[(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2][
Γ1y1y1k1K
′′
1P
′
1q1(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn) + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2k1K ′′1P ′1q1
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)
]
+ (K ′′2 +D
′′
2m)nP
′
1P
′
2q1q
2
2k1K
′′
1
[Γ1y1y1 + (1 + (n− 1)ε)Γ2LL] + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)k2K ′′2nP ′2q2Γ2y2L[
(K ′′1 +D
′′
1m)(C
1
X(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1q21) + C1XP ′1m
]}
< 0
∂b2
∂m
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{[
K ′′1 (P
′
1CC1 − 1) +m(P ′1 +D′′1(P ′1CC1 − 1))
]
P ′2q2k2K
′′
2
[
Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + nC
1
XΓ
2
y2y2 + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)
]
+ P ′1P
′
2q
2
1q2nΓ
2
y2y2k2K
′′
2 (K
′′
1 +D
′′
1m) + (1 + (n− 1)ε)Γ2y2Lk1K ′′1nP ′1q1[
(K ′′2 +D
′′
2m)q2 + C
2
X [(K
′′
2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2]
]}
< 0
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In order to unambiguously sign the comparative-static effects on the emission
tax rates we further assume that Γ2Ly2 is sufficiently small, which together with
Condition 1 implies that the effect of learning on the marginal cost of RES-E
equipment producers in the second period is not too large:
∂τ1
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{[
−((P ′1)2 + k1K ′′1P ′′1 )(Γ1y1y1 + C1Xn)k1 +D′′1k1(K ′′1 − P ′1)[
Γ1y1y1(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + n(C1X(P ′1CC1 − 1) + P ′1q21)
]][
(Γ2y2y2 + C
2
Xn)
[
(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2
]
+ (K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)nP
′
2q
2
2
]
+ δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2k1
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)
[K ′′2 (P
′
2CC2 − 1) +m(P ′2 +D′′2(P ′2CC2 − 1))]
[−((P ′1)2 + k1K ′′1P ′′1 ) + (K ′′1 − P ′1)(P ′1CC1 − 1)]
+ Γ2y2Lk2K
′′
2nP
′
2q1q2[−((P ′1)2 + k1K ′′1P ′′1 ) + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1)]
+ Γ2LLk1(1 + (n− 1)ε)(K ′′2 +D′′2m)nP ′2q22
[−((P ′1)2 + k1K ′′1P ′′1 ) + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)(K ′′1 − P ′1)(P ′1CC1 − 1)]
}
> 0
∂τ2
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{[
(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1
]
[
−((P ′2)2 + k2K ′′2P ′′2 )[Γ1y1y1k2(Γ2y2y2 + C2Xn) + δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2k2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)] +D′′2k2(K ′′2 − P ′2)[
[(Γ2y2y2 + C
2
Xn)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) + nP ′2q22](Γ1y1y1 + C1Xn)
+ δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)2[
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)(P ′2CC2 − 1) + Γ2LLnP ′2q22]
]]
+ (K ′′1 +D
′′
1m)k2n(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)
[
−((P ′2)2 + k2K ′′2P ′′2 )
[((P ′1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1)C1X + P ′1q21] +D′′2P ′1q21(K ′′2 − P ′2)(P ′2CC2 − 1)
]
+D′′2n
2P ′1P
′
2q
1
1q
2
2k2(K
′′
1 +D
′′
1m)(K
′′
2 − P ′2) + Γ2y2L(1 + (n− 1)ε)k1K ′′1nP ′1q1q2
[−((P ′2)2 + k2K ′′2P ′′2 ) +D′′2m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2)]
}
> 0
The sign of the comparative-static effect on the subsidy in the RES-E equipment
industry is ambiguous and Appendix A.2 further explores this ambiguity by pro-
viding a numerical example where both cases (positive and negative sign of the
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variation of the subsidy rate) can occur:
∂σ1
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqδε(n− 1)
{
k1K
′′
1 (1 + (n− 1)ε)
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LL(Γ
2
y2y2 + C
2
Xn)− (Γ2y2L)2)P ′1q1
[
(K ′′2 +mD
′′
2)(P
′
2CC2 − 1) +mP ′2
]
+ Γ2LLk1K
′′
1 (1 + (n− 1)ε)(K ′′2 +D′′2m)nP ′1P ′2q1q22 + Γ2y2Lk2K ′′2P ′2[
(Γ1y1y1 + C
1
Xn)
[
(K ′′1 +mD
′′
1)(P
′
1CC1 − 1) +mP ′1
]
+ (K ′′1 +D
′′
1m)nP
′
1q
2
1
]}
≶ 0
A.2 The ambiguity of the comparative-static ef-
fect ∂σ1/∂m
In order to assess the ambiguous sign of ∂σ1/∂m, we numerically simulate the sys-
tem of equations given by (1.2)–(1.4), and (1.13)–(1.19) over the number of firms
in the fossil-fuel industry for different values of b. The parameter b determines
the extent to which a RES-E equipment firm can reduce its costs and marginal
costs in the second period through learning in the first period. The results are
illustrated in Figure A.1. For a low value of b = 0.1, the optimal subsidy for
RES-E equipment producers decreases with an increasing number of fossil-fuel
firms, whereas it increases for a relatively high value of b = 0.8.
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5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
m
0.00008165
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0.0000819
Σ1
Subsidy for RES-E equipment producers with b=0.1
5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
m
-0.0000219
-0.00002185
-0.0000218
Σ1
Subsidy for RES-E equipment producers with b=0.8
1
Figure A.1: The ambiguous effect of market structure in the fossil-fuel industry
on the optimal learning subsidy rate.
A.3 Derivation of the strategic effect ∂y˜2/∂y1
In order to analyze the effect of an output increase by one firm on any of the
(n− 1) other firms (say, firms A and B), we set up the FOCs of both firms in the
second period:
B2(X2) +B
′
2(X2)y2 + σ2 − Γ2y2(y2, L) = 0, (A.20)
B2(X2) +B
′
2(X2)y˜2 + σ2 − Γ2y˜2(y˜2, L˜) = 0, (A.21)
where y2 and L = y1 + (n − 1)εy˜2 denote output and learning of firm A, and
y˜2 and L˜ = y˜1 + (n − 2)εy˜1 + εy1 output and learning of firm B, respectively.
The total number of RES-E equipment devices in the second period is given by
X2 = y2 + (n− 1)y˜2. Differentiating (A.20) and (A.21) with respect to y1 yields
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the following system of equations:
[2B′2(X2) +B
′′
2 (X2)y2 − Γ2y2y2(y2, L)]
∂y2
∂y1
(A.22)
+[B′2(X2) +B
′′
2 (X2)y2](n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
− Γ2y2L(y2, L) = 0,
[B′2(X2) +B
′′
2 (X2)y˜2]
∂y2
∂y1
(A.23)
+[nB′2(X2) + (n− 1)B′′2 (X2)y˜2 − Γ2y˜2y˜2(y˜2, L˜)]
∂y˜2
∂y1
− εΓ2
y˜2L˜
(y˜2, L˜) = 0.
Solving (A.23) and (A.24) for ∂y˜2/∂y1 and ∂y2/∂y1 we obtain the comparative-
static effect of increasing output by firm A in period 1 on output of firm B in
period 2:
∂y˜2
∂y1
=
Γ2y2L(B
′
2 +B
′′
2 y˜2) + ε[Γ
2
y˜2L˜
Γ2y2y2 − Γ2y˜2L˜(2B
′
2 +B
′′
2y2)]
D
, (A.24)
where
D = −Γ2y˜2y˜2Γ2y2y2 − (n+ 1)(B′2)2 + Γ2y˜2y˜2(2B′2 +B′′2y2)
+Γ2y2y2(nB
′
2 + (n− 1)B′′2 y˜2)− (y2 + (n− 1)y˜2)B′2B′′2 .
A.4 Proof of the comparative-static effects of
market concentration with oligopolistic com-
petition in both the fossil-fuel and the RES-
E equipment industry
The proof of the comparative-static effects described in Section 1.4.2.1 essentially
follows the same techniques as described in Appendix A.1, except that we use the
inverse demand function for RES-E equipment, the first order conditions for RES-
E equipment producers, and the optimal subsidy rates for the case of oligopolistic
competition in the RES-E equipment industry given by (1.20) and (1.22) - (1.25),
respectively. Differentiating the equations with respect to the number of firms in
the RES-E equipment industry n leads to the following system of equations:
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Aggregate electricity production:
∂Q1
∂n
=
1
1− P ′1(Q1)CC1
[
m
∂k1
∂n
+ q1(X1)
∂X1
∂n
]
(A.25)
∂Q2
∂n
=
1
1− P ′2(Q2)CC2
[
m
∂k2
∂n
+ q2(X2)
∂X2
∂n
]
(A.26)
Production of electricity by intra-marginal RES-E firms:
∂q1(x˜)
∂n
=
P ′1(Q1)
C1qq(q1(x˜), x˜)
∂Q1
∂n
∀x˜ ≤ X1 (A.27)
∂q2(x˜)
∂n
=
P ′2(Q2)
C2qq(q2(x˜), x˜)
∂Q2
∂n
∀x˜ ≤ X2 (A.28)
Production of electricity by fossil-fuel utilities:
0 = [P ′1(Q1) + P
′′
1 (Q1)k1]
∂Q1
∂n
+ [P ′1(Q1)−K ′′1 (k1)]
∂k1
∂n
− ∂τ1
∂n
(A.29)
0 = [P ′2(Q2) + P
′′
2 (Q2)k2]
∂Q2
∂n
+ [P ′2(Q2)−K ′′2 (k2)]
∂k2
∂n
− ∂τ2
∂n
(A.30)
Emission taxes:
∂τ1
∂n
= P ′′1 (Q1)k1
∂Q1
∂n
+ [P ′1(Q1) +D
′′
1(mk1)]
∂k1
∂n
(A.31)
∂τ2
∂n
= P ′′2 (Q2)k2
∂Q2
∂n
+ [P ′2(Q2) +D
′′
2(mk2)]
∂k2
∂n
(A.32)
Total number of RES-E equipment:
∂X1
∂n
= n
∂y1
∂n
+ y1 (A.33)
∂X2
∂n
= n
∂y2
∂n
+ y2 (A.34)
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Electricity prices:
∂p1
∂n
= P ′1(Q1)
∂Q1
∂n
(A.35)
∂p2
∂n
= P ′2(Q2)
∂Q2
∂n
(A.36)
RES-E equipment prices:
∂b1
∂n
= P ′1(Q1)q1(X1)
∂Q1
∂n
− C1X(q1(X1), X1)
∂X1
∂n
(A.37)
∂b2
∂n
= P ′2(Q2)q2(X2)
∂Q2
∂n
− C2X(q2(X2), X2)
∂X2
∂n
(A.38)
Production of RES-E equipment firms:
0 = [B′1(X1) +B
′′
1 (X1)y1]
∂X1
∂n
(A.39)
+ [B′1(X1)− Γ1y1y1 − δΓ2LL(1 + (n− 1)ε)]
∂y1
∂n
+
∂σ1
∂n
+ δB′′2 (X2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
∂X2
∂n
− δΓ2y2L
∂y2
∂n
+ δB′2(X2)
∂y˜2
∂y1
− δΓ2LLεy1
0 = [B′2(X2) +B
′′
2 (X2)y2]
∂X2
∂n
+ [B′2(X2)− Γ2y2y2 ]
∂y2
∂n
+
∂σ2
∂n
(A.40)
− Γ2y2L(1 + (n− 1)ε)
∂y1
∂n
− Γ2y2Lεy1
Output subsidies for RES-E equipment firms:
∂σ1
∂n
= −[B′1(X1) + (n− 1)εΓ2LL(1 + (n− 1)ε)]∂y1∂n −B′′1 (X1)y1∂X1∂n (A.41)
− δ(n− 1)εΓ2y2L
∂y2
∂n
− δB′′2 (X2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
∂X2
∂n
− δ[B′2(X2)∂y˜2∂y1 + εΓ2L + (n− 1)ε2Γ2LLy1]
∂σ2
∂n
= −B′2(X2)
∂y2
∂n
−B′′2 (X2)y2
∂X2
∂n
(A.42)
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B′t(Xt) and B
′′
t (Xt) are obtained by differentiating the zero-profit condition for
RES-E producers given by equation 1.20 with respect to Xt, i.e.
B′t(Xt) =
P ′t(Qt)qt(Xt)
2
1− P ′t(Qt)CCt
− CtX(qt(Xt), Xt) (A.43)
B′′t (Xt) =
P ′′t (Qt)qt(Xt)
3
[1− P ′t(Qt)CCt]2
− CtXX(qt(Xt), Xt) (A.44)
+
[ P ′t(Qt)qt(Xt)
1− P ′t(Qt)CCt
− CtXq(qt(Xt), Xt)
][ P ′t(Qt)qt(Xt)
Ctqq(qt(Xt), Xt)[1− P ′t(Qt)CCt]
− C
t
Xq(qt(Xt), Xt)
Ctqq(qt(Xt), Xt)
]
+ P ′t(Qt)qt(Xt)
[ P ′t(Qt)qt(Xt)
Ctqq(qt(Xt), Xt)[1− P ′t(Qt)CCt]2
− C
t
Xq(qt(Xt), Xt)
Ctqq(qt(Xt), Xt)[1− P ′t(Qt)CCt]
+
P ′t(Qt)qt(Xt)
2CCt
[1− P ′t(Qt)CCt]2
]
.
To unambiguously sign the effects on the endogenous variables we impose two ad-
ditional assumptions, again implying that the effects of learning on the marginal
cost in the second period are not too large:
Condition 2 : y1Γ
2
Ly2
+ y2Γ
2
y2y2
≥ 0,
Condition 3 : δy2Γ
2
Ly2
+ y1(Γ
1
y1y1
+ δΓ2LL) ≥ 0.
Solving the system of equations for the comparative-static effects, assuming Con-
ditions 1, 2 and 3 to hold yields the following results, where Det again denotes
the determinant of the matrix:
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Det = −C1qqC2qq
{
−(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )[−(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2)))] + P ′1[−(m((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2))) + ((CC1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1) + nq21)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ CC1δ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2)))(mD′′1 +K ′′1 ))
+ (mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )P
′
2[mD
′′
2(m((C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2)
+ δ(CC2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2) +Γ2LL(C2XCC2n+ nq22)))
+ ((CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2) + CC1δ(CC2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2)
+ Γ2LL(C
2
XCC2n+ nq
2
2)))K
′′
1 ) +m(m((C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2))) + ((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(CC2(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2) + nq22)
+ δ(CC2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2) +Γ2LL(C2XCC2n+ nq22)))K ′′2 )
+K ′′1 (m((CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + CC1δ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2)))
+ ((CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2) + CC1δ(CC2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2)
+ Γ2LL(C
2
XCC2n+ nq
2
2)))K
′′
2 ) +mD
′′
1(m((CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)
+ CC1δ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2))) + ((CC1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1) + nq21)(CC2(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ nq22) + CC1δ(CC2
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2y2L)2) +Γ2LL(C2XCC2n+ nq22)))(mD′′2 +K ′′2 ))]]
}
< 0
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∂k1
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqq1P
′
1
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )y1(CC2P
′
2 − 1) + P ′2my1] + [
Condition 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
δy2Γ
2
Ly2 + y1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )(C
2
Xn(P
′
2CC2 − 1) + P ′2nq22) + P ′2C2Xn]
}
< 0
∂k2
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqq2P
′
2
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )y2(CC1P
′
1 − 1) + P ′1my2] + (
Condition 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
y1Γ
2
Ly2 + y2Γ
2
y2y2)
[(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )(C
1
Xn(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1nq21) + P ′1mC1Xn]
}
< 0
∂q1
∂n
=
1
Det
C2qqq1P
′
1(mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )y1(CC2P
′
2 − 1) + P ′2my1] + [
Condition 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
δy2Γ
2
Ly2 + y1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )(C
2
Xn(P
′
2CC2 − 1) + P ′2nq22) + P ′2C2Xn]
}
< 0
∂q2
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqq2P
′
2(mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 )
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )y2(CC1P
′
1 − 1) + P ′1my2] + (
Condition 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
y1Γ
2
Ly2 + y2Γ
2
y2y2)
[(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )(C
1
Xn(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1nq21) + P ′1mC1Xn]
}
< 0
∂Q1
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqq1(mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )y1(CC2P
′
2 − 1) + P ′2my1] + [
Condition 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
δy2Γ
2
Ly2 + y1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )(C
2
Xn(P
′
2CC2 − 1) + P ′2nq22) + P ′2C2Xn]
}
> 0
∂Q2
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqq2(mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 )
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )y2(CC1P
′
1 − 1) + P ′1my2] + (
Condition 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
y1Γ
2
Ly2 + y2Γ
2
y2y2)
[(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )(C
1
Xn(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1nq21) + P ′1mC1Xn]
}
> 0
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∂X1
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq((mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )(1− P ′1CC1)− P ′1m)
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )y1(CC2P
′
2 − 1) + P ′2my1] + [
Condition 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
δy2Γ
2
Ly2 + y1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )(C
2
Xn(P
′
2CC2 − 1) + P ′2nq22) + P ′2C2Xn]
}
< 0
∂X2
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq((mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 )(1− P ′2CC2)− P ′2m)
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )y2(CC1P
′
1 − 1) + P ′1my2] + (
Condition 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
y1Γ
2
Ly2 + y2Γ
2
y2y2)
[(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )(C
1
Xn(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1nq21) + P ′1mC1Xn]
}
< 0
∂b1
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq[(mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )(P
′
1(C
1
Xm+ C
1
XCC1 + q
2
1)− C1X)]
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )y1(CC2P
′
2 − 1) + P ′2my1] + [
Condition 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
δy2Γ
2
Ly2 + y1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL)]
[(mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )(C
2
Xn(P
′
2CC2 − 1) + P ′2nq22) + P ′2C2Xn]
}
< 0
∂b2
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq[(mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 )(P
′
2(C
2
Xm+ C
2
XCC2 + q21
2)− C2X)]
+
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)][(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )y2(CC1P ′1 − 1) + P ′1my2]
+ (
Condition 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
y1Γ
2
Ly2 + y2Γ
2
y2y2)[(mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )(C
1
Xn(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1nq21) + P ′1mC1Xn]
}
< 0
∂τ1
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqq2[(P
′
1)
2 +mP ′1D
′′
1 + k1P
′′
1 (mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )]
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)][(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )y1(CC2P ′2 − 1) + P ′2my1]
+ [
Condition 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
δy2Γ
2
Ly2 + y1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL)][(mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 )(C
2
Xn(P
′
2CC2 − 1) + P ′2nq22) + P ′2C2Xn]
}
< 0
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∂τ2
∂n
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqq2[(P
′
2)
2 +mP ′2D
′′
2 + k2P
′′
2 (mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 )]
{
[Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)][(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )y2(CC1P ′1 − 1) + P ′1my2]
+ (
Condition 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
y1Γ
2
Ly2 + y2Γ
2
y2y2)[(mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )(C
1
Xn(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1nq21) + P ′1mC1Xn]
}
< 0
The signs of the variation of the subsidy rates cannot be determined without
further assumptions. Simplifying the expressions for the subsidy rates with Γ2LL ≈
0 and Γ2Ly2 ≈ 0 yields the following results:
∂σ1
∂n
=
1
Det(P ′1CC1 − 1)2
[(C2Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)((mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 )(P
′
2CC2 − 1) + P ′2m) + P ′2nq22(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )]{
P ′1[C
1
qqm((C
1
X)
2 − C1XXy1Γ1y1y1) + (C1qqC1X(3C1XCC1 + 2q21)
+ (−3C1qqC1XXCC1 + C1qXq1)y1Γ1y1y1)(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )]
− (P ′1)2[C1qqm(C1X(2C1XCC1 + q21)− 2C1XXCC1y1Γ1y1y1) + (2q1(C1qXCC1 + q1)y1Γ1y1y1
+ C1qq(3(C
1
XCC1)
2 + 4C1XCC1q
2
1 + q
4
1 − 3C1XX(CC1)2y1Γ1y1y1))(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )]
+ CC1(P
′
1)
3[C1qqm(C
1
X(C
1
XCC1 + q
2
1)− C1XXCC1y1Γ1y1y1) + (q1(C1qXCC1 + 2q1)y1Γ1y1y1
+ C1qq((C
1
XCC1 + q
2
1)
2 − C1XX(CC1)2y1Γ1y1y1))
(mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )]− C1qq(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )((C1X)2 − C1XXy1Γ1y1y1 + q31y1Γ1y1y1P ′′1 )
}
< 0
∂σ2
∂n
=
1
Det(P ′2CC2 − 1)2
[(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)((mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )(P
′
1CC1 − 1) + P ′1m) + P ′1nq21(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )]{
P ′2[C
2
qqm((C
2
X)
2 − C2XXy2Γ2y2y2) + (C2qqC2X(3C2XCC2 + 2q22)
+ (−3C2qqC2XXCC2 + C2qXq2)y2Γ2y2y2)(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )]
− (P ′2)2[C2qqm(C2X(2C2XCC2 + q22)− 2C2XXCC2y2Γ2y2y2) + (2q2(C2qXCC2 + q2)y2Γ2y2y2
+ C2qq(3(C
2
XCC2)
2 + 4C2XCC2q
2
2 + q
4
2 − 3C2XX(CC2)2y2Γ2y2y2))(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )]
+ CC2(P
′
2)
3[C2qqm(C
2
X(C
2
XCC2 + q
2
2)− C2XXCC2y2Γ2y2y2) + (q2(C2qXCC2 + 2q2)y2Γ2y2y2
+ C2qq((C
2
XCC2 + q
2
2)
2 − C2XX(CC2)2y2Γ2y2y2))(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )]
− C2qq(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )((C2X)2 − C2XXy2Γ2y2y2 + q32y2Γ2y2y2P ′′2 )
}
< 0
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Similarly, differentiating the system of equations with respect to the number of
firms in the fossil fuel industry m yields the following comparative-static results:
∂q1
∂m
=
1
Det
C2qqP
′
1
{−k1K ′′1 (mD′′2 +K ′′2 )((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)δ(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)) + P ′2
[
k2mnq1q2δΓ
2
y2LD
′′
1K
′′
2
+K ′′1
[
k1m((C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)δ(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + δ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))
+ k1mD
′′
2 [(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2) + δ(Γ
2
LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2)
+ CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))] +K ′′2 [k1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(CC2(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2) + nq22)
+ δ(C2XCC2k1nΓ
2
LL + k2nq1q2Γ
2
y2L + k1(nq
2
2Γ
2
LL + CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)))]
]]}
< 0
∂q2
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqP
′
2
{−k2K ′′2 (mD′′1 +K ′′1 )K ′′2 ((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)) + P ′1
[
k1mnq1q2Γ
2
y2LD
′′
2K
′′
1
+K ′′2
[
k2m((C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + δ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))
+ k2mD
′′
1 [(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)(CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)
+ δCC1(Γ
2
LLC
2
Xn+
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
+K ′′1 [k1nq1q2Γ
2
Ly2 + C
1
XCC1k2n(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + C
2
Xk2n(nq
2
1 + CC1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL))
+ k2(nq
2
1Γ
2
y2y2 + CC1(Γ
1
y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)))]
]]}
< 0
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∂k1
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{−k1D′′1 [−((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )
+ P ′2[m(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) +mδ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)
+ (mD′′2 +K
′′
2 ) + [(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2 + nq
2
2))
+ δ(Γ2LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2) + CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))]]]
+ P ′1
[
−k1(mD′′2 +K ′′2 )[(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2) + δ(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)
+D′′1((CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)
+ δCC1(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))]
+ P ′2
[
k1m((C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + δ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))
+ k1mD
′′
2 [(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2 + nq
2
2)) + δ(Γ
2
LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2)
+ CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))] +K ′′2 [k1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(CC2(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2 + nq22))
+ δ(C2XnCC2k1Γ
2
LL + k2nq2q1Γ
2
Ly2 + k1(nq
2
2Γ
2
LL + CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)))]
+ k1D
′′
1
[
m(CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)
+ CC1mδ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)
+ (mD′′2 +K
′′
2 )[(CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2 + nq
2
2))
+ CC1δ(Γ
2
LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2) + CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))]
]]]}
< 0
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∂k2
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{−k2(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )[−D′′2((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)) + P ′2[(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2) + (mD′′2 +K ′′2 ) +D′′2 [(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)
(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2 + nq
2
2)) + δ(Γ
2
LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2) + CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))]]]
+ P ′1
[
−k2D′′2 [m(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2) +mδ(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)
+ (mD′′1 +K
′′
1 )((CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)
+ δCC1(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))] + P ′2
[
k2m((C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)) + k2mD′′1 [(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)(CC1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1 + nq21))
+ δCC1(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2) +D′′2 [(CC1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1) + nq21)
(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2 + nq
2
2)) + δCC1(Γ
2
LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2) + CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))]]
+K ′′1 [k1nq1q2Γ
2
Ly2 + C
1
XCC1k2n(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + C
2
Xk2n(CC1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL) + nq
2
1)
+ k2(nq
2
1Γ
2
y2y2 + CC1(Γ
1
y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))]
+ k2D
′′
2
[
m(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) +mδ(Γ
2
LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2)
+ CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)) +K ′′1 [(CC1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1) + nq21)(CC2(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2 + nq22))
+ CC1δ(Γ
2
LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2) + CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))]
]]]}
< 0
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∂X1
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqn
{
k2q2δΓ
2
Ly2P
′
2K
′′
2 (mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 )
+ P ′1
[
−k1q1(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)K ′′1 (mD′′2 +K ′′2 )
+ P ′2
[
k2mq2δΓ
2
Ly2(1 + P
′
1CC1)K
′′
2 +K
′′
1
[
k1mq1(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)
+ k1mq1D
′′
2(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2)
+K ′′2 [k1q1(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)− CC1k2q2δΓ2Ly2)]
]]]}
< 0
∂X2
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqn
{−k2q2P ′2K ′′2 (mD′′1 +K ′′1 )(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1 + δΓ2LL)
+ P ′1
[
k1q1Γ
2
Ly2K
′′
1 (mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 )
+ P ′2
[
k2mq2K
′′
2 (C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL +D
′′
1(CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL) + nq
2
1))
+K ′′1
[−Γ2Ly2k1mq1(1 + CC1D′′2) +K ′′2 (C1XnCC1k2q2 − CC2k1q1Γ2Ly2
+ k2q2(CC1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL) + nq
2
1))
]]]}
< 0
∂Q1
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{−k1K ′′1 (mD′′2 +K ′′2 )((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)) + P ′2
[
k2mnq1q2δΓ
2
Ly2D
′′
1K
′′
2
+K ′′1
[
k1m((C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + δ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))
+ k1mD
′′
2 [(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2) + δ(Γ
2
LL(C
2
XnCC2 + nq
2
2)
+ CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))] +K ′′2 [k1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(CC2(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2) + nq22)
+ δ(k1nΓ
2
LL(C
2
XCC2 + q
2
2) + k2nq1q2Γ
2
Ly2 + k1CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))]
]]}
> 0
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∂Q2
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{−k2K ′′2 (mD′′1 +K ′′1 )((C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ δ(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)) + P ′1
[
k1mnq1q2Γ
2
Ly2D
′′
2K
′′
1
+K ′′2
[
k2m((C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + δ(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))
+ k2mD
′′
1 [(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)(CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)
+ δCC1(C
2
XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)]
+K ′′1
[
k1nq1q2Γ
2
Ly2 + C
1
XCC1k2n(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + C
2
Xk2n(CC1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL) + nq
2
1)
+ k2(Γ
2
y2y2(nq
2
1 + CC1Γ
1
y1y1) + δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))
]]]}
> 0
∂b1
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{−C1Xk2nq2δΓ2Ly2P ′2(mD′′1 +K ′′1 )K ′′2 + P ′1[−k1q1K ′′1 (mD′′2 +K ′′2 )
(Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2) + C2Xn(Γ1y1y1 + δΓ2LL))
+ P ′2
[
k2mnq2δΓ
2
Ly2K
′′
2 (C
1
X +D
′′
1(C
1
XCC1 + q
2
1)) +K
′′
1
[
k1mq1(Γ
1
y1y1Γ
2
y2y2
+ δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)) + k1mq1D′′2 [(C2XnCC2 + nq22)(Γ1y1y1 + δΓ2LL)
+ CC2(Γ
1
y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))] +K ′′2 [k2nq2δΓ2Ly2(C1XCC1 + q21)
+ C2XCC2k1nq1(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL) + k1q1(nq
2
2(Γ
1
y1y1 + δΓ
2
LL) + CC2(Γ
1
y1y1Γ
2
y2y2
+ δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)))]
]]]}
< 0
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∂b2
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq
{−k2q2P ′2K ′′2 (mD′′1 +K ′′1 )
(Γ1y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + C
1
XnΓ
2
y2y2 + δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))
+ P ′1
[
−C2Xk1nq1Γ2Ly2K ′′1 (mD′′2 +K ′′2 ) + P ′2
[
k2mq2K
′′
2 [Γ
1
y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + C
1
XnΓ
2
y2y2
+ δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2) +D′′1(Γ2y2y2n(C1XCC1 + nq21)
+ CC1(Γ
1
y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)))]
+K ′′1
[
k1mnq1Γ
2
Ly2(C
2
X +D
′′
2(C
2
XCC2 + q
2
2)) +K
′′
2 [k1nq1Γ
2
Ly2C
2
XCC2 + q2(k1nq1q2Γ
2
Ly2
+ k2(Γ
2
y2y2n(C
1
XCC1 + nq
2
1) + CC1(Γ
1
y1y1Γ
2
y2y2 + δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))))]
]]]}
< 0
Again, the signs of the variation of the tax and subsidy rates cannot be determined
without further assumptions. Simplifying the expressions for the tax and subsidy
rates with Γ2LL ≈ 0 and Γ2Ly2 ≈ 0 yields the following results:
∂τ1
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqk1[−(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)(mD′′2 +K ′′2 ) + P ′2(m(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ (CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2)(mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 ))][(P
′
1)
2(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1
+ (CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)D
′′
1)− P ′1D′′1(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1
+ (CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)K
′′
1 ) + (C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)K
′′
1 (D
′′
1 + P
′′
1 k1)] < 0
∂τ2
∂m
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqk2[−(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(mD′′1 +K ′′1 ) + P ′1(m(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)
+ (CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 ))][(P
′
2)
2(C2Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2
+ (CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2)D
′′
2)− P ′2D′′2(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2
+ (CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2)K
′′
2 ) + (C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)K
′′
2 (D
′′
2 + P
′′
2 k2)] < 0
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∂σ1
∂m
= − 1
Det(CC1P ′1 − 1)2
C2qqK
′′
1k1[−(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)(mD′′2 +K ′′2 ) + P ′2(m(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ (CC2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + nq
2
2)(mD
′′
2 +K
′′
2 ))][−P ′1(C1qqq1(C1X + C1XXny1)
+ C1qXy1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)) + (P
′
1)
2(C1qqq1(q
2
1 + 2CC1(C
1
X + C
1
XXny1))
+ 2y1(C
1
qXCC1 + q1)(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1))− (P ′1)3CC1(C1qqq1(q21 + CC1C1X + C1XXCC1ny1)
+ y1(C
1
qXCC1 + 2q1)(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)) + C
1
qqq
2
1y1P
′′
1 (C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)] > 0
∂σ2
∂m
= − 1
Det(CC2P ′2 − 1)2
C1qqK
′′
2k2[−(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(mD′′1 +K ′′1 ) + P ′1(m(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)
+ (CC1(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + nq
2
1)(mD
′′
1 +K
′′
1 ))][−P ′2(C2qqq2(C2X + C2XXny2)
+ C2qXy2(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)) + (P
′
2)
2(C2qqq2(q
2
2 + 2CC2(C
2
X + C
2
XXny2))
+ 2y2(C
2
qXCC2 + q2)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2))− (P ′2)3CC2(C2qqq2(q22 + CC2C2X + C2XXCC2ny2)
+ y2(C
2
qXCC2 + 2q2)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)) + C
2
qqq
2
2y2P
′′
2 (C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)] > 0
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To obtain the comparative-static effects with respect to the feed-in tariffs, we dif-
ferentiate equations (1.2), (1.3), and (1.29)–(1.33) with respect to ζ1 and simplify
via the envelope theorem. This yields the following system of equations:
Aggregate electricity production:
∂Q1
∂ζ1
=
∫ X1
0
∂q1(x˜)
∂ζ1
dx˜+ q1(X1)
∂X1
∂ζ1
+m
∂k1
∂ζ1
(A.45)
∂Q2
∂ζ1
=
∫ X2
0
∂q2(x˜)
∂ζ1
dx˜+ q2(X2)
∂X2
∂ζ1
+m
∂k2
∂ζ1
(A.46)
Production of electricity by intra-marginal RES-E operators:
∂q1(x˜)
∂ζ1
=
1
C1qq(q1(x˜), x˜)
∀x˜ ≤ X1 (A.47)
∂q2(x˜)
∂ζ1
= 0 ∀x˜ ≤ X2 (A.48)
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Production of electricity by fossil-fuel utilities:
0 = [P ′1(Q1) + P
′′
1 (Q1)k1]
∂Q1
∂ζ1
+ [P ′1(Q1)−K ′′1 (k1)]
∂k1
∂ζ1
(A.49)
0 = [P ′2(Q2) + P
′′
2 (Q2)k2]
∂Q2
∂ζ1
+ [P ′2(Q2)−K ′′2 (k2)]
∂k2
∂ζ1
(A.50)
Output of RES-E equipment firms:
0 =
∂b1
∂ζ1
− [Γ1y1y1(y1) + δΓ2LL(y2, L)(1 + (n− 1)ε)]
∂y1
∂ζ1
(A.51)
− δΓ2y2L(y2, L)
∂y2
∂ζ1
(A.52)
0 =
∂b2
∂ζ1
− Γ2y2L(y2, L)(1 + (n− 1)ε)
∂y1
∂ζ1
− Γ2y2y2(y2, L)
∂y2
∂ζ1
(A.53)
Total number of RES-E equipment:
∂X1
∂ζ1
= n
∂y1
∂ζ1
(A.54)
∂X2
∂ζ1
= n
∂y2
∂ζ1
(A.55)
RES-E equipment prices:
∂b1
∂ζ1
= q1(X1)− C1X(q1(X1), X1)
∂X1
∂ζ1
(A.56)
∂b2
∂ζ1
= −C2X(q2(X2), X2)
∂X2
∂ζ1
(A.57)
Electricity prices:
∂p1
∂ζ1
= P ′(Q1)
∂Q1
∂ζ1
(A.58)
∂p2
∂ζ1
= P ′(Q2)
∂Q2
∂ζ1
(A.59)
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Substituting the expressions for ∂q1(x˜)
∂ζ1
and ∂q1(x˜)
∂ζ1
from equations (A.47) and (A.48)
into equations (A.45) and (A.46) leads to the following expressions determining
the change in aggregate electricity production:
∂Q1
∂ζ1
= q1(X1)
∂X1
∂ζ1
+m
∂k1
∂ζ1
+ CC1 (A.60)
∂Q2
∂ζ1
= q2(X2)
∂X2
∂ζ1
+m
∂k2
∂ζ1
(A.61)
where CC1 =
∫ X1
0
1
C1qq(q1(x˜),x˜)
dx˜. Solving the system of equations for the comparative-
static effects yields the following results:
Det = −C1qqC2qq(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(−K ′′2 + P ′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + (1 + (n− 1)ε)(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)] > 0
∂q1
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C2qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(−K ′′2 + P ′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)] > 0
∂q2
∂ζ1
= 0
∂k1
∂ζ1
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(P
′
1 + P
′′
1 k1)(K
′′
2 − P ′2 −m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[((C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)CC1 + nq
2
1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + CC1(1 + (n− 1)ε)
(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)] < 0
∂k2
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(1 + (n− 1)ε)n(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2)q1q2Γ2y2L < 0
∂y1
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q1
(C2Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) > 0
∂y2
∂ζ1
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(1 + (n− 1)ε)(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))
(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q1Γ2y2L > 0
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∂Q1
∂ζ1
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1)(K ′′2 − P ′2 −m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))[(C1Xn+ Γ1y1y1)(C2Xn+ Γ2y2y2)
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)] > 0
∂Q2
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(1 + (n− 1)ε)n(K ′′2 − P ′2)(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))q1q2Γ2y2L > 0
∂b1
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(−K ′′2 + P ′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q1
[Γ1y1y1(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)] > 0
∂b2
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqC
2
Xn(1 + (n− 1)ε)(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))
(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q1Γ2y2L < 0
For the comparative-static with respect to ζ2, equations (A.47), (A.48), (A.56),
(A.57), (A.60) and (A.61) change as follows:
∂q1(x˜)
∂ζ2
= 0 (A.62)
∂q2(x˜)
∂ζ2
=
1
C2qq(q2(x˜), x˜)
(A.63)
∂b1
∂ζ2
= −C1X(q1(X1), X1)
∂X1
∂ζ2
(A.64)
∂b2
∂ζ2
= q2(X2)− C2X(q2(X2), X2)
∂X2
∂ζ2
(A.65)
∂Q1
∂ζ1
= q1(X1)
∂X1
∂ζ1
+m
∂k1
∂ζ1
(A.66)
∂Q2
∂ζ1
= CC2 + q2(X2)
∂X2
∂ζ1
+m
∂k2
∂ζ1
(A.67)
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where CC2 =
∫ X2
0
1
C2qq(q2(x˜),x˜)
dx˜. The solution of the system of equations yields
the following results for the comparative-static effects with respect to ζ2:
∂q1
∂ζ2
= 0
∂q2
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(−K ′′2 + P ′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)(C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2) + (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)] > 0
∂k1
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqn(K
′′
2 − P ′2 −m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1)q1q2δΓ2y2L < 0
∂k2
∂ζ2
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(P
′
2 + P
′′
2 k2)(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))
[(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)((C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)CC2 + nq
2
2)
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(Γ2LLnq22 + CC2(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))] < 0
∂y1
∂ζ2
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(−K ′′2 + P ′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q2δΓ2y2L > 0
∂y2
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(−K ′′2 + P ′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q2
(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1 + (1 + (n− 1)ε)δΓ2LL) > 0
∂Q1
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqn(K
′′
1 − P ′1)(K ′′2 − P ′2 −m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q1q2δΓ2y2L > 0
∂Q2
∂ζ2
=
1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(K
′′
2 − P ′2)(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))
[(C1Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1)((C
2
Xn+ Γ
2
y2y2)CC2 + nq
2
2)
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(Γ2LLnq22 + CC2(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2))] > 0
∂b1
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qqC
1
Xn(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q1δΓ2y2L < 0
∂b2
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
2
qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(−K ′′2 + P ′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q2
[Γ2y2y2(C
1
Xn+ Γ
1
y1y1) + (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
y2y2 − (Γ2Ly2)2)] > 0
The derivation of the comparative-static effects of increasing the feed-in tariffs
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on the endogenous variables when there is oligopolistic competition in the RES-E
equipment industry follows the same steps as described at the beginning of this
section, except that we now use the first-order conditions for RES-E equipment
producers given by equations (1.34) and (1.35). From the free-entry condition we
define
B˜(Xt, ζt) = ζtqt(Xt)− Ct(qt(Xt), Xt). (A.68)
Differentiating equation (A.68) with respect to Xt yields
B˜X(Xt, ζt) = [ζtqt(Xt)− Ctqt(qt(Xt), Xt)]q′t(Xt)− CtXt(qt(Xt), Xt). (A.69)
In equation (A.69) the expression ζtqt(Xt) − Ctqt(qt(Xt), Xt) = 0 (following from
the first-order conditions of the renewable electricity producers). Inserting (A.68)
and (A.69) into the first-order conditions of the RES-E equipment producers
(1.22) and (1.23) then gives the following expressions:
0 = ζ1q1(X1)− C1(q1, X1)− C1X(q1, X1)y1 − Γ1y1 (A.70)
−δ[C2X(q2, X2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
+ Γ2L(y2, L)]
0 = ζ2q2(X2)− C2(q2, X2)− C2X(q2, X2)y2 − Γ2y2 (A.71)
Differentiating (A.71) and (A.71) with respect to the feed-in tariff in the first and
second period ζ1 and ζ2 yields:
− q1(X1) = −C1qX(q1, X1)y1
∂q1(X1)
∂ζ1
(A.72)
−[C1X(q1, X1) + C1XX(q1, X1)y1]
∂X1
∂ζ1
−[C1X(q1, X1) + Γ1y1y1(y1) + δΓ2LL(1 + (n− 1)ε)]
∂y1
∂ζ1
−δC2qX(q2, X2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
∂q2(X2)
∂ζ1
−δC2XX(q2, X2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
∂X2
∂ζ1
− δΓ2y2L(y2, L)
∂y2
∂ζ1
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0 = −C2qX(q2, X2)y2
∂q2(X2)
∂ζ1
(A.73)
−[C2X(q2, X2) + C2XX(q2, X2)y2]
∂X2
∂ζ1
−Γ2y2y2(y2, L)
∂y2
∂ζ1
− Γ2y2L(y2, L)(1 + (n− 1)ε)
∂y1
∂ζ1
0 = −C1qX(q1, X1)y1
∂q1(X1)
∂ζ2
(A.74)
−[C1X(q1, X1) + C1XX(q1, X1)y1]
∂X1
∂ζ2
−[C1X(q1, X1) + Γ1y1y1(y1) + δΓ2LL(1 + (n− 1)ε)]
∂y1
∂ζ2
−δC2qX(q2, X2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
∂q2(X2)
∂ζ2
−δC2XX(q2, X2)(n− 1)
∂y˜2
∂y1
∂X2
∂ζ2
− δΓ2y2L(y2, L)
∂y2
∂ζ2
−q2(X2) = −C2qX(q2, X2)y2
∂q2(X2)
∂ζ2
(A.75)
−[C2X(q2, X2) + C2XX(q2, X2)y2]
∂X2
∂ζ2
−Γ2y2y2(y2, L)
∂y2
∂ζ2
− Γ2y2L(y2, L)(1 + (n− 1)ε)
∂y1
∂ζ2
We can now solve the system of equations for the comparative-static effects
with respect to the feed-in tariff for the case of imperfect competition among RES-
E equipment producers. The signs of the comparative-static effects are in line
with the case of perfect competition (i.e. Lemma 1), but require one additional
assumption to ensure unambiguity:
Condition 4 C1qqq1 − C1qxy1 ≥ 0,
If Condition 4 holds and ∂y˜2/∂y1 ≈ 0, the comparative-static effects with respect
to ζ1 and ζ2 yield the following expressions, where Det denotes the determinant:
Det = −C1qqC2qq(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(C1X + n(C
1
X + C
1
XXy1) + Γ
1
yy)(n(C
2
X + C
2
XXy2) + Γ
2
yy)
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(nC2XΓ2LL + Γ2LLΓ2yy − (Γ2yL)2 + nC2XXy2Γ2LL)] > 0
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∂q1
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C2qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(C1X + n(C
1
X + C
1
XXy1) + Γ
1
yy)(n(C
2
X + C
2
XXy2) + Γ
2
yy)
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(nC2XΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
yy − (Γ2yL)2 +nC2XXΓ2LLy2)] > 0
∂q2
∂ζ1
= 0
∂y1
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C2qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)(C2Xn+ C2XXny2 + Γ2yy) > 0
∂y2
∂ζ1
=
1
Det
C2qq(1 + (n− 1)ε)(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)Γ2yL > 0
∂k1
∂ζ1
=
1
Det
C2qq(P
′
1 + P
′′
1 k1)(K
′′
2 − P ′2 −m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[((
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)nq1 + C1qq(C1XCC1(1 + n) + nC1XXCC1y1 + CC1Γ1yy))
(C2Xn+ C
2
XXny2 + Γ
2
yy) + C
1
qqCC1(1 + (n− 1)ε)δ
(C2XnΓ
2
LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
yy − (Γ2yL)2 +C2XXny2Γ2LL)] < 0
∂k2
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C2qq(1 + (n− 1)ε)n(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2)q2
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)Γ2yL < 0
∂b1
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C2qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(C1qXC
1
Xny1 + C
1
qqq1(C
1
X + C
1
XXny1 + Γ
1
yy))(C
2
X + C
2
XXny2 + Γ
2
yy)
+ C1qq(1 + (n− 1)ε)q1(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
yy − (Γ2yL)2 +C2XXny2Γ2LL)] > 0
∂b2
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C2qqC
2
X(1 + (n− 1)ε)n(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))
(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)Γ2yL < 0
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∂X1
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C2qqn(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)Γ2yL(C2X + C2XXny2 + Γ2yy) > 0
∂X2
∂ζ1
=
1
Det
C2qq(1 + (n− 1)ε)n(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))
(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)Γ2yL > 0
∂Q1
∂ζ1
=
1
Det
C2qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1)(K ′′2 − P ′2 −m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))[(C2X + C2XXny2 + Γ2yy)
((
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)nq1 + C1qq(C1XCC1(1 + n) + nC1XXCC1y1 + CC1Γ1yy))
+ C1qqCC1(1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(C2XnΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
yy − (Γ2yL)2 +C2XXny2Γ2LL)] > 0
∂Q2
∂ζ1
= − 1
Det
C2qq(1 + (n− 1)ε)n(K ′′1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))
(K ′′2 − P ′2)q2(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1qqq1 − C1qXy1)Γ2yL > 0
∂q1
∂ζ2
= 0
∂q2
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(C1X + n(C
1
X + C
1
XXy1) + Γ
1
yy)(n(C
2
X + C
2
XXy2) + Γ
2
yy)
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)δ(nC2XΓ2LL +
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
yy − (Γ2yL)2 +nC2XXΓ2LLy2)] > 0
∂y1
∂ζ2
=
1
Det
C1qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)δΓ2yL > 0
∂y2
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)(C1X + n(C1X + C1XXy1) + Γ1yy)
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)δΓ2LL(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)] > 0
∂k1
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqn(P
′
1 + P
′′
1 k1)(K
′′
2 − P ′2 −m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))q1
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)δΓ2yL > 0 182
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∂k2
∂ζ2
=
1
Det
C1qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2)[(C1X(n+ 1) + C1XXny1 + Γ1yy)
[(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)nq2 + C2qqn(C2XCC2 + C2XXCC2y2) + C2qqCC2Γ2yy]
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)[nq2Γ2LL(C2qqq2 − C2qXy2) + C2qq(nCC2Γ2LL(C2X + C2XXy2)
+ CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
yy − (Γ2yL)2))]] < 0
∂b1
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqC
1
Xn(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)δΓ2yL < 0
∂b2
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
[(C1X(n+ 1) + C
1
XXny1 + Γ
1
yy)(C
2
qXC
2
Xny2 + C
2
qqq2(C
2
XXny2 + Γ
2
yy))+
(1 + (n− 1)ε)δ[(C2qXC2X + C2qqq2C2XX)ny2Γ2LL + C2qqq2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
yy − (Γ2yL)2)] > 0
∂X1
∂ζ2
=
1
Det
C1qqn(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)δΓ2yL) > 0
∂X2
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqn(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(P ′2 −K ′′2 +m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))[(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)
(C1X(n+ 1) + C
1
XXny1 + Γ
1
yy) + (1 + (n− 1)ε)δΓ2LL(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)] > 0
∂Q1
∂ζ2
= − 1
Det
C1qqn(K
′′
1 − P ′1)(K ′′2 − P ′2 −m(P ′2 + P ′′2 k2))
(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)δΓ2yL > 0
∂Q2
∂ζ2
=
1
Det
C1qq(K
′′
1 − P ′1 −m(P ′1 + P ′′1 k1))(K ′′2 − P ′2)[(C1X(n+ 1) + C1XXny1 + Γ1yy)
[(
Condition 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2qqq2 − C2qXy2)nq2 + C2qqn(C2XCC2 + C2XXCC2y2) + C2qqCC2Γ2yy]
+ (1 + (n− 1)ε)[nq2Γ2LL(C2qqq2 − C2qXy2) + C2qq(nCC2Γ2LL(C2X + C2XXy2)
+ CC2(
Condition 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ2LLΓ
2
yy − (Γ2yL)2))]] > 0
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A.6 Derivation of the second-best optimal feed-
in tariffs
The second-best optimal feed-in tariffs are obtained by differentiating welfare
given by (1.5) with respect to the feed-in tariff rates ζ1 and ζ2, yielding the
following expression:
∂W
∂ζ1
= [P1(Q1)−K ′1(k1)−D′1(mk1)]m
∂k1
∂ζ1
(A.76)
+[P1(Q1)− C1q (q1(X1), X1)− Γ1y1(y1)− δ(1 + (n− 1)ε)Γ2L(y2, L)]
∂X1
∂ζ1
+
∫ X1
0
[P1(Q1)− C1q (q1(x˜), x˜)]
∂q1(x˜)
∂ζ1
dx˜
+δ[P2(Q2)−K ′2(k2)−D′2(mk2)]m
∂k2
∂ζ1
+δ[P2(Q2)− C2q (q2(X2), X2)− Γ2y2(y2, L)]
∂X2
∂ζ1
+δ
∫ X2
0
[P2(Q2)− C2q (q2(x˜), x˜)]
∂q2(x˜)
∂ζ1
dx˜ = 0.
Expanding (A.76) with ζtqt
∂Xt
∂ζt
− ζtqt ∂Xt∂ζt + nbt
∂yt
∂ζt
− nbt ∂yt∂ζt for t = 1, 2 and using
the behavioral conditions of the firms allows us to simplify (A.76) as follows:
0 = [−P ′1(Q1) + τ1 −D′1(mk1)]m
∂k1
∂ζ1
(A.77)
+ [P1(Q1)− ζ1][q1(X1)∂X1
∂ζ1
+
∫ X1
0
∂q1(x˜)
∂ζ1
dx˜]
− δΓ2L(y2, L)(n− 1)εn
∂y1
∂ζ1
+ δ[−P ′2(Q2) + τ2 −D′2(mk2)]m
∂k2
∂ζ1
+ δ[P2(Q2)− ζ2]q2(X2)∂X2
∂ζ1
.
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Analogously, differentiating welfare with respect to ζ2 and simplifying yields:
0 = [−P ′1(Q1) + τ1 −D′1(mk1)]m
∂k1
∂ζ2
+ [P1(Q1)− ζ1]q1(X1)∂X1
∂ζ2
(A.78)
− δΓ2L(y2, L)(n− 1)εn
∂y1
∂ζ2
+ δ[−P ′2(Q2) + τ2 −D′2(mk2)]m
∂k2
∂ζ2
+ δ[P2(Q2)− ζ2][q2(X2)∂X2
∂ζ2
+
∫ X2
0
∂q2(x˜)
∂ζ2
dx˜].
Solving the latter two expressions for ζ1 and ζ2 yields the second-best optimal
feed-in tariffs given in section 1.5.1.
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B.1 Construction of weather indices
We construct several daily temperature and precipitation indices from weather
stations in Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. For the calculation of the indices
we use different methodologies that have been used in the pertinent literature on
emission prices and weather variables. The temperature and precipitation data
have been obtained from the publicly available European climate and assessment
dataset (http://eca.knmi.nl/).
B.1.1 Daily mean temperature and precipitation indices
The mean temperature index is aggregated by multiplying each individual series
with its respective regional population weight (following Valor et al., 2001), and
the daily precipitation index is aggregated by multiplying the series with weights
representing hydroelectric capacity installed in each country:
Xt =
N∑
n=1
xl,twl,t, (B.1)
where X = Temp, Prec represents daily mean temperature and precipitation on
day t, xl,t is the value of the respective weather variable at location l on day
t, wl,t is the regional-population or hydroelectric-capacity weight belonging to
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each location, and N represents the number of weather stations (N = 52 for the
temperature index and N = 50 for the precipitation index).
To obtain the weather indices used in model specification 1, we then calculate
the deviation of the daily indices in our sample period from their daily historical
means:
Devt = Xt − Et−1[Xt], (B.2)
where Et−1[Xt] represents the daily historical mean temperature or precipitation
index. The daily historical weather index is calculated as the 29-year average
from 1 January 1978 to 31 December 2006:
Et−1[Xt] =
1
29
2006∑
y=1978
Xdy, (B.3)
where d = 1, 2, .., 365 is the calendar day corresponding to day t and year y.
According to Hintermann (2010), traders in the energy markets are likely
to take into account not only the weather on a given day, but also past and
forecasted weather. We therefore calculate 5-day moving averages of the daily
weather deviations:
MAX,t =
t+2∑
k=t−2
Xk − Ek−1[Xk]
5
. (B.4)
For model specification 2, we construct indices that account for extreme
weather conditions, i.e. extremely hot, cold, rainy, and dry days. For this pur-
pose, we follow Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) and calculate the percentiles of
both indices Xt in (B.1) and separate the values of temperature and precipitation
lying in the 5th and the 95th percentile into four indices: TE5t, TE95t, PR5t,
and PR95t. For instance, the index TE5t on any given day t will be assigned the
daily mean temperature value on day t if it lies within the 5th percentile of the
distribution (assuming a daily mean temperatures are normally distributed) and
will be zero otherwise.
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B.1.2 Degree day indices
For model specifications 3 and 4, we calculate two different indices reflecting the
daily energy demand for the heating of buildings at certain locations. A degree
day index is calculated on days where the average outside temperature lies below
a certain threshold, determined by the base temperature below which buildings
need to be heated. Different base temperatures may be used, depending on the
specific heating requirements at a certain location or building.
For model specification 3, we follow Fell (2010) in calculating the daily heating-
degree-day index (HDDt):
HDDt,l =
{
Baseout − Tempt,l if Tempt,l < 15◦C,
0, else.
(B.5)
In (B.5) HDDt reflects the difference between the average outside temperature
on day t at location l and the base outside temperature (Baseout), which is set to
15◦C. Therefore, if the outside temperature on day t is greater or equal to 15◦C,
no heating is needed and the index is equal to zero. If the outside temperature
is below 15◦C, the HDDt-index is calculated. Therefore, the lower the outside
temperature, the lower is the value of the HDDt-index.
1
For model specification 4 we calculate a German degree-day index (”Grad-
tagzahl” (GTZ), in German). The GTZt index is calculated in a similar fashion
as the HDDt index except that the base inside temperature is taken instead of
the heating threshold temperature, i.e.
GTZt,l =
{
Baseins − Tempt,l, if Tempt,l < 15◦C,
5, else.
(B.6)
Following the approach of the German weather service (Deutscher Wetterdienst),
we set the inside temperature Baseins to 20
◦C. All daily average temperatures
greater than 15◦C are normalized to 15◦C. Therefore, the value of the GTZt
index when no heating is needed is 5. A higher value of the index thus indicates
a higher heating energy demand.
1In a similar fashion one could calculate a cooling degree day index measuring the demand
for energy to cool buildings when outside temperature exceeds a certain base temperature.
188
B.2 Unit root tests
We calculate the HDDt index as a European temperature index, whereas
the GTZt index only takes into account German temperature. The reason for
calculating both indices is that some of the commodities under study are traded
Europe- or even worldwide (i.e. emission allowances and coal) while the others
are traded mainly in Germany (i.e. power and natural gas). In the latter case, a
German temperature index may have a higher predictive power than a European
index.
To account for seasonal effects, we further construct seasonal dummy variables
in order to separate the impact of the temperature indices during summer months
DSt (April to October) and winter months DWt (November to March). We also
construct dummy variables for each month of the year DMONt for MON =
JAN,FEB, ..., DEC. Table B.1 summarizes the weather indices used in the
alternative model specifications 2-4.
Table B.1: Weather indices used in the alternative model specifications
Index Description
TE5t, TE95t Temperature values within the 5th (95th) percentile
PR5t, PR95t Precipitation values within the 5th (95th) percentile
HDDt Heating degree days
GTZt Degree day number (Gradtagzahl)
DMONt Dummy for each month of the year (JAN −DEC)
B.2 Unit root tests
It is important to test for stationarity of the time series, because if the time
series are integrated of an order higher than zero (i.e. they are non-stationary),
the regression analysis may provide spurious correlations. A data generating
process is stationary if it has time-invariant first and second moments, i.e. it is
integrated of order zero, I(0) for short. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
considers the null hypothesis that the data generating process has a unit root, i.e.
it is I(1), against the alternative of stationarity. Conversely, the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test considers the null hypothesis that the data
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generating process is I(0) against the alternative of a unit root. The value of
the test statistics for both tests are reported in table B.2, where bl, pl indicates
baseload and peakload prices, respectively, and the corresponding critical values
are displayed at the bottom of the table. From the results of the ADF test we
clearly cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all the price series at
any confidence level. Moreover, according to the KPSS test we can clearly reject
the null hypothesis that the price series are I(0) at a 1% confidence level.
Table B.2: Unit root tests
ADF test KPSS test
pe(bl),t -0.5172 10.6457
pe(pl),t 0.0089 10.7073
pa,t -0.7860 18.9861
pg,t 0.9873 11.9530
pc,t -1.0018 7.1205
Selection of lags for ADF test according to Schwarz criterion. Number of lags equal
to one for KPSS test. Critical values: ADF test (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993):
-3.43 (1%), -2.86 (5%), -2.57 (10%); KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992):
0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%), 0.347 (10%).
B.3 Results of the alternative model specifica-
tions
To test the robustness of the empirical results of the VECM with orthogonal
GARCH errors, we estimate the model with different specifications of the matrix
of exogenous variables. In particular, we include different types of weather indices,
all of which have been used in previous studies on CO2 and energy prices.
In specification 2, the weather indices TE5t, TE95t, PR5t, PR95t include
observations lying in the 5th and 95th percentile of both temperature and pre-
cipitation series, representing extremely high and low daily mean temperatures
and precipitation levels, respectively. Specification 3 includes a European heating-
degree-day index (HDDt) and the extreme precipitation indices PR5t and PR95t.
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Finally, specification 4 includes only German weather indices, namely a German
degree-day-index (GTZt) and German extreme-precipitation indices (PR5Gt,
PR95Gt). In order to account for seasonal effects in the temperature series,
we multiply both HDDt and GTZt indices with twelve dummy variables repre-
senting each month of the calendar year. Therefore, HDDi,t−1 for i = 1, ..., 12
denotes the monthly HDDt index obtained by multiplying the daily HDDt in-
dex with the monthly dummy vectors, i.e. HDDi,t−1 = HDDt−1 × DMONt−1
for MON = JAN,FEB, ..., DEC. Analogously, GTZi,t−1 for i = 1, ..., 12 de-
notes the monthly GTZt index obtained by multiplying the daily GTZt index
with the monthly dummy vectors, i.e. GTZi,t−1 = GTZt−1 × DMONt−1 for
MON = JAN,FEB, ..., DEC. The results of the alternative model specifica-
tions are presented in Tables B.3, B.4, and B.5. Overall, the estimated coeffi-
cients for the endogenous variables, the contemporaneous coefficients, and the
variance coefficients do not exhibit major changes in their value or significance
level throughout the different specifications, indicating that the empirical results
are robust.
Concerning the significance of the alternative weather indicators, the results
of baseload specification 2 (Table B.3) show that the extreme-temperature and
extreme-precipitation variables have a statistically significant impact at the 5%
or 10% level on at least one of the four returns of power, emission allowances,
natural gas, and coal futures in the baseload specification. Similar results are
obtained in peakload specification 2.
The HDDt index used in baseload specification 3 (Table B.4) is significant at
least at the 10% level for electricity returns (in February, May, and December),
for EUA returns (in January and May), for natural gas returns (in April and
September), and for coal returns (in May). The results of peakload specification
3 are again very similar.
Finally, in baseload specification 4 (Table B.5) the German GTZt index has
a high explanatory power for natural gas and coal returns (in April, May, and
June), and is statistically significant at the 10% level for electricity returns (in
May and December), for natural gas returns (in March and September), and
for coal returns (in October). In addition, the German extreme-precipitation
variables used in specification 4 only have a statistically significant impact at the
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5% or 10% level on natural gas returns. Finally, the German weather indices have
very little explanatory power for EUA returns, reflecting the fact that allowance
prices depend on EU-wide emissions and therefore they are not influenced by
weather conditions in a single country. Again, similar results are obtained in
peakload specification 4.
Independent Baseload specification 2 Peakload specification 2
variables re,t ra,t rg,t rc,t re,t ra,t rg,t rc,t
Cons. υ 34.1845 50.1108 19.8459 18.1231 16.9391 29.7995 9.1542 7.0040
[4.42] [3.51] [1.90] [1.45] [4.26] [3.43] [1.35] [0.95]
zt−1 -0.1172 -0.1718 -0.0677 -0.0620 -0.0632 -0.1112 -0.0337 -0.0260
[-4.41] [-3.50] [-1.89] [-1.45] [-4.24] [-3.42] [-1.33] [-0.94]
re,t−1 0.1088 -0.1221 0.2478 0.2274 0.1075 -0.1287 0.1932 0.2081
[1.50] [-0.65] [2.50] [2.35] [1.53] [-0.62] [2.00] [2.00]
Endo. ra,t−1 0.0296 0.1587 0.0044 -0.0292 0.0229 0.1637 0.0263 -0.0124
[0.92] [2.13] [0.11] [-0.63] [0.82] [2.22] [0.67] [-0.27]
rg,t−1 0.0133 0.0355 -0.1106 0.0849 0.0369 0.0161 -0.1030 0.0894
[0.36] [0.53] [-1.60] [1.40] [1.17] [0.24] [-1.51] [1.46]
rc,t−1 -0.0458 -0.1217 0.0086 -0.0828 -0.0528 -0.1257 0.0429 -0.0598
[-0.88] [-1.22] [0.16] [-1.21] [-1.29] [-1.37] [0.83] [-0.94]
OILt−1 -0.0149 -0.0937 0.0569 0.0377 0.0042 -0.0917 0.0553 0.0372
[-0.53] [-2.03] [1.36] [0.81] [0.18] [-2.00] [1.32] [0.80]
EARt−1 -0.0093 -0.0523 -0.0204 -0.0315 -0.0029 -0.0492 -0.0180 -0.0294
[-0.91] [-2.90] [-1.40] [-2.59] [-0.29] [-2.76] [-1.29] [-2.50]
TE5t−1 -0.0438 1.0318 0.3142 0.3207 -0.1311 0.8496 0.2593 0.2816
[-0.17] [1.72] [0.48] [0.35] [-1.02] [1.37] [0.40] [0.31]
Exo. TE95t−1 -0.0124 -0.0142 -0.0430 -0.0125 -0.0171 -0.0171 -0.0423 -0.0117
[-1.67] [-0.83] [-3.50] [-0.92] [-1.89] [-1.06] [-3.41] [-0.85]
PR5t−1 -0.0386 -0.0629 -0.0758 -0.0499 -0.0391 -0.0656 -0.0778 -0.0514
[-1.75] [-1.55] [-2.74] [-1.63] [-1.95] [-1.61] [-2.79] [-1.67]
PR95t−1 0.0023 0.0017 -0.0048 0.0073 0.0016 0.0016 -0.0049 0.0071
[0.97] [0.36] [-1.43] [2.04] [0.76] [0.35] [-1.49] [1.99]
ue,t 0.7535 0.6063 0.5207 0.7318 0.1317 0.0851 -0.1932 -1.0953
[4.51] [3.95] [4.37] [4.15] [1.44] [0.34] [-1.50] [-6.05]
ua,t 0.2057 2.2108 0.1930 0.1114 0.1814 2.2724 0.2439 0.1448
[3.68] [7.01] [2.01] [0.63] [3.22] [6.15] [2.36] [0.88]
Cont. ug,t 0.0515 0.1659 1.3747 0.0845 0.0282 0.1322 1.3838 0.0971
[1.44] [1.46] [22.63] [1.09] [0.87] [1.25] [22.24] [1.12]
uc,t -0.0079 -0.0618 0.2128 1.0423 0.6259 0.5285 0.5080 0.7538
[-0.11] [-0.27] [2.16] [5.33] [4.07] [3.61] [4.01] [3.87]
ωe,t ωa,t ωg,t ωc,t ωe,t ωa,t ωg,t ωc,t
ω•,t−1 0.8856 0.8449 0.3402 0.9443 0.9288 0.8614 0.3123 0.8953
[8.93] [5.61] [0.39] [4.95] [6.67] [5.34] [0.44] [7.36]
Vol. u2•,t−1 0.1060 0.1189 0.1454 0.0484 0.0572 0.1114 0.1581 0.0960
[4.77] [2.06] [2.39] [1.99] [2.47] [2.14] [2.26] [4.00]
Table B.3: VECM with orthogonal GARCH errors, specification 2:
mean/variance equations and contemporaneous coefficients. See table 2.6 for
further details.
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Independent Baseload specification 3 Peakload specification 3
variables re,t ra,t rg,t rc,t re,t ra,t rg,t rc,t
Cons. υ 39.0828 48.0959 18.9393 22.3008 17.6075 25.2618 7.1903 8.4430
[5.10] [3.26] [1.74] [1.74] [4.35] [2.88] [1.03] [1.14]
zt−1 -0.1341 -0.1651 -0.0651 -0.0766 -0.0658 -0.0946 -0.0270 -0.0316
[-5.09] [-3.26] [-1.74] [-1.74] [-4.35] [-2.88] [-1.04] [-1.15]
re,t−1 0.0923 -0.1590 0.2406 0.2382 0.0641 -0.1858 0.1802 0.2067
[1.27] [-0.85] [2.42] [2.36] [0.91] [-0.93] [1.85] [1.90]
Endo. ra,t−1 0.0240 0.1470 0.0058 -0.0293 0.0233 0.1569 0.0291 -0.0090
[0.79] [1.99] [0.15] [-0.62] [0.89] [2.17] [0.76] [-0.19]
rg,t−1 0.0060 0.0211 -0.1203 0.0726 0.0344 0.0076 -0.1103 0.0785
[0.16] [0.33] [-1.72] [1.19] [1.10] [0.11] [-1.60] [1.27]
rc,t−1 -0.0416 -0.1020 0.0035 -0.0960 -0.0417 -0.1039 0.0391 -0.0680
[-0.80] [-1.02] [0.06] [-1.38] [-1.01] [-1.15] [0.74] [-1.02]
OILt−1 -0.0220 -0.1071 0.0504 0.0332 -0.0002 -0.1013 0.0500 0.0335
[-0.82] [-2.37] [1.24] [0.73] [-0.01] [-2.25] [1.22] [0.73]
EARt−1 -0.0104 -0.0565 -0.0218 -0.0321 -0.0049 -0.0545 -0.0197 -0.0299
[-1.07] [-3.02] [-1.56] [-2.57] [-0.49] [-2.93] [-1.46] [-2.44]
HDD1,t−1 -0.0173 -0.1021 0.0137 0.0212 -0.0133 -0.0906 0.0146 0.0231
[-0.78] [-2.54] [0.44] [0.55] [-0.78] [-2.23] [0.47] [0.60]
HDD2,t−1 -0.0590 -0.0184 0.0031 -0.0101 -0.0574 -0.0093 0.0100 -0.0002
[-2.15] [-0.22] [0.09] [-0.24] [-2.30] [-0.11] [0.29] [-0.00]
HDD3,t−1 0.0239 0.0930 0.0362 -0.0035 0.0419 0.1090 0.0419 0.0027
[0.64] [1.38] [0.85] [-0.06] [1.39] [1.59] [1.01] [0.05]
HDD4,t−1 0.0649 0.1254 0.1803 0.0638 0.0495 0.1218 0.1876 0.0724
[1.14] [1.38] [2.39] [1.12] [1.01] [1.33] [2.42] [1.21]
HDD5,t−1 0.5647 0.8653 0.6131 0.4100 0.4661 0.8427 0.5790 0.3707
[3.73] [2.46] [1.58] [2.04] [3.05] [2.45] [1.45] [1.77]
HDD6,t−1 0.0418 0.1420 0.3257 0.3044 0.0513 0.2143 0.3731 0.3616
[0.14] [0.29] [1.09] [0.61] [0.25] [0.45] [1.31] [0.74]
Exo. HDD7,t−1 -0.3241 0.1072 -0.4436 -0.1869 0.0165 0.3419 -0.5119 -0.2152
[-0.97] [0.07] [-0.54] [-0.25] [0.06] [0.22] [-0.63] [-0.28]
HDD8,t−1 0.2475 0.0364 0.6284 0.4943 0.3765 0.2559 0.6657 0.5574
[0.46] [0.02] [0.49] [0.90] [0.67] [0.11] [0.50] [0.96]
HDD9,t−1 0.1244 0.2315 0.2448 0.1052 0.1092 0.2732 0.2556 0.1185
[1.02] [1.22] [1.85] [0.43] [1.14] [1.43] [1.89] [0.48]
HDD10,t−1 0.0293 0.0172 0.0392 0.0449 0.0210 0.0126 0.0348 0.0408
[0.82] [0.23] [0.54] [0.86] [0.66] [0.17] [0.48] [0.79]
HDD11,t−1 -0.0268 -0.0295 -0.0402 -0.0602 -0.0319 -0.0356 -0.0381 -0.0580
[-0.66] [-0.57] [-1.32] [-1.49] [-0.93] [-0.67] [-1.23] [-1.38]
HDD12,t−1 0.0446 0.0406 0.0273 0.0385 0.0311 0.0227 0.0158 0.0254
[1.91] [1.01] [0.76] [0.95] [1.67] [0.61] [0.45] [0.65]
PR5t−1 -0.0400 -0.0678 -0.0701 -0.0494 -0.0402 -0.0689 -0.0711 -0.0503
[-1.88] [-1.69] [-2.53] [-1.61] [-2.05] [-1.70] [-2.54] [-1.61]
PR95t−1 0.0021 0.0017 -0.0047 0.0072 0.0014 0.0016 -0.0049 0.0070
[0.88] [0.37] [-1.40] [2.08] [0.69] [0.35] [-1.46] [2.02]
ue,t 0.8239 0.5942 0.5750 0.9613 0.3390 0.4667 0.0573 -0.7798
[5.02] [4.01] [4.72] [4.62] [3.42] [1.96] [0.42] [-4.53]
ua,t 0.2402 2.2512 0.2520 0.2452 0.1389 2.2293 0.2802 0.2902
[3.54] [6.28] [2.44] [1.39] [1.93] [5.62] [2.70] [2.09]
Cont. ug,t 0.0811 0.1663 1.3945 0.1345 0.0288 0.0816 1.3907 0.1561
[2.08] [1.50] [22.94] [1.69] [0.74] [0.72] [22.38] [2.00]
uc,t -0.1499 -0.2631 0.0953 0.9101 0.6208 0.5194 0.5491 1.0013
[-1.97] [-1.07] [0.89] [5.63] [4.66] [3.72] [4.45] [4.26]
ωe,t ωa,t ωg,t ωc,t ωe,t ωa,t ωg,t ωc,t
ω•,t−1 0.8815 0.8584 0.2567 0.9462 0.9345 0.8804 0.1933 0.8975
[9.20] [5.41] [0.74] [5.74] [7.15] [5.52] [0.93] [7.84]
Vol. u2•,t−1 0.1082 0.1120 0.1605 0.0456 0.0529 0.0989 0.1871 0.0928
[4.71] [2.06] [2.61] [2.11] [2.44] [2.27] [2.61] [4.03]
Table B.4: VECM with orthogonal GARCH errors, specification 3:
mean/variance equations and contemporaneous coefficients. See table 2.6 for
further details.
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Independent Baseload specification 4 Peakload specification 4
variables re,t ra,t rg,t rc,t re,t ra,t rg,t rc,t
Cons. υ 36.5408 45.8462 15.6035 15.2395 15.5132 22.9033 4.3895 2.9369
[4.64] [2.97] [1.43] [1.19] [3.85] [2.52] [0.64] [0.40]
zt−1 -0.1263 -0.1591 -0.0565 -0.0545 -0.0591 -0.0879 -0.0196 -0.0135
[-4.67] [-3.02] [-1.51] [-1.23] [-3.92] [-2.60] [-0.76] [-0.49]
re,t−1 0.0955 -0.1567 0.2594 0.2393 0.0593 -0.1864 0.1797 0.1988
[1.31] [-0.83] [2.61] [2.40] [0.84] [-0.93] [1.86] [1.83]
Endo. ra,t−1 0.0232 0.1436 0.0062 -0.0265 0.0249 0.1554 0.0321 -0.0058
[0.75] [1.95] [0.15] [-0.56] [0.93] [2.14] [0.82] [-0.12]
rg,t−1 0.0109 0.0335 -0.1194 0.0717 0.0407 0.0214 -0.1049 0.0821
[0.29] [0.51] [-1.74] [1.17] [1.31] [0.33] [-1.54] [1.33]
rc,t−1 -0.0425 -0.1038 -0.0107 -0.0958 -0.0422 -0.1060 0.0306 -0.0668
[-0.80] [-1.03] [-0.19] [-1.36] [-1.01] [-1.17] [0.59] [-1.02]
OILt−1 -0.0274 -0.1177 0.0437 0.0251 -0.0054 -0.1116 0.0431 0.0255
[-1.02] [-2.62] [1.09] [0.56] [-0.23] [-2.49] [1.07] [0.57]
EARt−1 -0.0107 -0.0564 -0.0222 -0.0315 -0.0058 -0.0549 -0.0202 -0.0296
[-1.10] [-2.87] [-1.69] [-2.61] [-0.58] [-2.85] [-1.58] [-2.49]
GTZ1,t−1 0.0018 -0.0353 0.0383 0.0421 0.0032 -0.0259 0.0382 0.0425
[0.11] [-1.16] [1.57] [1.43] [0.23] [-0.86] [1.58] [1.43]
GTZ2,t−1 -0.0181 0.0055 0.0331 0.0284 -0.0180 0.0141 0.0366 0.0341
[-0.96] [0.10] [1.28] [0.95] [-1.05] [0.27] [1.39] [1.10]
GTZ3,t−1 0.0231 0.0591 0.0503 0.0336 0.0306 0.0712 0.0536 0.0377
[1.01] [1.41] [1.71] [0.96] [1.60] [1.69] [1.85] [1.09]
GTZ4,t−1 0.0404 0.0813 0.1036 0.0857 0.0344 0.0867 0.1070 0.0911
[1.51] [1.62] [2.60] [2.14] [1.49] [1.73] [2.62] [2.20]
GTZ5,t−1 0.0846 0.1182 0.1949 0.1542 0.0773 0.1226 0.1901 0.1524
[1.85] [1.26] [2.77] [2.31] [1.86] [1.31] [2.64] [2.22]
GTZ6,t−1 0.0570 0.0647 0.1397 0.1685 0.0615 0.0926 0.1500 0.1821
[1.12] [0.65] [2.03] [2.08] [1.40] [0.94] [2.16] [2.22]
Exo. GTZ7,t−1 0.0111 0.0065 0.0953 0.0898 0.0086 0.0232 0.0949 0.0924
[0.21] [0.06] [1.30] [1.03] [0.19] [0.22] [1.27] [1.03]
GTZ8,t−1 0.0522 0.1223 0.0768 0.1036 0.0435 0.1331 0.0808 0.1099
[1.07] [1.27] [1.06] [1.33] [1.00] [1.39] [1.09] [1.37]
GTZ9,t−1 0.0268 0.0503 0.1005 0.0682 0.0301 0.0703 0.1023 0.0712
[0.68] [0.71] [1.95] [0.98] [0.89] [0.99] [1.95] [1.00]
GTZ10,t−1 0.0261 0.0333 0.0519 0.0590 0.0211 0.0371 0.0505 0.0585
[1.14] [0.72] [1.41] [1.71] [1.05] [0.80] [1.36] [1.69]
GTZ11,t−1 -0.0037 0.0051 0.0140 0.0089 -0.0079 0.0073 0.0157 0.0118
[-0.16] [0.14] [0.56] [0.30] [-0.40] [0.19] [0.61] [0.38]
GTZ12,t−1 0.0330 0.0364 0.0418 0.0461 0.0258 0.0305 0.0360 0.0405
[1.79] [1.11] [1.45] [1.41] [1.71] [0.95] [1.25] [1.25]
PR5Gt−1 0.3058 0.5803 0.5750 0.2293 0.3919 0.6245 0.5610 0.2160
[1.42] [1.54] [1.81] [0.77] [1.97] [1.63] [1.77] [0.72]
PR95Gt−1 0.0149 0.0218 0.0414 0.0335 0.0182 0.0249 0.0383 0.0304
[0.99] [0.69] [2.06] [1.55] [1.48] [0.80] [1.92] [1.42]
ue,t 0.8171 0.6459 0.5811 0.9035 0.3157 0.4150 0.0852 -0.7982
[4.87] [4.05] [4.66] [4.60] [4.23] [2.11] [0.73] [-5.63]
ua,t 0.2126 2.2145 0.2230 0.1736 0.1479 2.2320 0.2570 0.2760
[3.75] [6.76] [2.26] [1.10] [2.36] [5.79] [2.53] [2.17]
Cont. ug,t 0.0516 0.1447 1.3805 0.1240 0.0075 0.0969 1.3868 0.1665
[1.42] [1.25] [23.98] [1.52] [0.20] [0.86] [23.52] [2.15]
uc,t -0.0935 -0.1625 0.0947 0.9388 0.5971 0.5076 0.5334 0.9495
[-1.60] [-0.81] [0.99] [5.16] [4.29] [3.59] [4.16] [4.17]
ωe,t ωa,t ωg,t ωc,t ωe,t ωa,t ωg,t ωc,t
ω•,t−1 0.8734 0.8491 0.1578 0.9499 0.9352 0.8754 0.1049 0.8976
[9.92] [5.75] [0.94] [5.05] [7.17] [5.44] [0.99] [7.60]
Vol. u2•,t−1 0.1169 0.1175 0.1529 0.0426 0.0524 0.1025 0.1791 0.0942
[5.08] [2.15] [3.07] [1.89] [2.48] [2.26] [2.99] [4.04]
Table B.5: VECM with orthogonal GARCH errors, specification 4:
mean/variance equations and contemporaneous coefficients. See table 2.6 for
further details.
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